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Preface
[the country] had probably long ago acquired that full complement of riches
which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions. But this
complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions,
the nature of its soil, climate and situation might admit of.
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations2
Why are We so Rich and They so Poor?3What explains modern economic growth
and the marked di¤erences in income per capita levels around the world? For example,
why is Luxembourg with a purchasing power parity adjusted income per capita of
46,000 US Dollars nearly a 100 times richer than Tanzania with its 500 US Dollars?4
Why did Germany and Japan catch up with world leaders in income levels after the
second World War? Why did the growth process accelerate in some nations like China
and India while others, like most in Sub-Saharan Africa, stagnate? How did South
Korea and Taiwan achieve doubling their income in a decade or less? As Robert Lucas
(1988) famously put it:
The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are
simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them it is hard to think
of anything else.
This dissertation analyzes the importance of institutions for economic performance,
trying to make a modest contribution to explain why some countries remain poor, while
others prosper. It was written at the Munich Graduate School of Economics from 2002
to 2005 and consists of three chapters that can be read independently. The rst two
chapters assess the importance of institutions empirically, while the last one provides
2Adam Smith (1937, p. 95), emphasis added.
3Landes (1990)
4These income data are from the Penn World Tables 6.1. Units are PPP in terms of trade adjusted
1996 US Dollars.
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a dynamic model of institutional change. Given the paramount role of institutions
for economic development established in the rst chapters and, more importantly, in
prominent recent contributions to the literature, this last chapter tries to answers the
question why countries trying to improve their institutional framework may fail.
While an entire school of thought, the New Institutional Economics(NIE), con-
cerns itself with them, institutions, until recently, did not receive particular attention
in main-stream, neoclassical economics.5 According to Nobel Laureate Douglass North
(1990) a widely accepted broad denition of institutions is that they are humanly de-
vised constraints that structure human interaction. However, the institutional frame-
work under which agents operate was implicitly taken as given in theoretical models
and the concept of institutions hard to grasp empirically.
Starting with an important contribution by Mauro (1995) on the e¤ects of cor-
ruption on economic growth, institutions have received considerable more attention in
empirical studies in recent years and their causal e¤ect on economic performance has
been well established. Proting from greater data availability for institutional vari-
ables, Hall and Jones (1999) show that accumulation in human and physical capital
cannot adequately explain di¤erences in income per worker across countries. Instead,
they stipulate that the quality of institutions inuences both factor accumulation and
the e¢ ciency of production and thus explains long run economic performance. They
use a broad index of social infrastructure to proxy for institutions that includes the
rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, government repu-
diation of contracts and openness to trade. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,
2002, 2005) focus on the security of private property and the risk of being expropriated
by the state and conclude that institutions are the fundamental cause of long run
economic growth.
The importance of these particular institutions, that are usually categorized as
economic institutions, had been acknowledged by classical economists. Adam Smith
(1937) for example species the institutions from the introductory quote:6
Commerce and manufactures [..] ourish [..with] a regular administration
of justice, possession of their property, [..] faith of contracts [...].
5The NIE cannot be done justice by surveying it in this short preface. For important contributions
see North and Thomas (1973), North (1990), North (1994) or Williamson (2000).
6Very recently, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have attempted to further unbundlethese economic
institutions into contracting and property rights institutions.
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Only a few formal theoretical models exist that endogenize property rights institu-
tions. Grossman and Kim (1996) and Tornell (1997) determine the security of property
as a result of individual defense spending. Zak (2002) allows for a role of the state in
levying taxes to protect property. Eicher and Penalosa (2004) endogenize the strength
of intellectual property rights in an endogenous growth model.
A somewhat distinct set of institutions is analyzed by Persson (2004, 2005) and
Persson and Tabellini (2003). They show what e¤ects constitutional or political in-
stitutions have on economic outcomes. In particular their focus is on how the form
of democracies (presidential or majoritarian systems) inuence economic policies and
national income. Theoretical models in this area concentrate on the transition to the
institutionof democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001) or what type of con-
stitution (voting rules required to block legislation) results from agentsbargaining in
the process of writing it (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2004).
The connection between these two types of institutions is made by Williamson
(2000), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and
Roland (2004), who all posit a hierarchy of institutions. The basic argument is that
the constitutional institutions / political rules set the stage for the economic institu-
tions, since they set the incentive for legislators and policymakers that shape economic
institutions and regulations.7
The recent thorough analysis of institutions in the academic literature is met by
increased attention towards them in more policy related elds. For example the World
Bank dedicated its 2002 World Development Report (World Bank, 2002) to Building
Institutions for Markets, followed a year later by the International Monetary Funds
(IMF, 2003) focus on Growth and Institutionsin its World Economic Outlook.
In this dissertation, the primary focus of the rst two chapters is on the empirical
relevance of economic institutions. Chapter 1 shows that they are robust determinants
of economic growth in a global sample of countries over a 35-year period, even if
one controls for a large number of other variables that have been suggested in the
literature. Chapter 2 provides evidence that these economic institutions are important
determinants of income per capita even in the more developed OECD countries which
one might not have expected. To do so, the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis is
utilized to show that political institutions can serve as valid instruments for economic
ones. The use of instrumental variables is necessary to establish unbiased, causal
7Empirical validation for such a hierarchy is given by Persson (2004, 2005) and Eicher and
Schreiber (2005) and is analyzed in detail in chapter 2.
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e¤ects in income level regressions because the quality of economic institutions might
be endogenous to income.8
In chapter 3, a further di¤erentiation of institutions - aside from the dichotomy of
economic and political ones mentioned above - is considered to explain the failure of
large scale institutional reform or institutions transplantation.9 Most notably, North
(1990) argues that institutions may be of formal (constitutions, laws and regulations)
or informal nature (norms, codes of conduct, established ways of doing business and
informal conict resolution procedures). Institutional reforms will fail if only the for-
mal institutional framework is changed, while people do not decide to Develop norms
of behavior that will support and legitimize new [formal] rules. The last chapter of
this dissertation analyzes in detail why agents might rationally choose not to adapt
their informal institutions after a change in the formal ones. Since norms and the like
are an inherently social phenomenon it is shown how su¢ ciently strong interpersonal
interdependencies in their creation lead to critical threshold levels of informal institu-
tional quality. Since this informal quality is context specic to the prevailing formal
institutional framework, disruptions of the institutional equilibrium that are too large
will result in a situation in which agents do not adjust to changes in the formal in-
stitutions and thus can lead to dismal outcomes of large scale reforms. The next few
paragraphs briey summarize the methodology and preview the results of the three
chapters in more detail.
Chapter 1 pays particular attention to the role of model uncertainty in cross coun-
try growth regressions and uses the Bayesian model averaging (BMA) methodology
to account for it. The concept of model uncertainty explicitly acknowledges that in
economic theory competing models exist to explain the same phenomenon and that it
is not clear that only one model is the correct one.10 In the context of growth models
and growth econometrics, Durlauf (2001) and coauthors argue that modern growth
theories are fundamentally open-ended : one growth theory typically has no bearing
on the empirical relevance of another. The researcher is not sure which theory is the
correct one and hence what exact model should be specied to be tested empirically
8Richer Countries might be able to a¤ord better institutions because enforcing property rights
and to establish a well functioning judicial system is costly.
9Taking the institutional framework of successful western economies and transplantit to poorer
nations.
10The pioneering work of Hansen and Sargent (2001a,b, 2005) on robust control models this un-
certainty in the context of monetary policy. An empirical test of their theories using simple model
averaging has recently been proposed by Levin and Williams (2003).
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and which covariates should be included in it.11
The number of potential regressors to be included in growth regressions is large
and one cannot simply run a regression with all theories let alone all variables used
to proxy for these theories in the literature.12 This has typically lead researchers
to engage in empirical variable selection strategies and report results only for one
preferred model and a limited amount of other specications to establish robust results.
This subset of results can of course be criticized for potentially not being selected
randomly. Furthermore, in the reported results uncertainty is understated: When a
model selection method such as general to specic or a stepwise procedure is used, the
single model obtained is assumed to be the correct model. All future inferences and
predictions that are made with the model do not account for the uncertainty involved in
the selection process. Alternatively, the Bayesian model averaging methodology does
incorporate the variance component associated with the uncertainty of model building.
The basic idea of BMA - dating back to Leamer (1978) - is that, instead of using
just one model and discarding all information from other, potentially good models, to
average estimates of quantities of interest over all models with a reasonable datat,
using weights proportional to this t. This methodology has been applied in the context
of cross-country growth studies by Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley and Steel
(2001a), and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004).13 In chapter 1, a number of
measures of institutional quality and a variable that proxies for the degree of nancial
development, that had not been considered in these studies, are included in a BMA
analysis. The importance of institutions has been discussed above and is the main
topic of this dissertation. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), Levine (2005) and Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) provide substantial evidence for an important role
of nance for economic development. Categorizing over 30 variables according to the
seven most important growth theories chapter 1 sets out to discover whether nance
or institutions or something else are decisive factors shaping the growth performances
of di¤erent countries. The results conrm an important role for institutions, while
nancial intermediation does not seem to play a role, once institutional characteristics
and, perhaps surprisingly, the public health environment are controlled for. Institutions
and health are also shown to signicantly inuence the rate of convergence in income
11Cf. Brock and Durlauf (2001), Durlauf (2001), Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) and Durlauf,
Johnson and Temple (2005).
12In the most recent survey on the topic the count of variables used in di¤erent growth regressions
is up to over 140 (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005).
13Other economic application include Finance (Avramov, 2002), Returns to Schooling (Tobias and
Li, 2004) and Forecasting of ination and exchange rates (Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin, 2003,
Wright, 2003a,b and Jacobson and Karlsson, 2005).
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levels for countries.
In chapter 2, another important problem of cross sectional regressions is addressed:
Parameter heterogeneity. As Brock and Durlauf (2001) assess, it seems questionable
that certain institutional indices can reasonably be expected to exhibit parameter ho-
mogeneity across complex heterogeneous objects such as countries. Specically, the
question asked in this chapter is, whether the economic institutions that have plaid
a paramount role in the global sample of Hall and Jones (1999) or in the sample of
developing countries of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) can also con-
tribute to explaining di¤erences in income per capita levels across the more advanced
OECD countries. It might be expected that these institutions vary substantially less
across this group of countries and that other factors or more specic institutions (like
labor and nancial market regulations) are more important here. Surprisingly, it is
found that, while the coe¢ cients on institutions is about half as big for the OECD
sample compared to the global one, it is nevertheless highly signicant and econom-
ically important, explaining up the 60 percent of the up to eight fold di¤erences in
income per worker for advanced nations. Since the quality of institutions might be
endogenous to income levels, as establishing and maintaining this quality is costly,
one needs to instrument the economic institutions in income level regressions. The
instruments that are well established in the literature pertain to the degree of Western
European historical inuence.14 These instruments are inadequate for OECD coun-
tries, since they were for the most part the source of that inuence. In a rst step, it is
shown in chapter 2 that these instruments indeed do not perform well once the global
sample is splitted into OECD and Non-OECD members. Surprisingly the instruments
of Hall and Jones (1999) fail even in the Non-OECD sample. Next, the hierarchy of
institutions hypothesis is employed in search of instruments that are valid across all
subsamples. While economic institutions determine economic performance, they are
themselves inuenced by political institutions. Persson (2004, 2005) and Eicher and
Schreiber (2005) report empirical evidence for the hierarchy of institutions, by employ-
ing specic political/constitutional variables as instruments for economic institutions.
The same method is followed in chapter 2. The instruments perform well because they
are slow moving and because they have a negligible direct impact on output. As a prac-
14Hall and Jones (1999) use English, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish languages and
Latitude as their main instruments and refer to Western Europes discovery of the ideas of Adam
Smith, the importance of property rights, and the system of checks and balances in government.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005) use the mortality rates that European settlers
faced, arguing that the settlers established good institutions only in those areas where they actually
settled - and survived - in large numbers.
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tical matter, this is established in the regressions results of that chapter. Glaeser et al.
(2004) also argue forcefully against a direct link between output and political institu-
tions. The strategy employed to establish the validity of these new instruments is to
rst show that they perform at least as well as the established ones in the global sample
and to then verify, that they pass all relevant statistical tests in the subsamples. Af-
ter substantial robustness analysis which examines di¤erent estimation methods, time
periods, datasets and samples, chapter 2 concludes that a common set of economically
important institutions does indeed exist among advanced and developing nations. The
impact of these institutions does vary substantially across samples; it is about three
times higher in developing countries than in the OECD.
Given the importance of institutions for economic development and welfare estab-
lished in the rst chapters, chapter 3 analyzes why large scale institutional change
might fail. After all, what seems to be implied by the empirical results is that poor
nations only need to improve their institutional framework in order to prosper. Why
then, do large regions of the world remain submerged in utter poverty?
One explanation is, that due to conicting and vested interests no attempts to im-
prove matters are made because the entrenched elites stand to loose from these changes.
Even in a democracy, ex-ante uncertainty about who might gain and who might loose
under a new institutional framework could lead to the rejection of institutional reform,
even though a majority would have benetted ex-post (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).
However, if political economy arguments were the only reason, one could not ex-
plain another fact about institutions and economic performance that is observed in
reality: even countries that did indeed set out on the path of institutional reform do
not uniformly perform well. Some succeeded and others failed, even though most of
them were trying to implement institutional reforms that were generally seen to be
e¢ ciency enhancing. In fact, in many cases of transition economies the reforms had
been prescribed by western advisors.15
Chapter 3 analyzes the dynamics of large scale institutional change to answer that
question. It incorporates the New Institutional Economicsdistinction between formal
and informal institutions in a formal theoretical model and analyzes their interaction
in a dynamic framework. The failure of institutions transplantation is often ascribed
to the fact that the imposed formal framework does not t well to the informal one.
What has not been analyzed so far, is why agents would not adjust these informal
15For a detailed discussion on the experience of China relative to Latin America or Russia compared
to other more succesfull transition economies see for example Rodrik (2005).
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institutions, as that should clearly be in their economic interest. This chapter com-
bines two well established notions from distinct strands of literature to answer that
question: i) institutions are context specic and ii) informal institutions are a social
phenomenon with externalities and network e¤ects in their creation. By changing the
formal institutions the government inuences the quality of the informal ones: they
are initially less valuable in the new context. People would need to adjust them. As
informal institutions are viewed to exist in a social context it is shown how su¢ ciently
strong interpersonal interdependencies in the creation of norms lead to critical thresh-
old values for the informal institutional quality. If a reform lowers this value by a
too large extent, it leads to a non-adjustment trap and thus explains why large scale
institutional change my fail, even in the long run.
The model economy is populated by a large number of innitely lived, representative
agents. Their productivity is linked to the overall institutional quality, much as it seems
to be suggested by the empirical studies cited above. This overall quality is in turn
made up of the interplay of formal and informal institutions.16 While agents decide
to accumulate informal institutional capital, the government decides on the formal
institutions. To model the question at hand, it is assumed, that it has a one time
chance to alter the formal framework. The government is assumed to be what might
be considered a benevolent dictatorwho knows what the best formal institutions are
and changes them for the better (i.e. it is assumed that they can be ordinally ranked).
This change does not come without a cost, however, as informal institutions are
context specic. They had been adapted to the old formal institutional setting. Agents
have to decide whether to expend precious e¤ort to Developing norms of behavior that
will support and legitimize new [formal] rules.17 Since norms are an inherently social
phenomenon, how high the individual e¤ort is rewarded in terms of improved informal
and thus overall institutional quality depends on how much e¤ort the other agents are
exerting.
Thus an externality similar to the one analyzed by Azariadis and Drazen (1990)
in the context of human capital accumulation may lead to critical threshold levels of
informal institutional quality. The interesting feature of the model is that the govern-
ment actually inuences the starting value of that quality in the agentsoptimization
16Indeed the importance of something akin to the concept of informal institutions had been dis-
cussed by J.S. Mill who wrote: much of the security of person and property in modern nations is the
e¤ect of manners and opinion [..and of] the fear of exposure rather [than] the direct operation of the
law and the courts of justice.
17North (1990).
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problem.18 If this value is lowered by too much (and large scale formal institutional
reforms naturally lead to greater depreciationof the informal ones), the economy may
become trapped in a situation in which agents rationally choose not to adapt. Due to
the externality, the pay o¤ to engaging in trying to improve the informal institutions is
very low and is thus not worthwhile the agents e¤ort. Since this outcome is more likely
the larger the reform is, the model o¤ers an explanation why institutions transplanta-
tion or very large scaled reforms may fail, even in the long run. One might think of a
country like Liberia, that for a number of years, de jure shared the formal institutions
and constitution with the United States but de facto was submerged in what could be
described as informal institutional anarchy.
18Nothing actually happens to the informal institutions themselves. They are just initially less
valuable in the new formal context, and agents need to learn about the new rules and nd out what
works best under the new conditions.
Chapter 1
Finance, Institutions and Growth -
Accounting for Model Uncertainty
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There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, scene 5
1.1 Introduction
Two questions have been at the forefront of empirical growth research recently. What
are the deep and robust determinants of economic growth and how can the di¤ering
convergence experiences of di¤erent countries be explained?
This chapter aims to nd out whether two concepts suggested by distinct strands
of literatures, nancial intermediation and institutions, or rather some other variables
may help to answer these questions. The aim is to treat regressors categorized according
to the most important growth theories on an equal footing and to properly account for
the model uncertainty that is particularly severe in empirical growth regressions due
to the many potential regressors.
The last 15 years have witnessed a noticeable revival of growth theories and the
development of many di¤erent growth models initiated by the seminal work of Romer
(1986) and Lucas (1988). The abundance of models is met by an even greater cornu-
copia of variables that have been used in the empirical eld to proxy for some aspects
of these growth theories and to test their relevance.
A good overview of the current state of the literature is the Handbook of Economic
Growth (Aghion and Durlauf, forthcoming). The interested reader nds theories and
evidence linking education, health and human capital (chapter 13), trade openness,
liberalization and good macroeconomic policies (chapters 15, 23) and sociopolitical
stability and conicts (chapter 25) to economic performance. A further important
question in the literature on the deep determinants of economic growth is the Insti-
tutions versus Geography debate in which some authors argue for a direct e¤ect of
geography (Sachs, 2003) while others asses that Institutions Rule (Rodrik, Subra-
manian and Trebbi, 2004) and are the Fundamental Causes of Long Run Growth
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005).
Somewhat distinct from the deep determinants debate has been a strand of the
literature arguing for an important inuence of nancial intermediation on growth.1
It has perhaps not been considered as a deep determinant because nance is clearly
1For an excellent survey, see Levine (2005).
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endogenous to even short and medium run growth and thus causal and unbiased e¤ects
are hard to establish. In a recent paper, however, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) use
legal origins as instruments for nancial development and show that the exogenous
component of nance exerts a strong inuence on economic performance.
The basic question relating to convergence is why only some poor countries do catch
up to richer nations given that all should equally enjoy Gerschenkrons (1962) famous
advantage of backwardness. In particular the poorest less developed nations should
be able to benet the most from technological and capital transfer from more advanced
nations and positive international externalities.
Following the seminal paper by Nelson and Phelps (1966) the common answer to
this question is a version of Barriers to Technology Adoption(Parente and Prescott,
1994). The basic idea is that the rate at which the gap to the technological frontier
is closed depends on the capacity of a country to absorb the new technologies, usually
exemplied in the level of human capital. In a very recent contribution Aghion, Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) argue that rate of technological di¤usion is linked to the level
of nancial intermediation rather than education.
This dependence of the implementation of new technologies on the levels of certain
variables are empirically tested through specications that include a term interacting
the stock of human capital or nance with backwardness, measured as a countrys
distance from the technological leader in terms of initial GDP per capita.
The many regressors suggested by the literature and the possibility of di¤erential
convergence rates due to the di¤erent levels of some regressors point to an important
problem in empirical growth research: Model uncertainty. What does the truemodel
look like, how should it be empirically specied and what covariates be included?
As argued by Steve Durlauf and coauthors (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Brock,
Durlauf and West, 2003; Durlauf, 2001 and Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005),
modern growth theories are fundamentally open-ended. One growth theory typically
has no bearing on the empirical relevance of another. The researcher is not sure which
theory is the correct one and hence what exact model should be specied in order to
be tested empirically. Given that according to the most recent survey article (Durlauf,
Johnson and Temple, 2005) well over 140 di¤erent regressors have been used in the
literature, researchers have naturally only considered a limited subset and engaged in
empirical variable selection strategies. Usually, results for one preferred model and a
limited number of other specications are reported. This subset of results can of course
be criticized for potentially not being selected randomly. Furthermore, in the reported
Chapter 1 - Finance, Institutions and Growth 13
results uncertainty is understated: When a model selection method such as general to
specic or a stepwise procedure is used, the single model obtained is assumed to be
the correct model. All future inferences and predictions that are made with the model
do not account for the uncertainty involved in the selection process.
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) has emerged as a solution to the problem of model
uncertainty that is soundly founded in statistical and decision theory that includes the
variance component associated with model building in the presented results. The basic
idea is that instead of using just one model and discarding all information from other,
potentially good models, to average estimates of quantities of interest over all models
with a reasonable datat, using weights proportional to this t.
The BMA methodology has recently been applied in the context of cross-country
growth studies by Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a), and
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004). While a limited number of institutional
variables have been included in these contributions, proxies for the level of nancial
intermediation were not considered due to their potential endogeneity.2 Furthermore,
these papers focused on the deep determinants of economic growth in linear regression
specications and did not address non-linear e¤ects, in particular issues of barriers to
technology adaption and di¤ering convergence rates.
This chapter aims to ll that gap. It introduces in a Bayesian model averaging
analysis a wider range of proxies for institutional variables and especially includes
the exogenous component of nance that has been used by Levine, Loayza and Beck
(2000) and Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) alongside variables suggested by
most other important theories of economic growth. It also allows for an interaction of
those variables for which this might be suggested by theory (human capital, health,
nance, institutions, liberalization and good, stable macroeconomic policies) with the
initial output gap to nd out which variables might indeed inuence the technological
di¤usion and thus rates of convergence. In doing so it also the rst contribution
to scrutinize the e¤ects of nancial development by a very comprehensive robustness
analysis.
In a rst step the results show that in a simple linear specication, institutions and
surprisingly the public health of a country inuence the growth rate while nance does
not. There is also substantial evidence for convergence. In a next step, we nd that
2Institutional variables include political rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and the degree of
capitalism. Variables measuring the security of private property or bureaucratic quality that have
been found important elsewhere were not included.
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the level of institutional quality and health inuence the speed of convergence. There
is also some weak evidence linking the rate of technological di¤usion to the level of
human capital, while such an e¤ect is not corroborated for nancial development.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 briey reviews
the growth theories and variables proxying for them used in the BMA analysis in
more detail. Section 1.3 gives an overview of the statistical theory and methodology
of Bayesian model averaging for the problem at hand, before section 1.4 presents the
results rst for a simple linear setup and then adding the threshold terms with a special
focus on nance. Robustness to di¤erent priors, endogeneity and multicollinearity
concerns are analyzed in part 1.5 until section 1.6 nally o¤ers some concluding remarks
and an outlook for further research.
1.2 Growth Theories and the Data
Given the large number of theoretical contributions on the topic of economic growth and
possible variables suggested in the literature to measure some aspects of these theories,
Durlauf and Quah (1999) conclude that there are as many potential regressors as
countries. Indeed in the most recent survey on the topic the count is up to over 140
(Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005). The most prominent strands of theories can be
broadly summarized under the following categories: (i) Human capital and schooling,
(ii) geography, (iii) health, (iv) good macroeonomic policies and openness to trade,
(v) social conict and sociopolitical stability, (vi) institutions and nally (vii) nancial
intermediation.
Human Capital gures prominently in the augmented SolowModel (Mankiw, Romer
and Weil, 1992) and the new endogenous growth theories (Romer, 1986 and Lucas,
1988). Following Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Levine, Loayza and
Beck (2000) in this chapter, we use Barro and Lees (1996) measures of average years
of schooling and secondary schooling relative to a 60-year working life in the popula-
tion in 1960 as a proxy for the fraction of time devoted to accumulating more human
capital. We also utilize the human capital to output ratios constructed by Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997). To account for the dynamic aspects, like Aghion, Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005), we use the growth rates of these variables, which are available
for the average years of schooling and the human capital ratio.3
3From 1960-1995 and 1960-1985 respectivly.
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There is an intense debate in the literature about the direct e¤ects of geography on
economic outcomes. The idea was put forward in the economics literature by Nobel
Laureate Gunnar Myrdal, who wrote:
a serious study of the problems of underdevelopment ... should take into account
the climate and its impacts on soil, vegetation, animals, humans and physical assetsin
short, on living conditions in economic development (1968, volume 3, p.2121).
Following the work by Jared Diamond (1997) many authors have tried to validate
(Sachs, 2001, 2003; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999 and Masters and McMillan,
2001) or debunk (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004, Easterly and Levine, 2003
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002) the direct e¤ect of geography and
climate on growth empirically. The geography debate also shows how growth theories
are open-ended and interrelated: some authors argue for example that geography exerts
its inuence manly through its e¤ect on other variables such as transportation costs
and trade possibilities (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 1995) or on the
disease environment (Bloom and Sachs, 1998) or its e¤ects on institutions (Hall and
Jones, 1999). Variables for all of these possible channels through which geography
might inuence development are included and to preview some results we indeed nd
no strong direct e¤ect for it. Following most of the literature we include a dummy for
Africa, the absolute latitude, the percentage of the population within a 100 km of an
ice free coast (to proxy for obstacles to trade) and the percentage of the population
living in the geographical tropics.
How healthy people are, may of course inuence the quality of human capital
(Schultz, 2002), individual productivity (Miguel and Kremer, 2004 and Strauss and
Thomas, 1998) and the growth rate of the labour force (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002).4 To
capture these ideas and the possible e¤ect of geography through the disease environ-
ment, we follow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and include the average life
expectancy at birth, the average child mortality and a variable measuring the malaria
ecology.5
The degree of trade openness is seen as essential in models of technology di¤usion.
The importance of trade has already been alluded to (also see Alcalà and Ciccone,
2004 among many others). Openness is part of a set of good macroeconomic policies
that have been suggested (most notably by the so called Washington Consensus) to
4In two very recent papers, Weil (2005) argues for an e¤ect of health on growth using micro level
evidence and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005b) using macro data argue against it.
5See Kiszewski et al (forthcoming) for details. This variable is constructed with exogenous vari-
ables based on temperature, mosquito abundance and type of mosquito prevelance.
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be essential for less developed countries to achieve satisfactory and sustained growth.
For example, the key components of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility -
the centerpiece of the IMFs strategy from 1987 to 1999 to aid poor countries and
promote long run growth - were prudent macroeconomic policies and the liberalization
of markets. Growth, it was hoped, would follow automatically.6 Given this practical
relevance of macro policies and the academic discussion on their merits (for example
Acemoglu et al., 2003), we include in the BMA analysis, the trade volume and a black
market exchange rate premium as proxies for openness, the scal policy variable of
government spending as a percentage of GDP, the average ination rate from 1960-
1995 and an index of state owned enterprises to cover most of the policies usually used
in the literature.7
Building on work by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and others, some researchers have
attributed under-development to the multiplicity of population subgroups, dened by
di¤erences in sociocultural factors such as racial features and languages which might
result in social conicts over redistribution and other vital questions.8 We include direct
measures of the occurrences of conicts like the number of revolutions and coups over a
time span of 30 years (Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1993; Sala-i-Martin et al, 2004) and
the number of assassinations per 1000 inhabitants (Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes,
2005 and Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000). Furthermore a measure of ethnolinguistic
fragmentation is used, since it is believed that higher social fragmentation could make
conicts more likely (Easterly and Levine, 1997).
There is a substantial, well established literature seeing Institutions as the Funda-
mental Cause of Long-Run Growth(Acemoglu et al., 2005, 2001, 2002; Hall and Jones,
1999 and Rodrik et al., 2004 to name but a few). Since institutions shape economic and
political incentives they inuence investment decisions in human and physical capital
and the e¢ ciency of the organization of production, research and trade. The causal ef-
fect of institutions has been established in income levels regressions using sophisticated
instrumental variables, but in cross country growth regression they have failed to show
up very robustly (Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller, 2004 and Fernandez, Ley and
Steel, 2001a). In the present analysis we include a broad range of variables spanning
the institutional continuum from business regulations, the quality of the bureaucracy
and corruption over the prevalence of the rule of law, security of property rights and
6See Azariadis and Starchurski (2005).
7Compare Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Levine, Loyaza and Beck (2000) for
examples of these so-called policy conditioning sets.
8See among others: Tornell and Velasco (1992), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Alesina et al.
(1999) and Rodrik (1999).
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the expropriation risk to broader indices like civil liberties, and statehistory, an index
of in-depth experience with state-level institutions that has recently been introduced
by Bockstette et al (2002).
A causal e¤ect of the exogenous component of nancial intermediation on growth
on the other hand has found in the important contribution of Levine, Loayza and Beck
(2000). Much more theory and evidence about nance and growth is summarized in
Levine (2005). Financial intermediation is seen to help (i) production of ex ante infor-
mation about possible investments, (ii) monitoring of investments and implementation
of corporate governance, (iii) trading, diversication, and management of risk, (iv)
mobilization and pooling of savings, and (v) exchange of goods and services.
To test the theory of a role for nance we use the exogenous component of the
ratio of private credit to GDP that has emerged as the preferred proxy for nancial
intermediation in the literature. Since nance is potentially endogenous even to short
run growth it is instrumented by legal origins, which have been shown to be valid
instruments by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005) and Levine (2005).
A summary explaining the variables used and their sources as well as their descrip-
tive statistics are given in Tables 1.A1 and 1.A2 in the appendix respectively. Thus,
this chapter is the rst to introduce such a broad range of theories including nance
and many aspects of institutions into a Bayesian model averaging exercise. But it does
not stop short there, but also allows for nonlinearities in the variables, particularly
interactions of some regressors with the initial output gap, also a novelty in BMA
analyses about economic growth.
Nelson and Phleps (1966) were the rst to formalize Gerschenkrons (1962) catch-
up hypothesis. Firstly the growth of the technology frontier reects the rate at which
new discoveries are made and the growth of total factor productivity depends on the
implementation of these discoveries, and varies positively with the distance between
the technology frontier and the level of current productivity. Secondly they stipulate
that the rate at which the gap between the technology frontier and the current level
of productivity is closed depends on the level of human capital. This was a break with
the view that human capital is an input into the production process. Early empirical
support for this hypothesis is o¤ered by Welch (1975), Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987)
and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995).
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) characterize the dependence of implementation of
new technologies on human capital levels through a specication that includes a term
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interacting the stock of human capital with backwardness, measured as a countrys
distance from the technological leader. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) use
the same methodology to test their somewhat modied but closely related theory: in
their model it is nancial intermediation that needs to surpass a critical threshold
level. Indeed, in all of their empirical specications an interaction term of nance with
the initial output gap is strongly signicant and negatively correlated with growth. To
document robustness they interact each variable in their conditioning set with the initial
output gap and then run a regression including that term and the nancial interaction
term for each of these variables separately.9 This robustness exercise appears somewhat
arbitrary especially in the light of model uncertainty and theory open-endedness. It
could well be that more than one or two theories about economic growth are valid or
even interacting.
While there are the theories mentioned about barriers to technological di¤usion in
human capital, education and nance and Parente and Presscot (1994) actually put
forward the idea that these barriers might be linked to institutions, it is hard to think
of a theory that would call for an interaction term with geographical variables, like
the African dummy. The coe¢ cient on such a term would be even harder to interpret:
one can not overcome a threshold of being a little African. That is why we only use
interactions with nance, institutions, policies and human capital and health variables
in our base specication but not for geography. Given that including the interaction
terms we consider 56 right hand side variables, model uncertainty is substantial in this
context and the next section spells out how BMA may be used to deal with it in this
context.
1.3 Accounting for Model Uncertainty
The workhorse for cross country growth regression has become a simple linear frame-
work based on the contributions of Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
The growth rate is regressed on a set of potential regressors suggested by the various
growth theories mentioned above.
g = 0 +
kX
j=1
jzj + " = Z + "; (1.1)
9Basically we use all the variables that they used in our analysis below.
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where g is the average growth rate of per capita GDP over a certain time period, 0 is
a constant term and Z is a vector of k potential covariates including the initial output
gap. As Brock and Durlauf (2001, p. 234) put it, the fundamental problem with growth
regressions is determining what variables to include in the vector Z. Growth theories
are open-ended in the sense that the validity of one causal theory of growth does not
imply the falsity of another. Furthermore, even if one agrees on a set of theories,
there have been well over 140 (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005) di¤erent variables
suggested to proxy for di¤erent aspects of these theories. Given that there are only so
many countries in the world that make up the set of observations the researcher has to
make a choice as to which variables are going to be in- and excluded. She has to decide
on a specic model. The incertitude associated with the process of selecting regressors
is known as model uncertainty and a Bayesian solution to it was rst proposed by
Leamer (1978).
If, following Nelson and Phelps (1966), only one possible form of nonlinearities
in the growth process is accounted for, the problem is even more severe because the
number of regressors is basically doubled as pointed out above. For example, exactly
like Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) did for human capital, Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005) test their theory of thresholds in nancial intermediation by including
a proxy for nancial intermediation interacted with the initial output gap relative to
the technological leader (taken to be the US) in a standard cross-sectional growth
regression.
gi   g1 = 0 + y(yi   y1) + fFi + fyFi(yi   y1) +Xix + "i; (1.2)
where index 1 stands for the leader country and i for any other, g is the average
growth rate of per capita GDP, y is its initial level of it, Fi is the average level of
nancial intermediation and Xi is a vector of other country specic regressors.10 A
signicant negative inuence of the interaction term on growth (more precisely on the
growth di¤erential relative to the leader) is taken as evidence of the non-linearity in
the variable under scrutiny, be that human capital (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) or
nance like in this example from Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
In fact, Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) rst use some regressors without
interacting them as a conditioning set Xi. In their robustness analysis they take one
potential other regressor at a time, interact it with the initial gap and include the
regressor, its interaction as well as the interaction term of nancial development in
10Compare their equation (13) on page 191.
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the regression. These alternative regressors are meant to cover most other competing
theories of economic development. Their results show that the only signicant coe¢ -
cient in this particular exercise turns out to be fy the one for the interaction term of
nancial development and the initial output gap.11 But of course they only consider
a small subset of all possible models in doing so. Given that g1 can be taken to be
constant only a¤ecting the intercept and that nancial intermediation is just another
regressor we can write the growth regression as a linear regression model on k potential
covariates z like in equation (1.1) above and potentially k s interaction terms of these
regressors with the initial output gap:12
g = 0 +
kX
j=1
jzj +
k sX
j=1
zyzi(yi   y1) + ": (1.3)
A consequence of the additional source of uncertainty in the process of selecting which
regressors and their interaction terms to include in (1.3) is that basing inference on a
single model and thus ignoring model uncertainty may result in underestimating the
uncertainty about quantities of interest (Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting, 1997). This
uncertainty can be substantial as there are now R = 2k(k s) potential di¤erent models.
For example, in the literature on economic growth up to 67 variables have been
used in a single paper at once (Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller, 2004) and the
importance of model uncertainty is acknowledged to be particularly severe (see, e.g.
Temple, 1999; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Durlauf, 2001). Levine and Renelt (1992)
address the issue of model uncertainty by employing a version of the extreme bounds
analysis pioneered by Leamer (1983) and basically nd only the initial income to be
robustly related to growth.13 Sala-i-Martin (1997), using a less restrictive test, identies
a relatively large number of variables to which he assigns some level of condence for
inclusion in growth regressions.
These two methods have been criticized for lack of a sound statistical and decision
theoretic foundation and the rst one for being far too restrictive, as the model on which
the rejection of robustness of a variable is based might be tting the data extremely
poorly. Bayesian model averaging has emerged as a theoretically sound solution to
11Financial indermediation and its interaction with the initial GDP gap are here instrumented by
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) legal origin variables to adress potential endogeneity issues. All other
variables are not instrumented.
12Where k - s is the number of variables for which an interaction term is suggested by theories of
technological di¤usion.
13Robust refers to the question of whether the coe¢ cient associated with the variable never changes
sign and retains at least a ve percent signicance across all possible model specifcations.
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account for model uncertainty and will be discussed below. The simple robustness
analysis carried out by Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) only takes into ac-
count a fraction of the potential models and bases inferences on them, thus completely
ignoring models that include more than one additional potential determinant of growth
apart from their simple conditioning sets.
1.3.1 Bayesian Model Averaging
Leamer (1978) formalized the idea to account for model uncertainty by simply basing
inference about quantities of interest on weighted averages over all possible models, in-
stead of focusing on a single one. As weights he proposed a measure that is proportional
to the quality of the model relative to the other models, more formally the posterior
model probability, which will be derived below. Apart from accurately accounting for
model uncertainty, BMA has been shown to have a number of advantages (for details
see Raftery and Zheng, 2003): (i) It is soundly based on statistical and decision theory;
(ii) Je¤reys (1939) proofed that model selection using Bayes factors (on which BMA is
based) minimizes the Total Error Rate;14 (iii) a point estimate based on BMA about
a quantity of interest that has a common interpretation across all models, minimizes
the Mean Squared Error (MSE) among point estimators and the average length of the
condence interval is consistently shorter than the standard condence interval; (iv) it
selects the truemodel (with su¢ cient data), if the true model is contained in the set
of competing models even if that true model is the null or full model;15 (v) it builds in
penalties for model complexity; (vi) theoretically, the BMA predictive distribution is
optimal under Goods (1952) Logarithmic Scoring Criterion and (vii) the superior pre-
dictive performance of BMA, relative to selecting a single model, has been conrmed
in various simulation exercises and assessments of out of sample predictions.16
The last results intuitively underlines the appeal of model averaging in the following
sense: BMA allows to use more information that is contained in the data than by just
using a single model and discarding information contained in any other model. BMA
is superior to the full model because models get weighted according to their data-t
such that very bad models will receive a negligible weight and statistical relevance of
variables is not attenuated by the inclusion of irrelevant regressors.
14With Total Error Rate=Type I error rate + Type II error rate. This is true for nested models,
if the practical distribution is equal to the prior distribution over the parameters.
15Cf. Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997).
16Cf. Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997), Hoeting et al (1999), Raftery (1995), Raftery Madigan
and Volinsky (1995) and Fernadez, Ley and Steel (2001a, 2001b).
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Bayesian estimation in general expresses all uncertainty, including uncertainty about
the unknown parameters of a model, in terms of probability and views unknown pa-
rameters as random variables. All results follow directly from elementary probability
theory, notably the denition of conditional probability, Bayestheorem and the law of
total probability.17 A simple probability model for the data D is specied by a vector
of d unknown parameters  = (1; :::; d). In case of the linear regression model of
(1.1) these parameters simply are (0; :::; k; 
2). An important Bayesian concept is
the prior probability density (or prior) p() which incorporates any information the
researcher may posses about  prior to observing the data. The probability model is
then dened by the likelihood p(Dj), which is the probability of observing the data
D given that  is the true parameter vector.18 The fundamental question that econo-
metricians are trying to answer is what the data has to say about a certain quantity
of interest. Using Bayesrule we can formulate the posterior distribution of  as the
conditional probability of , given the data and the prior
p(jD) = p(Dj)p()
p(D)
: (1.4)
Since p(D) does not involve  we can ignore it and state that the posterior distrib-
ution is proportional to the likelihood times the prior:
p(jD) / p(Dj)p(): (1.5)
This equation can be thought of as an updating rule where the data allows us to
update our prior beliefs about parameters in . The resulting posterior distribution
combines both data and non-data (i.e.: the researchers priors) information.
Usually the researcher is faced with situations where there is more than one po-
tential model. In our application to economic growth, we noted that there might be a
large number R of di¤erent models. Then it also needs to be specied on which model,
Mr for r = 1; :::R, the posterior is conditioned on:
p(rjD;Mr) =
p(Djr;Mr)p(rjMr)
p(DjMr)
: (1.6)
The Bayesian logic behind equation (1.4) of expressing uncertainty in terms of
17Compare for this and the following for example Raftery (1995) and Koop (2003).
18In case of the classical linear regression model with a normal error distribution this will be a
normal density which depends upon the parameters.
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conditional probability may be easily extended to the level of model uncertainty. The
posterior probability that model Mr is the correct model (posterior model probability)
by Bayes rule is given by:
p(MrjD) =
p(DjMr)p(Mr)
RP
p(DjMs)p(Ms)
s=1
; (1.7)
where p(Mr) is the prior model probability of a model19 and p(DjMs) is the marginal
likelihood of model r. Sometimes also referred to as the integrated likelihood it is cal-
culated by integrating both sides of (1.6) over r and using the fact the LHS integrates
to one as:
p(DjMr)=
R
p(Djr;Mr)p(rjMr)dr: (1.8)
Then, following Leamer (1978), we can base inference about any quantity of interest
 (i.e. coe¢ cients or predictions) on its posterior distribution, which by the law of
total probability is
p(jD) =
RX
r=1
p(jD;Mr)p(MrjD): (1.9)
This formula is the essence of BMA: it provides information about the full posterior
distribution of , which is a weighted average of its posterior distributions under each
possible model with weights equal to the posterior model probabilities. Intuitively, if we
are for example interested in the point estimate of the mean of a particular coe¢ cient
j in the linear regression model (1.1), then it is simply the average of the estimates
of the mean of j in each model (in models where it is excluded that will simply be
zero), where each model is weighted by how well it ts the data compared to the other
models (i.e. the posterior model probability):
E(jjD) =
RX
r=1
E(jjD;Mr)p(MrjD): (1.10)
The posterior standard deviation may also be computed in this spirit as the sum
of the weighted average of the variance in each model and the variance of j across
19Most commonly this is assumed to be a uniform prior across the model space, meaning that
ex ante each model is assumed to be equally likely with p(Mr) = 1=R = 1=2k: A notable exception
is Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) who somewhat arbitrarily assume that models that
include 7 regressors are most likely. In the robustness section we experiment with di¤erent priors.
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models:
var(jjD) =
RX
r=1
var(jjD;Mr)p(MrjD) +
RX
r=1
[E(jjD;Mr)  E(jjD)]2p(MrjD):
(1.11)
The rst term on the RHS is equivalent to the calculation of the posterior mean and
reects the within model variance of j for each model. The second term captures the
fact that the models themselves are very di¤erent and with them the possible estimated
values for the mean of j. It is not determined by the model-specic variance calcu-
lations and thus captures how model uncertainty can increase the variance associated
with a parameter estimate relative to conventional models.20
With these posterior point estimates and standard errors it is of course easily pos-
sible to construct posterior t-values and other signicance statistics. In BMA however,
inference about the importance of variables is not primarily based on posterior t-values,
but rather on the cumulative posterior probability of the models that contain the vari-
able of interest. This is dened as the posterior inclusion probability of regressor xj in
terms of its coe¢ cient j:
Pr(j 6= 0jD) =
X
A1
p(MrjD); (1.12)
where A1 =

Mr : r = 1; :::; R; j 6= 0
	
is the set of models that include xj. Simply
put, a regressor is the more signicant the more often it shows up in models that
are well supported by the data. If a uniform prior on the model space is specied
(i.e. each model is equally likely ex ante with p(Mr) = 1=R, which implies a prior
inclusion probability of 1=2 for each individual regressor), Raftery (1995) suggests the
following interpretation of the posterior inclusion probabilities: Pr(j 6= 0jD) > 50%
suggests that the data provides weak evidence that the regressor is an important one,
p > 75% implies positive evidence and p > 95 and 99% provide strong and very
strong evidence for a regressor respectively. As a rule of thumb any variable that has a
posterior inclusion probability that is greater than the prior inclusion probability is at
least weakly supported by the data. For model priors that favor smaller models like in
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004), this prior regressor inclusion probability
can be smaller than 1=2 (0.11 in their baseline case), thus implying that generally
regressors with a posterior inclusion probability su¢ ciently greater than the prior one
may be agged as important. An inclusion probability close to one signals in any event,
20Compare Leamer (1978) and Brock, Durlauf and West (2003).
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that the particular regressor is included in almost all of the very good models and thus
contributes prominently to explaining the dependent variable even in the presence of
a high degree of model uncertainty.
What is left to do in order to undertake an BMA analysis is to specify priors, which
do not unduly inuence the posterior estimates but are uninformative and let the data
speak. For the prior on the model size it is common to assume a uniform prior on the
model space, i.e. each model is equally likely ex ante such that p(Mr) = 1=R = 1=2k
for each r.21 For the prior on the regressors we follow Raftery (1995) in implicitly
using the unit information prior by approximating the log of the likelihood p(MrjD)
with the BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) in all of the above equations. The unit
information prior is seen as a conservative prior in not assuming much prior information
and is su¢ ciently spread out over the relevant parameter values and reasonably at
over the area where the likelihood is substantial. For inference about the signicance of
a particular coe¢ cient  its mean is usually centered at zero a priori, corresponding to
the classical null hypothesis in frequentist econometrics that a regressor has no e¤ect
on the outcome.22
1.4 BMA Results
Our BMA analysis proceeds in three steps: First we scrutinize the results of Levine,
Loayza and Beck (2000) and those summarized by Levine (2005) of the importance
of nancial development on growth by including all the variables mentioned in section
1.2 in a linear way. Secondly, we consider the nonlinear e¤ect of nance on growth
suggested by Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), by just including the other
regressors linearly, only to nd that the claimed robustness of their results already
vanishes at this point. Finally, we perform the most comprehensive BMA analysis by
allowing interactions with the initial output gap for those variables for which it might
be suggested by theories of technological di¤usion.
21See for example, Brock, Durlauf and West (2003), Raftery (1995) and Fernandez, Ley and Steel
(2001a).
22For more details see Raftery (1999). Implicitly Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) also use the BIC (see
Raftery, 2005).
Chapter 1 - Finance, Institutions and Growth 26
1.4.1 Finance or Something Else?
To incorporate the e¤ect of the exogenous component of nancial intermediation along
with the other potential theories mentioned in section (1.2) in a linear growth regres-
sion, we follow Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005) in instrumenting their preferred proxy, the ratio of private credit to GDP23, with
legal origin variables. We use the predicted values from the rst stages for the follow-
ing BMA analysis. All other variables are directly taken from the Aghion, Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005) dataset.24 Table 1.1 presents the results.
The rst column reports the posterior probability that a variable is included in
the models as given by equation (1.12). The next 3 columns provide the posterior
coe¢ cient estimate, the posterior standard deviation over all models considered as in
(1.10) and (1.11) and the BMA equivalent to a t-value following from these. The last
ve columns present the ve models which receive the highest support by the data.
They present the best models selected from the model space according to the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC).25 The variables are sorted according to their posterior
inclusion probabilities in descending order. Figure 1.A1 in the appendix provides a
graphical assessment of what the over a 100 best models look like and their relative
support by the data. The models are depicted on the horizontal axis, where the width
assigned to them is proportional to their datat according to the BIC. Which variables
enter in which model and what sign the posterior coe¢ cient has (green for positive and
red for negative) is shown on the vertical axis. Variables that have a very low posterior
inclusion probability obviously never make it into any good models.
The rows at the bottom of Table 1.1 introduce the value of the BIC (lower values
indicate a better datat) and very importantly the posterior model probability. This
number very nicely illustrates the importance of model uncertainty: Even the best
model is only correct with a probability of under one percent. Thus, one could say
that a researcher who bases inferences on this model exclusively would use a model
which might be incorrect in over 99 percent of the time.
The variable most strongly supported by the data is the initial output gap relative
23The other variables they use are liquid liabilities, bank assets and the ratio of comercial banks
assets to total (central bank plus comercial bank) assets. As was the case for Levine, Loyaza and Beck
(2000) and Aghion, Hewitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) our results are not greatly altered when using
these alternative measures.
24We thank Aghion, Hewitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) for making the data publicly available at
Mayer-Foulkeswebsite.
25For the BIC, lower values mean a better model t (cf. Raftery, 1995).
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Variable Post.Inclusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D.
BMA t-
value
Best
BMA 1
Best
BMA 2
Best
BMA 3
Best
BMA 4
Best
BMA 5
Intercept 100 -12.5400 2.787 -4.499 -13.165 -12.980 -14.363 -10.818 -13.237
gap60 100 -1.9160 0.315 -6.090 -2.094 -2.017 -2.027 -1.885 -2.033
me 99.5 -0.1162 0.032 -3.641 -0.118 -0.105 -0.126 -0.101 -0.120
avgexpect 97.3 0.0913 0.034 2.724 0.096 0.102 0.101 0.078 0.095
expriskB 86.8 0.5616 0.273 2.060 0.600 0.719 0.676 0.688 0.663
f_prop97 54.5 0.1854 0.213 0.869 0.355 . 0.346 . 0.381
lat_abst 47.3 -0.8833 1.138 -0.776 . . . . -1.003
civil 43.3 0.1111 0.157 0.706 . . 0.151 . .
statehist 39.8 0.4118 0.620 0.664 . . . . .
rulelawB 30.4 0.0980 0.178 0.549 . . . . .
avgmort 23.4 -0.0008 0.002 -0.449 . . . -0.003 .
gschool 16.5 -0.0523 0.136 -0.386 . . . . .
ghy 16 0.0832 0.225 0.369 . . . . .
bureauB 14.6 0.0798 0.206 0.387 . . . . .
hy 14.3 0.2428 0.761 0.319 . . . . .
afr 12.8 -0.1754 0.505 -0.348 . . . . .
troppop 5.3 0.0279 0.148 0.189 . . . . .
infra 4.5 0.0345 0.243 0.142 . . . . .
school60 4.3 -0.0115 0.062 -0.184 . . . . .
soe 3.9 -0.0029 0.017 -0.164 . . . . .
bmp 3.8 0.0002 0.001 0.167 . . . . .
pi 3.1 0.0002 0.002 0.136 . . . . .
corruptB 1.8 -0.0044 0.040 -0.109 . . . . .
revc 1.7 -0.0154 0.143 -0.107 . . . . .
assass 0.9 0.0029 0.036 0.079 . . . . .
f_regu97 0.7 -0.0020 0.029 -0.069 . . . . .
sec 0.3 -0.0003 0.009 -0.029 . . . . .
gov 0.3 0.0001 0.002 0.040 . . . . .
privohat 0 0.000000001 0.000003 0.000 . . . . .
pop100cr 0 -0.00001560 0.004 -0.004 . . . . .
trade 0 0.000001 0.0001 0.009 . . . . .
avelf 0 -0.00000003 0.0003 0.000 . . . . .
nVar 5 4 6 5 6
r2 0.799 0.780 0.807 0.791 0.805
BIC -63.580 -62.965 -61.761 -61.651 -61.417
post. Model prob. 0.079 0.058 0.032 0.030 0.027
Observations 53 53 53 53 53
*Notes: Results obtained with R-BMA BIC.reg software provided by A. Raftery (1995)
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth rate 1960-1995
Privohat is the predicted value from a regression of private credit on legal origins
Table 1.1
BMA* Results For Linear Specifications
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to the leader. It has a posterior inclusion probability of 100 percent and as is visible
from Figure 1.A1 enters in every reasonable model with the expected negative sign.
This result is in line with the extreme bound analysis of Levine and Renelt (1992) and
with the Bayesian model averaging exercises of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller
(2004) and Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001a) and indicates support for the conditional
convergence hypothesis.
Apart from initial income only 4 variables that pertain to theories relating health
and institutions to growth have a posterior inclusion probability higher than the prior
one. Theories of geography, policies and trade openness, sociopolitical stability and in
particular nance are not supported by the data once the former variables are controlled
for and model uncertainty is taken into account. The second and third best variables
are two health variables. Malaria ecology and the average life expectancy. A variable
measuring the malaria prevalence was also included in Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and
Miller (2004) and ranked as 7 out of 68 followed by the life expectancy in 1960, insofar
our results are mirrored in theirs. Life expectancy was even ranked third in Fernandez,
Ley and Steel (2001a) who did not include any other health variables. Thus nding
health variables high on the list is not peculiar and these results are further reinforced
by the recent micro-level study of Weil (2005).
Next in line - strongly supported by the data with 86 percent inclusion probability
and showing up in almost all good models as Figure 1.A1 suggests - is the risk of
expropriation. Apart from the initial income gap this variable also has one of the
highest posterior coe¢ cients with 0.56, indicating that improvements in this aspect
of institutional quality could have sizable e¤ects on economic growth. This particular
variable has been found extremely important in the income level regression work of
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005). Thus our results reinforce their
research that focused on long run growth - by looking at how the exogenous component
of the expropriation risk impacts income levels - even for the medium run by looking at
growth rates of income over 35 years. This variable has not been included in other BMA
exercises as have been very few institutional variables: Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and
Miller (2004) only use civil and political liberties which turn out not to be robustly
related to growth. In addition to these two, Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001a) introduce
the rule of law and rank it 7 out of 41 with mild support by the data with an inclusion
probability of 52 percent. In our analysis these variables have only a 43 and 30 percent
posterior chance of inclusion respectively, but that is because we also include risk of
expropriation and property rights which prove to be more important. The security of
property variable is the last of the ve variables that receive at least weak support
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from the data in our analysis.
Of course, one might be concerned with the endogeneity of institutional variables
in our growth regressions. However, institutions are usually seen to be quite persistent
such that they should be inuenced a lot less by growth rates of income than by the
income level itself.26 Furthermore, they may also be measured with error which would
lead to a downward attenuation bias of their coe¢ cient, while the endogeneity problem
would lead to an upward one. It is usually found in the income levels regressions with
instrumented institutions that the Instrumental Variable coe¢ cient is larger than the
OLS estimate such that measurement error appears to be the more severe problem
of the two and our estimates on institutions should be if anything conservative.27
Nevertheless, in the robustness section we report results for instrumenting the dominant
component of the institutions vector instead of private credit which rea¢ rms our results
here.
Recapitulating, our ndings suggest that once other important theories of economic
growth are analyzed on an equal footing with the exogenous component of nance, the
claimed robust e¤ect of nance on growth vanishes. Typically, studies nding such
an e¤ect do not take model uncertainty into account because they ignore variables
suggested by other plausible growth theories.28 Paramount appear to be health condi-
tions and institutions. Higher life expectancy at birth, a lower risk of malaria infection
and securely dened and enforced property rights foster economic growth. The theo-
ries about the e¤ect of geography on growth are only corroborated inasmuch as they
postulate an indirect e¤ect through their inuence on the disease environment.
Taken together with the fact the another predetermined variable namely ethnolin-
guistic fragmentation is also not important, this suggests a more optimistic perspec-
tive on the prospects of achieving higher growth in a number of countries than the
geographic determinism view. In line with Acemoglu et al. (2003) we nd that once
health and especially institutional conditions are controlled for, bad macroeconomic
policy variables are merely the "symptoms" but not the cause of slow growth. Given
the pessimistic outlook for nance we now turn to see if it might not play an important
26The argument made about their endogeneity usually is that richer countries might be able to
a¤ord better institutions not the faster growing ones. If anything the value of institutional quality at
the end of the period should be of great concern, but we use period averages for most variables.
27Compare for example Hall and Jones (1999) and Bockstette et al. (2002, p. 360).
28Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) for example, only allow for initial income, average schooling,
governemt size, ination, the black market premium and openness to trade, thus allowing for two
additional theories: human capital and policies. Performing BMA on this set of regressors and the
instrumented nancial intermediation variable indeed provides nance with a posterior inclusion prob-
ability of 98 percent.
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role as a barrier to technological adaption as Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005)
nd.
1.4.2 Finance as a Barrier to Adaption?
Given that in reality there seems to be substantial evidence not only of conditional
convergence but also divergence in income rates - for example Quahs (1996, 1997)
Twin peaks- one would like to be able explain this phenomenon. Aghion, Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005)s model o¤ers just that. In fact, after estimating a simple
form of it they are able to divide the countries into the ones that are most likely to
converge and the ones to most likely diverge in income levels (table II, p. 197). Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) rst test their theory of a nancial threshold variable
by running a regression as specied in equation (1.2). However like Levine, Loayza
and Beck (2000), they ignore a number of growth theories in their main specications
when conditioning only on initial income, average schooling, government size, ination,
the black market premium, openness to trade, indicators of revolution and coups,
assassinations and ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Their decision to only include those
regressors from the entire set of variables at their disposal (which are all the variables we
use here and are described in Table 1.A1 in the appendix) appears somewhat arbitrary
and is not explained in their text.
Perhaps one reason is that including many irrelevant variables in a model inates all
standard errors and thus pushes the statistical signicance of all regressors downward.
Hence, it is di¢ cult to include all potential regressors in a simple OLS analysis without
running the risk of rendering all variables insignicant. Nevertheless, the results of
doing just that are telling. The last two columns of Table 1.2 provide results for the
full model where we include all the variables mentioned in section 1.2 alongside the
interaction term of nance with initial income.
While the interaction term of nance with the initial output gap is insignicant, a
number of other variables exhibit statistical signicance. In particular the initial output
gap has a sizable negative coe¢ cient lending support to conditional convergence even
after the Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes(2005) barrier in nance is allowed for.
Further important variables are institutional and human capital ones.
However, basing inference on just one model, especially the full one, is not adequate
rstly, because the inclusion of irrelevant regressors inates the standard errors of all
variables and secondly, because ignoringmodel uncertainty leads to an underestimation
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Variable Post. In-clusion
Post.
Coeff
Post.
S.D.
BMA t-
value
Best
BMA 1
Best
BMA 2
Best
BMA 3
Best
BMA 4
Best
BMA 5
Full
Model
Coeff.
Full
Model t-
value
Intercept 100 -12.500 2.802 -4.460 -13.165 -12.980 -14.363 -10.818 -13.237 -8.540 -1.66
gap60 100 -1.905 0.320 -5.950 -2.094 -2.017 -2.027 -1.885 -2.033 -1.501 -2.11
me 99.6 -0.116 0.032 -3.600 -0.118 -0.105 -0.126 -0.101 -0.120 -0.097 -1.7
avgexpect 97.3 0.091 0.033 2.720 0.096 0.102 0.101 0.078 0.095 0.070 1.31
expriskb 86.5 0.559 0.274 2.040 0.600 0.719 0.676 0.688 0.663 -0.211 -0.52
f_prop97 54 0.184 0.213 0.863 0.355 . 0.346 . 0.381 0.114 0.41
lat_abst 46.9 -0.873 1.133 -0.770 . . . . -1.003 -1.900 -1.1
civil 43.5 0.112 0.157 0.709 . . 0.151 . . 0.510 2.79
statehist 39.3 0.405 0.616 0.657 . . . . . 0.835 1
rulelawb 30.6 0.099 0.179 0.553 . . . . . 0.512 1.86
avgmort 24.1 -0.001 0.002 -0.458 . . . -0.003 . -0.001 -0.34
ghy 15.6 0.081 0.223 0.364 . . . . . 0.204 0.48
gschool 15.5 -0.053 0.140 -0.381 . . . . . -0.706 -3.08
bureaub 14.9 0.080 0.205 0.392 . . . . . 0.620 1.99
hy 13.4 0.255 0.799 0.319 . . . . . 3.462 1.76
afr 13.1 -0.184 0.523 -0.352 . . . . . -2.346 -1.96
troppop 5.2 0.028 0.147 0.188 . . . . . -0.393 -0.61
infra 4.7 0.041 0.253 0.160 . . . . . 1.307 1.01
school60 4.6 -0.014 0.070 -0.196 . . . . . -0.288 -1.44
soe 4.5 -0.004 0.021 -0.182 . . . . . -0.133 -1.45
Privohat_gap 4.3 -0.001 0.004 -0.149 . . . . . -0.018 -0.88
bmp 3.4 0.000 0.001 0.158 . . . . . 0.006 1.3
pi 3 0.000 0.002 0.135 . . . . . -0.002 -0.17
corruptb 1.8 -0.004 0.040 -0.108 . . . . . -0.074 -0.26
revc 1.6 -0.015 0.141 -0.104 . . . . . -1.542 -1.32
assass 0.8 0.003 0.036 0.077 . . . . . 0.522 1.5
f_regu97 0.6 -0.002 0.028 -0.066 . . . . . -0.102 -0.29
sec 0.3 0.000 0.009 -0.031 . . . . . -0.125 -0.67
gov 0.2 0.000 0.002 0.032 . . . . . 0.012 0.32
avelf 0.2 0.001 0.037 0.032 . . . . . -0.284 -0.31
trade 0.1 0.000 0.000 0.021 . . . . . 0.008 1.07
pop100cr 0.1 0.000 0.012 -0.016 . . . . . -0.374 -0.62
privohat 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . . -0.001 -0.05
nVar 5 4 6 5 6 all
r2 0.799 0.78 0.807 0.791 0.805 0.92
BIC -63.58 -62.965 -61.761 -61.651 -61.417 .
post. Model prob. 0.079 0.058 0.032 0.03 0.027 .
Observations 53 53 53 53 53 53
*Notes: Results obtained with R-BMA BIC.reg software provided by A. Raftery (1995)
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth rate 1960-1995
Privohat is the predicted value from a regression of private credit on legal origins
Privohat_gap is the predicted from regressing privo*gap60 on legal origins and
legal origins interacted with the gap60
Table 1.2
Interacted Finance Variables versus Levels of the Rest
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of the uncertainty associated with quantities of interest (Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting,
1997). These two points are nicely illustrated when contrasting results from the full
model in the last two columns of Table 1.2 with the more appropriate Bayesian model
averaging results in the rst 9 columns of that table. On the one hand, the best
BMA regressors gain in signicance in terms of posterior t-values relative to the full
model which is due to the ination of the standard errors by the inclusion of irrelevant
regressors in the saturated model. On the other hand, civil liberties, the rule of law,
bureaucratic quality, the growth rate of years of schooling and the African dummy
loose their statistical and economic signicance.29 This is due to the fact that model
uncertainty is now accounted for and thus alleviates the problem of underestimating
the uncertainty about quantities of interest. The full model ts the data a lot less well
than the best BMA model and most variables included in the full model do not show
up in many of the good models. Figure 1.A2 in the appendix, which depicts the best
models for Table 1.2, illustrates this point; only very few variables are included in all
good models. Thus BMA nicely allows to address both of these issues mentioned above
at once.
Comparing the results of Table 1.2 to Table 1.1 shows that including the nance
interaction term does not change the results for the other variables by much. The
same regressors remain relevant with almost identical posterior inclusion probabilities,
posterior coe¢ cients and t-values.
The use of the comprehensive conditioning set does lend support to theories of
conditional convergence, particularly the ones based on institutional, health and human
capital variables. But it does not seem to support the hypothesis of a critical threshold
level of nancial development necessary to join a convergence club since the coe¢ cient
on the interaction term of nance and the initial output gap is not statistically di¤erent
from zero in both the full model and the BMA results. Thus, the nancial barrier to
convergence that Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) nd in their base line
specications is not robust to the consideration of other theories that had not been
included in their conditioning sets.
Since divergence in growth rates is observed in reality, one may wonder whether the
data does not provide any evidence of what causes it. In fact, a rst hint is contained
in Table 1.A3 in the appendix: the square of the initial output gap is added to the set
of regressors and the coe¢ cient on that squared initial output gap is highly signicant
29Note that according to equation (1.11) this may be due to the fact that the variance within the
good models is higher than for the full model or (more likely) because the poinst estimate between
models di¤ers greatly for these variables.
Chapter 1 - Finance, Institutions and Growth 33
and negative. As Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) (p. 203) argue:
If this term were to have a signicant negative coe¢ cient [..] it might indicate that
what keeps poor countries from joining the convergence club is just being poor to start
with, or something other than nance that is correlated with being poor to start with.
As will be shown in the next subsection, we can indeed nd variables for which the
interaction term with the initial output gap is highly signicant. In particular, these
are health and institutional factors which might be correlated with "being poor to start
with".
1.4.3 Institutions and Health as Facilitators of Technological
Di¤usion
We now allow all regressors in the comprehensive conditioning set for which this might
be suggested by a theory of barriers to technology adoption to be interacted with the
initial output gap. It might be institutions (Parente and Prescott, 1994), human capital
(Nelson and Phleps, 1966 or Benhabib and Spiegel 1994) health variables or lack of a
su¢ ciently good macroeconomic policies or sociopolitical stability that keep countries
from converging fast. Table 1.3 shows that for a number of variables convergence is
signicantly faster the higher they are.
In this table the variables are ranked according to their posterior inclusion proba-
bilities and it is evident that the interaction terms make up the bulk (6 out of 9) of
the regressors that have an inclusion probability of greater 0.5 and have BMA t-values
greater one. Again, health and an institutional variable receive the strongest support
from the data: the average child mortality rate and the index of in-depth experience
with state-level institutions (statehistory) of Bockstette et al. (2002).30 The rest of
the variables inuencing the rate of convergence are two institutional (bureaucratic
quality and civil liberties) indices, human capital and also the policy variable of gov-
ernment spending. This e¤ect might be interpreted in the light of growth models with
productive government spending. Surprisingly, once we allow for these nonlinearities
the African dummy reclaims the signicance it has found in many other cross sectional
growth studies.
The predominance of institutional variables (3 interacted ones and the rule of law
entering linearly) among the 9 identied as robustly correlated with growth is in line
30The child mortality rate of course is measured as higher meaning worse performace such that a
positive associated interaction term indicates that lower mortality means faster convergence.
Chapter 1 - Finance, Institutions and Growth 34
Rank Variable Post.Inclusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D. BMA t-value
1 Avgmort_Gap 0.978 0.007 0.003 2.828
2 afr 0.969 -2.266 0.992 -2.285
3 Statehist_Gap 0.911 -1.029 0.525 -1.961
4 Gov_Gap 0.767 -0.033 0.026 -1.274
5 Bureaub_Gap 0.725 -0.231 0.197 -1.170
6 Civil_Gap 0.712 -0.111 0.108 -1.030
7 rulelawb 0.633 0.237 0.271 0.875
8 Hy_Gap 0.565 -0.820 1.012 -0.810
9 pop100cr 0.555 -0.380 0.457 -0.831
10 Rulelaw_Gap 0.493 -0.124 0.213 -0.582
11 bureaub 0.481 0.200 0.289 0.691
12 f_regu97 0.457 -0.122 0.193 -0.632
13 revc 0.442 -0.415 0.675 -0.615
14 Fprop97_Gap 0.434 0.068 0.114 0.593
15 School60_Gap 0.430 0.069 0.117 0.588
16 corruptb 0.422 -0.128 0.220 -0.579
17 Gschool_Gap 0.409 0.043 0.091 0.474
18 hy 0.408 0.490 0.933 0.526
19 me 0.407 0.129 0.233 0.554
20 gschool 0.405 -0.092 0.186 -0.491
21 Me_Gap 0.398 0.049 0.089 0.547
22 Assass_Gap 0.384 -0.089 0.178 -0.501
23 Avelf_Gap 0.375 -0.183 0.384 -0.476
24 Sec_Gap 0.375 -0.069 0.129 -0.532
25 Fregu97_GAP 0.348 0.056 0.118 0.469
26 Exprisk_Gap 0.343 0.061 0.133 0.458
27 assass 0.294 0.023 0.241 0.096
28 gov 0.290 0.008 0.023 0.337
29 civil 0.268 0.002 0.145 0.014
30 Corrupt_Gap 0.268 -0.003 0.123 -0.021
31 Pi_Gap 0.257 -0.001 0.005 -0.225
32 Privohat_Gap 0.255 -0.003 0.007 -0.350
33 Avgexpect_Gap 0.252 0.001 0.012 0.067
34 Revc_Gap 0.245 0.094 0.294 0.320
35 Ghy_Gap 0.243 -0.018 0.125 -0.142
36 Trade_Gap 0.242 -0.001 0.003 -0.302
37 trade 0.237 -0.001 0.004 -0.350
38 avgexpec 0.234 -0.006 0.025 -0.225
39 Soe_Gap 0.230 0.006 0.028 0.234
40 pi 0.228 -0.002 0.007 -0.264
41 statehis 0.228 0.113 0.414 0.273
42 bmp 0.223 -0.001 0.003 -0.220
43 f_prop97 0.218 0.012 0.144 0.082
44 sec 0.207 0.022 0.075 0.293
45 Gap_Gap 0.205 0.016 0.160 0.103
46 avgmort 0.203 0.000 0.001 -0.214
47 avelf 0.202 -0.016 0.483 -0.034
48 school60 0.199 -0.011 0.062 -0.169
49 Bmp_Gap 0.195 0.000 0.001 -0.052
50 expriskb 0.190 0.007 0.135 0.053
51 gap60 0.186 -0.061 0.804 -0.076
52 soe 0.180 -0.003 0.030 -0.088
53 lat_abst 0.177 -0.022 0.411 -0.054
54 troppop 0.158 -0.025 0.139 -0.179
55 ghy 0.144 0.007 0.116 0.064
56 privohat 0.134 0.000 0.002 0.077
Notes: Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) Gauss software BACE was used to generate these results. PrCredit(IV) and
 XprCredit(IV)_gap are the predicetd values of an OLS regression of Private Credit and (Private Credit)*Gap
 on AHM's legal origins and legal origins interacted with the initial gap. X_Gap is the variable x*gap60
The Gauss software BACE needs to be used because BIC.reg is limited to 45 variables.
BACE does not allow to select best models or calculate BICs. 53 observation
Table 1.3
Barriers to Technology Diffusion in Health and Institutions
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with Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes(2005) observation that there is apossibility
that what matters for convergence is some unspecied combination of nancial devel-
opment and institutions,except that institutions appear to be the dominant factor.
We would be inclined to interpret our results further in the tradition of the literature
of the e¤ects of institutions on long run growth: institutions ultimately determine factor
allocations, productivity and savings as Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001, 2002) pointed out. It seems hard to imagine that, given the
possibilities of technological transfer, a country with great investment opportunities,
an educated and healthy work force and a su¢ cient level of infrastructure provided
by the state (productive government spending) would not attract FDI as a substitute
for domestic credit in order to nance that transfer. What could, however, lead to
the absence of foreign capital ows into a country is the absence of security of these
investments, the rule of law, corrupt o¢ cials and the risk of expropriation or the lack
of a productive workforce.
1.5 Robustness
1.5.1 Robustness to Di¤erent Priors
One concern in Bayesian Econometrics is the robustness to di¤erent prior specications.
It has been pointed out by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) that choosing
a prior inclusion probability of 0:5 for each regressor might be to high as that would
favor relatively large models.31 They suggest a smaller probability of 0:11 which is the
ratio of the number of regressors they considered (68) and their preferred prior model
size of 7.32 Given that we consider a smaller set of 30 regressors here, we re-estimated
our results with a prior on the inclusion probability of 7=30 = 0:23. Tables 1.4 and
1.5 replicate tables 1.1 and 1.2 with the Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004)
prior model size of 7. Results are very robust to this change in the priors. The same
variables pass the threshold of signicance which is now dened as having a posterior
inclusion probability greater 0:23 and neither the private credit variables in Table 1.4
nor its interaction term in Table 1.5 are signicant.
31Note, however that the BIC already has a built in penalty for complexity (compare Raftery, 1995,
1999)
32By setting the prior inclusion probability to 0.5 one implictly assumes a prior model size of k/2,
where k is the number of potential regressors.
Chapter 1 - Finance, Institutions and Growth 36
Variable Post.Inclusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D.
BMA t-
value
Best
BMA 1
Best
BMA 2
Best
BMA 3
Best
BMA 4
Best
BMA 5
Intercept 100 -12.5300 2.545 -4.920 -13.165 -12.980 -14.363 -10.818 -13.237
gap60 100 -1.9910 0.281 -7.090 -2.094 -2.017 -2.027 -1.885 -2.033
expriskb 98.9 0.6776 0.159100 4.260 0.600 0.719 0.676 0.688 0.663
me 96.6 -0.1071 0.035 -3.060 -0.118 -0.105 -0.126 -0.101 -0.120
avgexpect 94 0.0932 0.036 2.580 0.096 0.102 0.101 0.078 0.095
f_prop97 26.8 0.0943 0.180 0.523 0.355 . 0.346 . 0.381
avgmort 12.1 -0.0005 0.002 -0.315 . . . -0.003 .
civil 7.3 0.012280 0.0538 0.228 . . 0.151 . .
lat_abst 5.6 -0.0627 0.339 -0.185 . . . . -1.003
rulelawb 4.7 0.0100 0.061 0.163 . . . . .
statehist 4.7 0.02889000 0.1764 0.164 . . . . .
infra 4.2 0.03818000 0.246 0.155 . . . . .
ghy 3.9 0.0098 0.068 0.145 . . . . .
hy 3.6 0.0321 0.237 0.135 . . . . .
afr 2.6 -0.0390 0.256 -0.152 . . . . .
gschool 2.3 -0.0026 0.025 -0.104 . . . . .
troppop 1.3 0.0053 0.063 0.085 . . . . .
pi 1.2 0.0001 0.001 0.081 . . . . .
bureaub 0.9 0.0052 0.055 0.096 . . . . .
privohat 0 0.0000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
school60 0 0.0000 0.000 -0.002 . . . . .
sec 0 0.0000 0.000 -0.001 . . . . .
pop100cr 0 0.0000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
trade 0 0.0000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
f_regu97 0 0.0000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
gov 0 0.0000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
bmp 0 0.0000 0.000 0.001 . . . . .
soe 0 0.0000 0.000 -0.002 . . . . .
avelf 0 0.0000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
revc 0 0.0000 0.001 -0.001 . . . . .
assass 0 0.0000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
corruptb 0 0.0000 0.001 0.000 . . . . .
nVar 5 4 6 5 6
r2 0.799 0.780 0.807 0.791 0.805
BIC -63.580 -62.965 -61.761 -61.651 -61.417
post 0.141 0.036 0.017 0.015 0.014
Observations 53 53 53 53 53
*Notes: Results obtained with R-BMA BIC.reg software provided by A. Raftery (1995)
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth rate 1960-1995
Privohat is the predicted value from a regression of private credit on legal origins
Assumed prior inclusion probability=0.23 which is equivalent to BACE prior model
size = 7.
Table 1.4
Robustness of Linear Specification to Prior Model Size 7
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Variable Post. In-clusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D.
BMA t-
value
Best
BMA 1
Best
BMA 2
Best
BMA 3
Best
BMA 4
Best
BMA 5
Intercept 100 -12.520 2.550 -4.910 -13.165 -12.980 -14.363 -10.818 -13.237
gap60 100 -1.983 0.283 -7.000 -2.094 -2.017 -2.027 -1.885 -2.033
expriskb 98.8 0.678 0.159 4.250 0.600 0.719 0.676 0.688 0.663
me 96.5 -0.107 0.035 -3.040 -0.118 -0.105 -0.126 -0.101 -0.120
avgexpect 93.8 0.093 0.036 2.560 0.096 0.102 0.101 0.078 0.095
f_prop97 25.8 0.091 0.178 0.511 0.355 . 0.346 . 0.381
avgmort 12 0.000 0.002 -0.314 . . . -0.003 .
civil 7 0.012 0.053 0.223 . . 0.151 . .
lat_abst 5.3 -0.058 0.326 -0.179 . . . . -1.003
rulelawb 4.5 0.010 0.060 0.160 . . . . .
statehist 4.5 0.027 0.171 0.159 . . . . .
infra 4.1 0.037 0.244 0.153 . . . . .
ghy 3.8 0.010 0.067 0.143 . . . . .
Privohat_Gap 3.2 0.000 0.003 -0.124 . . . . .
hy 2.8 0.027 0.217 0.125 . . . . .
afr 2.6 -0.040 0.259 -0.154 . . . . .
troppop 1.2 0.005 0.061 0.081 . . . . .
pi 1.1 0.000 0.001 0.079 . . . . .
bureaub 1 0.005 0.055 0.097 . . . . .
privohat 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
school60 0 0.000 0.000 -0.002 . . . . .
sec 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
gschool 0 0.000 0.003 -0.010 . . . . .
pop100cr 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
trade 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
f_regu97 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
gov 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
bmp 0 0.000 0.000 0.001 . . . . .
soe 0 0.000 0.000 -0.002 . . . . .
avelf 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
revc 0 0.000 0.001 -0.001 . . . . .
assass 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
corruptb 0 0.000 0.001 0.001 . . . . .
nVar 5.000 4.000 6.000 5.000 6.000
r2 0.799 0.780 0.807 0.791 0.805
BIC -63.580 -62.965 -61.761 -61.651 -61.417
post. Model prob. 0.139 0.064 0.016 0.013 0.013
Observations 53 53 53 53 53
*Notes: Results obtained with R-BMA BIC.reg software provided by A. Raftery (1995)
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth rate 1960-1995
Privohat is the predicted value from a regression of private credit on legal origins
Privohat_gap is the predicted from regressing privo*gap60 on legal origins and
legal origins interacted with the gap60
Assumed prior inclusion probability=0.23 which is equivalent to BACE prior model size = 7.
Robustness of Table 1.2 to Prior Model Size 7
Table 1.5
For the case of interactions in all variables, the picture is very similar. The core
results are not altered by changing the priors either. Table 1.6 shows results with
the same prior inclusion probability of 0.23 used above such that the assumed prior
model size is 13. However given that Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004)
emphasize the prior model size of 7, apparently regardless of the number of regressors
under consideration, we also estimated the interaction results with a prior inclusion of
0:125 in table 1.7.
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Rank Variable Post.Inclusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D. BMA t-value
1 Avgmort_GAP 0.995 0.007 0.002 4.609
2 Statehist_GAP 0.912 -1.061 0.487 -2.177
3 afr 0.823 -1.468 0.885 -1.659
4 rulelawb 0.680 0.267 0.222 1.202
5 Gov_GAP 0.622 -0.026 0.024 -1.080
6 Bureaub_GAP 0.620 -0.185 0.168 -1.100
7 Civil_GAP 0.542 -0.071 0.082 -0.865
8 bureaub 0.367 0.154 0.240 0.643
9 f_regu97 0.367 -0.121 0.186 -0.651
10 Rulelaw_GAP 0.341 -0.054 0.125 -0.433
11 pop100cr 0.244 -0.147 0.310 -0.474
12 Hy_GAP 0.217 -0.280 0.652 -0.430
13 hy 0.210 0.263 0.636 0.414
14 Fregu97_GAP 0.205 0.036 0.090 0.397
15 corruptb 0.194 -0.049 0.126 -0.390
16 Corrupt_GAP 0.193 0.030 0.084 0.351
17 gov 0.186 0.007 0.019 0.343
18 civil 0.173 0.010 0.087 0.117
19 Me_GAP 0.138 0.006 0.029 0.216
20 Gap_GAP 0.135 0.031 0.112 0.278
21 Gschool_GAP 0.128 0.007 0.033 0.207
22 gschool 0.124 -0.020 0.075 -0.272
23 me 0.123 0.007 0.070 0.095
24 expriskb 0.122 0.030 0.108 0.280
25 gap60 0.120 -0.107 0.466 -0.230
26 Avelf_GAP 0.118 -0.036 0.135 -0.268
27 revc 0.110 -0.064 0.246 -0.260
28 avgexpec 0.108 -0.004 0.017 -0.252
29 Exprisk_GAP 0.105 -0.005 0.041 -0.124
30 statehis 0.103 0.059 0.286 0.207
31 bmp 0.095 0.000 0.001 -0.215
32 avelf 0.090 0.042 0.209 0.200
33 Ghy_GAP 0.089 -0.011 0.067 -0.167
34 Revc_GAP 0.089 0.022 0.121 0.181
35 sec 0.087 0.009 0.044 0.216
36 Bmp_GAP 0.084 0.000 0.001 0.162
37 trade 0.083 0.000 0.002 -0.183
38 Fprop97_GAP 0.083 0.007 0.038 0.194
39 Avgexpect_GAP 0.081 0.001 0.006 0.090
40 Pi_GAP 0.079 0.000 0.002 -0.151
41 School60_GAP 0.079 0.004 0.028 0.128
42 f_prop97 0.076 -0.003 0.056 -0.057
43 Soe_GAP 0.074 -0.001 0.009 -0.103
44 Aassass_GAP 0.064 -0.005 0.039 -0.136
45 pi 0.064 0.000 0.003 -0.066
46 ghy 0.061 0.009 0.070 0.131
47 lat_abst 0.061 -0.029 0.213 -0.135
48 Privohat_GAP 0.059 0.000 0.002 -0.035
49 Trade_GAP 0.059 0.000 0.001 -0.048
50 avgmort 0.059 0.000 0.001 -0.104
51 Sec_GAP 0.059 -0.004 0.034 -0.114
52 assass 0.054 0.004 0.051 0.069
53 school60 0.054 -0.001 0.022 -0.029
54 soe 0.053 0.001 0.012 0.063
55 privohat 0.049 0.000 0.001 0.006
56 troppop 0.047 0.000 0.061 -0.008
Notes: Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) Gauss software BACE was used to generate these results
PrCredit(IV) and XprCredit(IV)_gap are the predicetd values of an OLS regression of
Private Credit and (Private Credit)*Gap on AHM's legal origins and legal origins interacted with the initial gap.
For clarity of exposition names for regressor interacted with the initial output gap start with an 'X'
The Gauss software BACE needs to be used because BIC.reg is limited to 45 variables.
BACE does not allow to select best models or calculate BICs 53 observation
Prior inclusion probability is 0.23, prior model size = 13
Table 1.6
Robustness of Table 1.3 to Prior Model Size 13
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Rank Variable Post.Inclusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D. BMA t-value
1 Avgmort_GAP 0.994 0.007 0.002 4.270
2 Statehist_GAP 0.872 -1.064 0.551 -1.930
3 rulelawb 0.702 0.291 0.223 1.304
4 afr 0.642 -1.154 1.007 -1.146
5 Bureaub_GAP 0.535 -0.158 0.165 -0.953
6 Gov_GAP 0.440 -0.018 0.024 -0.780
7 Civil_GAP 0.432 -0.056 0.074 -0.763
8 bureaub 0.226 0.086 0.181 0.474
9 Rulelaw_GAP 0.209 -0.035 0.097 -0.367
10 Gap_GAP 0.199 0.076 0.174 0.438
11 pop100cr 0.184 -0.133 0.321 -0.414
12 Hy_GAP 0.168 -0.261 0.685 -0.380
13 f_regu97 0.167 -0.052 0.134 -0.390
14 expriskb 0.162 0.061 0.155 0.391
15 Me_GAP 0.136 0.004 0.019 0.240
16 gov 0.135 0.005 0.016 0.317
17 gap60 0.128 -0.120 0.481 -0.249
18 Corrupt_GAP 0.118 0.020 0.069 0.291
19 Fregu97_GAP 0.113 0.020 0.067 0.293
20 Bmp_GAP 0.096 0.000 0.001 0.255
21 Exprisk_GAP 0.089 -0.010 0.044 -0.232
22 me 0.087 0.000 0.044 -0.011
23 corruptb 0.080 -0.019 0.083 -0.232
24 civil 0.070 0.005 0.054 0.084
25 avgexpec 0.069 -0.003 0.014 -0.201
26 hy 0.066 0.074 0.361 0.205
27 f_prop97 0.062 -0.005 0.043 -0.110
28 avelf 0.062 0.027 0.172 0.155
29 bmp 0.060 0.000 0.001 -0.195
30 Revc_GAP 0.058 0.019 0.108 0.178
31 Avelf_GAP 0.058 -0.016 0.095 -0.172
32 statehis 0.056 0.033 0.214 0.154
33 gschool 0.055 -0.007 0.040 -0.175
34 Avgexpect_GAP 0.054 0.000 0.005 -0.009
35 Pi_GAP 0.052 0.000 0.002 -0.145
36 revc 0.049 -0.027 0.162 -0.169
37 Gschool_GAP 0.043 0.002 0.016 0.124
38 sec 0.041 0.005 0.032 0.147
39 Ghy_GAP 0.039 -0.004 0.041 -0.106
40 pi 0.037 0.000 0.002 -0.033
41 avgmort 0.034 0.000 0.000 -0.110
42 trade 0.033 0.000 0.001 -0.117
43 Soe_GAP 0.033 -0.001 0.006 -0.080
44 ghy 0.032 0.005 0.049 0.097
45 Fprop97_GAP 0.032 0.002 0.020 0.091
46 Sec_GAP 0.030 -0.002 0.023 -0.080
47 privohat 0.029 0.000 0.001 -0.014
48 school60 0.029 0.001 0.014 0.062
49 School60_GAP 0.028 0.000 0.014 0.001
50 assass 0.028 0.000 0.031 -0.005
51 Trade_GAP 0.027 0.000 0.001 -0.004
52 lat_abst 0.027 -0.009 0.134 -0.068
53 soe 0.027 0.000 0.009 0.037
54 Privohat_GAP 0.025 0.000 0.002 -0.046
55 Assass_GAP 0.024 -0.001 0.020 -0.026
56 troppop 0.023 0.000 0.042 -0.006
Notes: Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) Gauss software BACE was used to generate these results
PrCredit(IV) and XprCredit(IV)_gap are the predicetd values of an OLS regression of
Private Credit and (Private Credit)*Gap on AHM's legal origins and legal origins interacted with the initial gap.
For clarity of exposition names for regressor interacted with the initial output gap start with an 'X'
The Gauss software BACE needs to be used because BIC.reg is limited to 45 variables.
BACE does not allow to select best models or calculate BICs 53 observation
Prior inclusion probability is 0.125 implying prior model size = 7
Table 1.7
Robustness of Table 1.3 to Prior Model Size 7
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While there seems to be a slight tendency that the number of regressors that have
a posterior inclusion greater than the prior one is increased a bit by lowering the
prior model size, the most important regressors remain the same, especially in terms
of their signicance in terms of BMA t-values. Given these results, one can be quite
condent that the ndings presented in the main section are very robust to di¤erent
prior specications.
1.5.2 Robustness to Instrumentation and Dilution
One might have further concerns regarding the instrumentation of the private credit
variable. Using the predicted value is actually not a proper instrumental variable
regression as that would imply to include all other regressors used in the second stage
also in the rst stage alongside the instruments. Obviously this is not feasible with
the very many di¤erent models considered here. Given that both the private credit
variable and its interaction term never show up in any reasonable model, one probably
need not be too concerned about this point. Another objection might be that one
unfairly biases results against the nancial intermediation terms by using predicted
values from regressions on legal origins and thus maybe taking away some variation
from it compared to the other regressors. That is why we re-estimated all our results
by using the actual and not the predicted values, i.e. not instrumenting private credit.
Since the results were virtually unchanged, especially in that the nancial terms never
reached any signicance and rather health and institutional variables are important
we do not report those results here to conserve space. We will report one specication
where we do not instrument nance below in the switched regressions.
A great concern in traditional econometrics are biases due to multicollinearity. This
is especially the case for large datasets with many di¤erent variables such as the present
one. In BMA however, this dilution that arises in regressions when independent vari-
ables are highly correlated is only a problem when the correlated regressors measure the
same underlying concept. When they correspond to substantially di¤erent mechanism
one need not worry (compare Hoeting et al, 1999, pp. 413-414). In our dataset the
problem of dilution might then be acute especially for the institutional variables, but
also geographical ones, schooling and health. The policy variables on the other hand,
certainly measure very di¤erent types of policies. To inspect whether our results are
unduly inuenced by this e¤ect, we performed factor analysis on the highly correlated
institutional, health, schooling and geographical variables.33 The correlation matrices
33Given that the variable statehistory measures something quite distinct from the other institutions,
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for these variables in Table 1.A4 in the appendix show that multicollinearity might
indeed be a problem. In all cases only one factor is dominant (eigenvalue substantially
greater than one). We label these newly created variables institution1, health1, school1
and geography1 respectively. Table 1.8 shows that when we use these factors instead of
the correlated variables, our basic results go through. Here, we directly introduce the
specication where we allow for interactions with the initial output gap for all variables
for which that is implied by the barriers to adaption theories.
Again what matters are institutional and health parameters but not nance. There
clearly two variables that inuence the rate of convergence. The health factor and in the
institutional experience variable state history.34 The institutional factor alone exhibits
a strong positive e¤ect. Interestingly, the initial output gap reclaims its signicance
such that one might conclude that its e¤ect was tarnished by the inclusion of correlated
regressors.35 The results for Table 1.8 are illustrated in Figure 1.A3 in the appendix
and show that indeed only variables or factors for theories that have been important
in the main specication appear in many good models.
A last concern might be that institutions might be endogenous. As mentioned
above, this should not be a great concern here since institutions are generally seen
to be inuenced by output levels not growth rates and we use period averages and
not end of period values. Nevertheless, as a nal robustness experiment we employ
what Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) call switched regressions: instead of
instrumenting nance with legal origins, we instrument the institutional factor. This
is now possible because we have only one potentially endogenous institutional variable
since statehistory is by construction exogenous to growth rates. That legal origins can
serve as valid instruments for institutions has been recently demonstrated by Levine
(forthcoming). Table 1.9 shows that even in this specication nancial intermediation
does not gain an important role.
namely the long term stability of a state and the in depth experience with institutions, we leave this
variable in the regression as it is. (it is also not very highly correlated with the other institutional
variables and certainly not endogenous). For the same reason the African Dummy is retained. The
Sociopolitical stability variables are not very highly correlated with one another.
34Unlike the mortality variable that proofed important in the main section, the health factor is
coded such that higher values mean better health conditions.
35Furthermore, we now include less interaction terms that are by their nature correlated with the
gap.
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Variable Post. In-clusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D.
BMA t-
value
Best
BMA 1
Best
BMA 2
Best
BMA 3
Best
BMA 4
Best
BMA 5
Intercept 100 -0.009 0.517 -0.017 -0.124 -0.369 0.225 -0.542 -0.077
Inst1 100 1.073 0.189 5.690 1.090 1.020 0.799 0.996 1.010
Health2_GAP 100 -0.772 0.099 -7.790 -0.814 -0.791 -0.743 -0.811 -0.801
Statehist_GAP 99.9 -1.235 0.311 -3.980 -1.258 -1.282 -1.635 -1.317 -1.347
gap60 73.4 -0.652 0.478 -1.370 -0.928 -1.071 . -0.916 -0.596
afr 41.9 -0.381 0.566 -0.672 . . . . .
gov_gap 34.8 -0.011 0.017 -0.609 . . -0.041 . -0.021
avelf_gap 22.1 -0.093 0.210 -0.441 . . . . .
trade_gap 19.3 -0.002 0.005 -0.445 . . . . .
trade 19 -0.003 0.007 -0.440 . . . . .
avelf 16.3 0.127 0.351 0.362 . . . . .
soe_gap 11.3 -0.006 0.023 -0.253 . . . . .
school1 10.6 0.024 0.089 0.273 . 0.245 . . .
gov 10.4 0.003 0.011 0.250 . . . 0.029 .
soe 3.5 -0.005 0.031 -0.170 . . . . .
school1_gap 3.4 -0.004 0.032 -0.123 . . . . .
health2 3 0.010 0.086 0.121 . . . . .
bmp_gap 2.4 0.000 0.000 0.098 . . . . .
pi_gap 2.4 0.000 0.001 -0.111 . . . . .
assass_gap 1.1 0.001 0.016 0.077 . . . . .
revc 1 -0.004 0.072 -0.062 . . . . .
pi 0.7 0.000 0.001 0.049 . . . . .
assass 0.2 0.000 0.011 -0.032 . . . . .
statehist 0.1 0.000 0.031 0.009 . . . . .
revc_gap 0.1 0.000 0.020 -0.018 . . . . .
privohat 0 0.000 0.000 0.003 . . . . .
privohat_gap 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
bmp 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
Inst1_gap 0 0.000 0.007 -0.014 . . . . .
geo1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
nVar 5 4 6 5 6
r2 0.799 0.78 0.807 0.791 0.805
BIC -63.5796 -62.9651 -61.7605 -61.6507 -61.4173
post. Model prob. 0.079 0.058 0.032 0.03 0.027
Observations 53 53 53 53 53
*Notes: Results obtained with R-BMA BIC.reg software provided by A. Raftery (1995)
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth rate 1960-1995
Prior inclusion probability is 0.5
Health2, school1, Inst1 and Geo1 are the first factors from factor analysis on the
variables specified in the correlation matrix 1.A4 in the appendix
Private Credit and its interaction term are instrumented with legal origins
Table 1.8
Robustness to Multicollinearity
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Post. In-
clusion Post. Coeff Post. S.D.
BMA t-
value
Best
BMA 1
Best
BMA 2
Best
BMA 3
Best
BMA 4
Best
BMA 5
Intercept 100 -0.208 0.372 -0.560 -0.275 -0.262 -0.150 0.127 -0.497
statehist_gap 100 -1.555 0.363 -4.284 -1.775 -1.536 -1.704 -1.614 -1.516
health2 100 1.537 0.227 6.768 1.534 1.490 1.240 1.628 1.644
inst3_gap 84.7 -0.395 0.241 -1.643 -0.389 -0.314 -0.394 -0.460 -0.500
gov_gap 71.9 -0.035 0.026 -1.311 -0.056 -0.044 -0.057 -0.067 -0.042
privo_gap 29.2 -0.003 0.005 -0.528 . -0.007 . . .
gap60 25.8 -0.274 0.525 -0.523 . . . . -0.469
bmp 22.3 -0.001 0.003 -0.444 . . . . .
assass 14.5 -0.044 0.132 -0.330 . . . . .
pi_gap 13.7 -0.003 0.009 -0.352 . . . . .
pi 13.1 -0.004 0.012 -0.344 . . . . .
assass_gap 12.2 0.026 0.083 0.315 . . . . .
bmp_gap 10.3 0.000 0.001 0.295 . . . . .
gov 6.1 -0.001 0.011 -0.125 . . . -0.034 .
health2_gap 5.6 -0.009 0.054 -0.174 . . -0.167 . .
trade_gap 3.9 0.000 0.002 -0.161 . . . . .
statehist 3.1 -0.015 0.134 -0.113 . . . . .
soe_gap 2.6 -0.001 0.006 -0.106 . . . . .
geo1 2.5 -0.003 0.032 -0.097 . . . . .
trade 2 0.000 0.002 -0.127 . . . . .
afr 1.8 -0.010 0.104 -0.097 . . . . .
inst3 1.5 0.004 0.043 0.099 . . . . .
revc 0.8 -0.004 0.063 -0.063 . . . . .
avelf 0.7 0.002 0.049 0.049 . . . . .
school1_gap 0.3 0.001 0.023 0.045 . . . . .
school1 0.2 0.001 0.024 0.034 . . . . .
revc_gap 0.1 0.000 0.011 0.018 . . . . .
privo 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
soe 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
avelf_gap 0 0.000 0.004 -0.006 . . . . .
nVar 5 4 6 5 6
r2 0.799 0.78 0.807 0.791 0.805
BIC -63.5796 -62.9651 -61.7605 -61.6507 -61.4173
post. Model prob. 0.079 0.058 0.032 0.03 0.027
Observations 53 53 53 53 53
*Notes: Results obtained with R-BMA BIC.reg software provided by A. Raftery (1995)
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth rate 1960-1995
Private Credit and its interaction term are not instrumented
Institution3 is the instrumented first factor from factor analysis on
f_regu97 bureauB corruptB rulelawB f_prop97 expriskB civil
Instrumented with LLB's Legal Origins
Health2, school1 and Geo1 are the first factors from factor analysis on the
variables specified in the correlation matrix 1.A4 in the appendix
Table 1.9
Switched Regression- Controling for the Endogeneity of Institutions
The instrumented institution and the health factor trade places with regard to dis-
playing the threshold and statehistory continues to play a paramount role as a thresh-
old. By using the not instrumented nancial intermediation variable its interaction
term does at least make it into the 5th best model. As Figure 1.A4 in the appendix
shows it now indeed does show up in the occasional good model but these occasional
appearances to not help to gain a signicant posterior inclusion probability or posterior
t-value. Given that a variable like private credit is a lot more likely to be inuenced
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by growth rates than institutions the light gain in importance of nance is maybe not
surprising as endogeneity leads to upward biases of OLS estimates.36
All in all, we can conclude that results of nance being unimportant once insti-
tutional quality, and the health environment are controlled for are quite robust to
di¤erent priors and di¤erent specications.
1.6 Conclusion
Are theories of nance and growth robust to the inclusion of variables implied by other
growth theories? Our results of a simple Bayesian model averaging analysis of a linear
growth model that properly accounts for model uncertainty and includes variables from
many theories including the exogenous component of nance that has received broad
attention in the literature suggest that this is not the case. The variables that are
robustly related to growth are measuring institutional and health quality.
Since this type of simple linear regression analysis cannot capture nonlinearities it
can only explain conditional convergence. However, one might be interested in digging
deeper into the question of why some countries do not catch up given that there should
be what Gerschenkron (1962) famously called the advantage of backwardness in
imitating foreign technology and in enjoying positive spillovers from other countries and
to nd out what explains the di¤ering convergence rates observed in reality. The ideas
of barriers to technological adaption have been put forward by a numbers of authors to
answer these questions. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) o¤er an interesting
model that characterizes critical thresholds in the nancial development of a country.
Some nancing is needed in order to successfully benet from technological spillovers.
The empirical test used to verify this theory largely ignores theory open-endedness
and model uncertainty. Properly taking account of these factors by means of Bayesian
model averaging, one can show that it seem to be rather institutional and health factors
that are at the heart of the non-convergence phenomenon. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes(2005) theory might be adapted to incorporate these ndings: given that it
can easily be generalized by replacing F for nance with an I for institutions or H for
healthy human capital, one can take that theory together with the empirical evidence
derived here to strongly argue for a theory of barriers to adaption in institutions and
health that is uniquely robust to the inclusion of other regressors and interactions.
36Institutions are regarded in the literature as very persistent (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,
2005), while the same is not true for private credit.
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Since the policy implications of the results here would clearly indicate a focus on
improving institutions and health conditions, more research to nd out why health is
important and how to improve it on the national scale is warranted. Given that na-
tional health systems are usually heavily institutionalized and bureaucratic - witness
some debates about the bureaucratic e¢ ciency of hospital administrations, health in-
surance companies and public administration o¢ cials involved - one might be tempted
to conclude form the results presented here that institutions are indeed the funda-
mental causesnot only of long run but also of intermediate run growth and that they
represent important reasons why countries are catching up, forging ahead and falling
behind37.
37Abramovitz (1986).
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1.7 Appendix Chapter 1
Figure 1.A1
Best Models for Table 1.1
(Green/Red indicate positive/negative coefficient)
Figure 1.A2
Best Models for Table 1.2
(Green/Red indicate positive/negative coefficient)
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Figure 1.A3
Best Models for Table 1.8
(Green/Red indicate positive/negative coefficient)
Figure 1.A4
Best Models for Table 1.9
(Green/Red indicate positive/negative coefficient)
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Growth: Growth rate of GDP per Capita 1960-1995
Gap60: Difference between log per-capita real GDP 1960 in each country and the USA.
Privo, private credit (FINANCE): {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t) + F(t-1)/Pe(t-1) ]}/[GDP(t)/ Pa(t)], where F is credit
by deposit money bank and other financial institutions to the private sectors (lines 22d +42d), GDP
is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line 64) and Pa is the average CPI for the year, IFS
statehist: "index of in-depth experience with state-level institutions" and the
antiquity of a state (1 to 1950 CE). Bockstette et al (2002)
rulelaw: Measure of the law and order tradition in a country. Averaged over 1982-1995
F_reg97: Business regulation. Rating of regulation policies related to opening and keeping
open a business. The scale is from 0 to 5, with higher scores meaning more favorable regulations.
bureau: An average of three indices published by Business International Corporation
(1984): efficiency of the judiciary system, red tape and corruption. The averages are over 1980-1983.
exprisk: Expropriation risk. Assessment of risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced
Nationalization. Lower scores indicating a higher risk. Averaged over 1982-1995
pr. rights: Property rights. Rating of property rights on a scale from 0 to 5.
infra: Measure of social infrastructure (1986-1995) computed as the average of the GADP
and an openness measures. GADP is an index of government antidiversion policies including
law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and government
repudiation of contracts, Hall and Jones (1999).
civil: Index of civil liberties, Freedom House 1994.
corruption: Measure of corruption. Data are averaged over 1982-1995. Higher values indicate less corruption
avgexpect: Average life expectancy at birth for the years 1960-1990, Children Data Bank
avgmort: Average under-5 mortality rate for the years 1970-1990, Children Data Bank for
me: Malaria Ecology. An ecologically-based variable that is predictive of the extent of
malaria transmission (Kiszewski et al., forthcoming).
pop100cr: Percentage of population within 100 km of ice-free coast, CID at Harvard University
tropop: Percentage of population in geographical tropics, CID at Harvard University.
lat_abst: Distance from the equator scaled between 0 and 1. (Hall and Jones, 1999)
africa: Dummy for countries in the African continent.
sec: Average years of secondary schooling in the population over 15 from 1960-1995, Barro and Lee (1996).
school: Average years of schooling in the population over 25 in 1960, Barro and Lee (1996).
gschool: Average annual growth rate of schooling from 1960 to 1995, LLB (2000).
hy: 1985 human-capital to output ratio, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997).
ghy: 1960-1985 annual growth rate of human capital to output ratio, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997).
bmp: Black market premium: Ratio of black market exchange rate and official exchange
rate minus one, Picks’ Currency Yearbook through (1989) and the World Currency Yearbook.
soe: Index of state owned enterprises (SOE). Higher Scores mean less government ownership
pi: Inflation rate. Log difference of consumer price index average from 1960-1995, IFS (line 64).
trade: Openness to trade. Sum of real exports and imports as a share of real GDP average
1960-1995, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), henceforth LLB.
gov: Government expenditure as a share of GDP average 1960-1995, LLB (2000).
assass: Number of assassinations per 1000 inhabitants, averaged over 1960-1990.
revc: Revolutions and coups. Data are averaged over 1960-1990, Banks (1994).
avelf : Ethnic fractionalization. Average value of five indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
with values ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values denote higher levels of
fractionalization, Easterly and Levine (1998).
Notes: Primary Data Source, if not othewise indicated, Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
growth 71 1.877485 1.863301 -2.811944 7.156855
privo 71 38.22211 28.70798 4.08484 141.2944
gov 64 14.78803 5.192442 6.681304 31.37076
trade 66 59.12508 35.90345 14.0502 231.6857
bmp 67 26.85629 51.2223 0 277.4202
sec 69 1.032029 1.01067 0 3.76
pi 71 15.28418 17.345 3.628935 90.78316
revc 71 0.1691054 0.2256045 0 0.9703704
assass 71 0.2592723 0.4744023 0 2.466667
civil 70 3.136429 1.877117 1 6.9
afr 71 0.1549296 0.3644129 0 1
school60 71 3.866901 2.54047 0.07 10.07
gschool 71 1.957346 1.583078 -0.4329169 8.897367
lat_abst 70 0.2988444 0.201646 0 0.7222222
f_regu97 66 2.939394 0.8015137 1 4
f_prop97 66 3.712121 1.034262 1 5
soe 66 4.812121 1.939351 0.4 8
avelf 71 0.3039895 0.2841969 0 0.8722529
troppop 67 0.4769708 0.4840587 0 1
pop100cr 67 0.6722388 0.3220946 0 1
infra 69 0.5637904 0.2645136 0.11267 1
statehist 67 0.4443284 0.261952 0.07 0.98
avgmort 64 94.53125 89.64841 11.33333 454.3333
avgexpect 64 62.32813 10.58421 37 75.5
hy 70 0.5401429 0.1492541 0.25 1
ghy 70 0.7481429 0.5084626 -0.64 2.35
gap60 71 -1.537205 0.837083 -3.294423 2.33E-07
me 67 2.767836 5.779551 0 23.325
corruptB 67 3.588396 1.565418 0.11875 6
rulelawB 67 3.685871 1.618471 0.91875 6
bureauB 67 3.713209 1.661099 0.90625 6
expriskB 67 7.578656 1.772431 3.71875 9.985714
Table 1.A2 - Descriptive Statistics
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Variable
Post.
Inclusio
n
Post. Coeff Post. S.D. BMA t-value
Best
BMA 1
Best
BMA 2
Best
BMA 3
Best
BMA 4
Best
BMA 5
Intercept 100 -9.322 2.501 -3.730 -10.681 -10.526 -5.917 -8.533 -11.488
gap60 100 -4.763 0.727 -6.550 -4.941 -4.747 -4.507 -4.389 -4.547
me 100 -0.105 0.025 -4.270 -0.098 -0.102 -0.110 -0.100 -0.113
GAP_SQRT 99.3 -1.074 0.248 -4.320 -1.083 -1.040 -1.086 -0.969 -0.995
rulelawb 99.2 0.782 0.172 4.550 0.747 0.769 0.867 0.775 0.748
hy 99.1 3.754 1.022 3.670 3.987 3.888 3.869 3.537 3.799
statehist 99.1 1.793 0.494 3.630 1.616 1.818 2.075 1.874 1.917
corruptb 97.9 -0.537 0.187 -2.870 -0.555 -0.501 -0.541 -0.503 -0.489
bureaub 97.4 0.445 0.163 2.720 0.448 0.443 0.406 0.414 0.522
pop100cr 96.5 -0.899 0.383 -2.350 -0.977 -1.002 -0.889 -0.961 -0.829
avgexpect 71.3 0.042 0.035 1.190 0.060 0.062 . 0.044 0.069
lat_abst 63 -1.012 1.020 -0.992 . -1.167 -1.584 -1.479 -1.521
avgmort 34.4 -0.001 0.002 -0.593 . . -0.004 -0.003 .
gov 25.1 0.008 0.018 0.447 . . . . .
civil 15.4 0.023 0.067 0.336 . . . . 0.140
f_prop97 13.9 0.028 0.091 0.306 . . . . .
Privohat_GAP 12.4 0.002 0.006 0.273 . . . . .
ghy 8.4 0.018 0.084 0.218 . . . . .
troppop 7.9 -0.033 0.152 -0.219 . . . . .
afr 6.1 -0.047 0.230 -0.206 . . . . .
sec 3.3 -0.004 0.033 -0.138 . . . . .
revc 2.7 -0.012 0.102 -0.114 . . . . .
avelf 1.9 0.008 0.090 0.089 . . . . .
expriskb 1.7 0.009 0.077 0.122 . . . . .
f_regu97 0.7 -0.001 0.023 -0.062 . . . . .
school60 0.5 -0.001 0.012 -0.054 . . . . .
bmp 0.5 0.000 0.000 0.053 . . . . .
gschool 0.3 0.000 0.012 -0.039 . . . . .
pi 0.3 0.000 0.001 0.043 . . . . .
infra 0.1 0.000 0.027 0.012 . . . . .
privohat 0 0.000 0.000 0.009 . . . . .
trade 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
soe 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 . . . . .
assass 0 0.000 0.004 0.010 . . . . .
nVar 10 11 11 12 12
r2 0.883 0.891 0.89 0.897 0.896
BIC -72.2716 -71.7371 -71.414 -70.9493 -70.31
post. Model prob. 0.084 0.064 0.055 0.043 0.031
Observations 53 53 53 53 53
*Notes: Results obtained with R-BMA BIC.reg software provided by A. Raftery (1995)
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth rate 1960-1995
Table 1.A3
Including the Square of the Initial Output Gap
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Institutions f_regu97 bureauB corruptB rulelawB f_prop97 expriskB civil
f_regu97 1
bureauB 0.5838 1
corruptB 0.6256 0.9142 1
rulelawB 0.5509 0.879 0.8863 1
f_prop97 0.5528 0.7534 0.7404 0.7884 1
expriskB 0.607 0.9184 0.8913 0.9234 0.8019 1
civil 0.5006 0.7449 0.7499 0.7404 0.6272 0.8247 1
Health avgmort avgexp~t me
avgmort 1
avgexpect -0.8083 1
me 0.5889 -0.6686 1
Geography troppop pop100cr lat_abst
troppop 1
pop100cr -0.2091 1
lat_abst -0.8674 0.3177 1
Schooling/HC hy ghy sec school60 gschool
hy 1
ghy 0.3829 1
sec 0.4367 0.1729 1
school60 0.7418 0.1559 0.6792 1
gschool -0.3863 -0.0244 -0.5044 -0.6924 1
Table 1.A4 - Correlation Matrix for Intsitutions, Health, Geography and HC
Chapter 2
Institutions and Economic
Performance - Endogeneity and
Parameter Heterogeneity1
1This chapter is based on joint work with Theo Eicher, University of Washington.
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What do Thailand, the Dominican Republic, Zimbabwe, Greece, and Bolivia
have in common that merits their being put in the same regression?
Harberger (1987)
2.1 Introduction
The hallmark of the recent development and growth literature is a quest to identify
institutions that explain a signicant portion of the observed di¤erences in living stan-
dards across countries.2 While the denitions of institutionsmay vary across studies,
the results are consistent and strong: institutions explain economically and statistically
signicant di¤erences in per capita incomes across countries.3 The set of countries un-
der observation is at times dictated by data availability, but generally the literature
examines either the global sample or developing countries. The types of institutions
that have been associated with economic performance commonly relate to measures of
government risk of expropriation, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, govern-
ment repudiation of contracts, civil liberties, and openness to trade.
Rather surprising is, however, the absence of a comprehensive literature that an-
alyzes which institutions determine the economic fortunes in developed nations. One
might expect, for example, that the above cited institutions hardly vary across OECD
countries - too little, perhaps, to provide insights into how these nations achieve and
maintain their rank at the front of the income frontier. In this chapter, we examine pa-
rameter heterogeneity as it relates to the inuence of institutions on output in OECD
and Non-OECD subsamples. We seek to examine whether a set of institutions exists
which contains explanatory power and economic inuence in both subsamples.
While the literature provides ample guidance as to which institutions are commonly
lacking in developing countries, there exists only a rudimentary understanding to what
degree the same institutions actually matter in OECD countries. Research that focuses
on advanced economies excludes the rest of the world; as a result, such studies focus on
completely di¤erent sets of institutions, such as labor market institutions (e.g., Nickell,
Nunziata and Ochel, 2005 and Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2000), traditional factor
markets such as human and physical capital (e.g., Bassanini, Hemmings and Scarpetta,
2Depending on the dataset, income per worker di¤erences are 35- or 94-fold (Hall and Jones, 1999
or Caselli, 2005).
3For prominent examples of denitions of institutions, economic institutions, social in-
frastructure, or structural policiessee Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2001), Hall and Jones (1999) or Persson (2004), respectively.
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2001), or product regulations (e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). It is undeniably true
that these institutions are crucial determinants of economic performance in advanced
countries. Our focus is di¤erent; we seek to establish the impact of those institutions
that have been shown to hold strong explanatory power in global regressions and to
examine whether they also hold explanatory power in the OECD subsample. The goal
is to establish a set of institutions that matter not only in advanced or developing
countries, but are fundamental determinants of economic performance in both.
Since we seek to investigate whether a set of institutions exists that matters across
all countries, our point of departure is the Hall and Jones (1999) methodology which
includes instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of institutions in a global,
structural model. While their institutional quality measure is clearly correlated with
income per worker in the global sample - see Figure 2.1 - the simple OLS regression lines
for the two subsamples indicate a di¤erential impact in OECD countries (scattered in
the upper right corner of the gure) as compared to the rest of the sample. OECD
countries do seem to have a noticeably lower slope than Non-OECD countries. How-
ever, conclusive statements to that e¤ect require solid analysis and extensive testing of
robustness and endogeneity.
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To address issues of parameter heterogeneity we employ two approaches. First, we
split the sample and second, we use the interaction methodology of Brock and Durlauf
(2001), who applied this approach after calling into question whether institutional
indices can reasonably be expected to exhibit parameter homogeneity across "complex
heterogeneous objects such as countries." Specically, they cite the case of the United
States and Russia, where Civil Liberties data can hardly be seen to have a similar
impact on economic performance.
Our results are not limited to a simple assessment of the impact of established
institutions on output in global and OECD samples. As we examine parameter hetero-
geneity, we nd that the established instruments are invalid when we split the sample
into OECD and Non-OECD countries. This forces us to consider a new set of appro-
priate instruments in order to successfully control for endogeneity in all subsamples
before we can examine the economic impact of institutions on output.
Our new set of instruments is based on the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis. The
hypothesis is laid out in detail in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and similar
approaches have provided empirical validation for such a hierarchy (see Persson, 2004,
2005 and Eicher and Schreiber, 2005). The basic argument is that the constitutional
institutions and political rules set the stage for the economic institutions. We thus
divide institutions into two dimensions: constitutional/political institutions to serve
as instruments, and economic institutions that are thought to exert direct e¤ects on
output.
Extensive robustness analysis conrms that the set of established economic insti-
tutions is indeed highly signicant and holds great explanatory power in both OECD
and Non-OECD countries. However, evidence for parameter heterogeneity is strong.
We show that these economic institutions matter signicantly more in Non-OECD
countries than in the global sample, and about two thirds less in OECD than in Non-
OECD countries. This highlights that the estimates obtained in the previous literature
for the global sample are a weighted average of the impact of institutions on economic
performance in advanced and developing countries.
The new set of political instruments that we propose performs strongly across sub-
samples, and our results are shown to be robust to a number of alternative specications
and tests. The coe¢ cient estimates for the political instruments are highly signicant
in all subsamples indicating the important impact of such institutions on the fabric of
economic institutions in both advanced and developing nations.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 rst motivates the investigation
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into parameter heterogeneity for both instruments and economic institutions. Here
we utilize the Hall and Jones (1999) framework and examine two main subsamples:
OECD-members and non-members and show how the established instruments fail in
section 2.2.1. Section 2.2.2 introduces alternative instruments based on the hierarchy
of institutions hypothesis. Section 2.3 consists of a series of robustness checks which
examine di¤erent estimation techniques, time periods, datasets and samples, before
Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Parameter Heterogeneity in Instruments and
Institutions
2.2.1 Established Instruments and Institutions
We approach parameter heterogeneity sequentially, rst examining the possibility of
heterogeneity in the instruments, and subsequently focusing on economic institutions.
This progression is necessary because we must establish valid instruments across sam-
ples (Global, OECD, and Non-OECD). In the absence of valid instruments, the inves-
tigation of the impact of economic institutions on output is tarnished by endogeneity
bias. Parameter heterogeneity would bias the global regressions even further.
Among the established instruments for economic institutions, immediate candi-
dates for parameter heterogeneity relate to the notion of Western European historical
inuence. Hall and Jones (1999) and Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1997) provide extensive
motivation and historical analysis, respectively, to support the use of those instruments
that relate to specic European development inuences (e.g., Europeans either settled
the countries or the countries speak a European language).4 The idea is that the col-
onizers and immigrants brought along with them the basic prerequisites to establish
those economic institutions that are conducive to economic development.
For OECD countries the instruments relating to European languages can only be
justied if they exhibit su¢ cient exogenous identifying variation and if they retain
similar explanatory power as in the global sample. In addition, the validity of these
instruments is directly related to how well they can be motivated. Since most OECD
countries were the source of the inuence that the instruments are supposed to measure,
4Hall and Jones (1999) refer to English, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish languages and
Western Europes discovery of the ideas of Adam Smith, the importance of property rights, and the
system of checks and balances in government.
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the motivation is called into question. Specically, measuring the positive inuence of
a countrys own historical experience upon itself makes for weak instruments.
A similar line of reasoning raises questions about Latitude (distance from the equa-
tor) as an appropriate instrument for OECD countries. Certainly, the preference of
European settlers to emigrate to similar Latitudes can be seen as a strong motivation
for Latitudes inuence on economic institutions in developing nations. However, one
might argue that, by denition, Latitude holds little power in OECD countries most
of whom were the very source of the settlers.
The last instrument Hall and Jones (1999) employ is the Frankel and Romer (1996,
1999) Implied Trade Share for a country. This measure provides geography-based
explanations for trade derived from a gravity approach. Deviations from the implied
trade share could thus signal weak, protectionist institutions. While this instrument
may appear most suitable for di¤erent sub-groups of countries, protectionism has been
uniformly low in OECD countries which leads us to suspect that the variable will hold
little explanatory power for subsamples of countries.
We commence with simple diagnostics to ascertain the validity of instruments and
economic institutions across OECD and Non-OECD subsamples. Subsequently, we ad-
dress the core issue at hand: are the relevant economic institutions in OECD countries
similar to those in the rest of the world? This question has two dimensions. First,
we may ask if there exists a common set of economic institutions that determines in-
come in OECD and Non-OECD countries. Certainly, rule of law, bureaucratic quality,
corruption, risk of expropriation, government repudiation of contracts, and openness
to trade (the components of Hall and Jones(1999) social infrastructureindex) are
key traits for development. However, in developed nations, by denition, one might be
skeptical whether these types of economic institutions are indeed the relevant ones. If
a common set of economic institutions exists, the second dimension examines whether
their inuence on output is uniform across OECD and Non-OECD countries.
To establish a benchmark, we follow the methodology introduced by Hall and Jones
(1999), who explore the e¤ects of institutions on output by examining the structural
model
log Y=L = + I + "; (2.1)
where Y=L denotes income per worker and I is the measure of economic institu-
tional quality. Recognizing that economic institutions are potentially endogenous to
income, apart from being determined by a vector of exogenous factors, X, a regression
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identifying institutions is specied as
I =  +  log Y=L+X + : (2.2)
Due to the possible endogeneity of economic institutions, the OLS estimation of equa-
tion (2.1) establishes neither causality nor unbiased coe¢ cients. Hall and Jones (1999)
therefore provide instruments designed to solve the endogeneity problem. Candidates
for instruments are selected from the vector of exogenous covariates, X, in equation
(2.2). We adopt their instrumental variable estimation strategy (IV) to achieve iden-
tication and unbiased estimates.5
Valid instruments fulll two criteria: they are i) uncorrelated with the error term
in equation (2.1), and ii) strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor, I. The
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation can then be specied as
bI = ~ +X~ + ~ (2.3)
log Y=L = ~+ bI + ~"; (2.4)
where X is a subset of X and equations (2.3) and (2.4) represent the rst and second
stage regressions, respectively.
The 2SLS regression (I) in Table 2.1 replicates the Hall and Jones (1999) results for
the global sample, where instruments are successful, in the sense that most regressors
in the rst stage are highly signicant, the adjusted R-squared is satisfactorily high,
and in that the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected.
Hall and Jones(1999) compelling motivation of Latitude, Implied Trade Shares,
and the fraction of the population which speaks European languages as instruments is
reected in these instrumentsstrong performance in the global sample. Not only is
the rst stage strong, but instrumented institutions are highly signicant and explain
large di¤erences in per capita income across countries.
5As pointed out by Hall and Jones (1999), a valid instrumental variable strategy can also address
measurement error and omitted variable bias of OLS estimates.
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Table 2.1
Explanatory Power of Institutions and Instruments
First Evidence for Parameter Heterogeneity (2SLS)
(I)
Hall and Jones (1999)
(II)
Global Sample
Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L
Institutions♦ 5.085***(0.545)
5.580***
(1.268)
OECD Dummy 0.340***(0.052)
-0.583
(0.522)
English Language
Fraction
0.136
(0.092)
0.054
(0.080)
European Language
Fraction
0.170***
(0.056)
0.098**
(0.049)
Implied  Trade Share 0.044*(0.025)
0.061***
(0.022)
Latitude 0.004***(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
N 127 127 127 127
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.41 0.48 0.35
Over-ID Test 0.243 0.044**
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels
are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. The First stage always includes the fraction of the population
speaking English or another European Language (English Fraction and European Fraction), the Implied
Trade Share from a gravity trade equation (Implied Trade Share) and the geographical Latitude of a
country. The second stage regresses the log of income per worker on the instrumented economic
institutional variable. The 2SLS regression (II) adds a Dummy for OECD membership in 1999 to both
stages. Over-ID Test is the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan Test statistic of overidentifying restrictions of all
(but one) Instrument, the joint null being that the instruments are valid.  The “♦”superscript indicates
instrumented variables.
As a rst exploration of parameter heterogeneity to uncover possible di¤ering e¤ects
of instruments and institutions in the OECD subsample, we add a region dummy, D,
to the 2SLS regression (I). This modies the structural model to:
bI = ~ +X~ + D + ~ (2.5)
log Y=L = ~+ bI + D + ~": (2.6)
The 2SLS regression (II) in Table 2.1 reports that the OECD dummy is indeed highly
signicant in the rst stage. In addition, the introduction of a regional dummy changes
the explanatory power of instrumented institutions signicantly. Having accounted for
OECD specic e¤ects, only two of the original four Hall and Jones instruments re-
main signicant. The Implied Trade Share actually gains signicance, moving from
10 to 1 percent levels, while the signicance of European Languages and Latitude is
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greatly reduced. The explanatory power of Latitude changes dramatically. It looses
its 1 percent signicance from the 2SLS regression (I) and shows no statistically sig-
nicant impact on economic institutions in the 2SLS regression (II). Perhaps some of
the explanatory power of the instruments in the global sample was derived from the
fact that the instruments di¤ered systematically across subsamples.
The t of the rst stage rises strongly as the adjusted R-squared improves, indi-
cating an increase in the power of the instruments from the 2SLS regression (I) to
the 2SLS regression (II). The introduction of the region dummy thus improves the
t of the rst stage signicantly, while the established instruments loose power. This
provides additional evidence that the region dummy actually drives the results in the
2SLS regression (II). In addition, the Sargan Over-ID Test is now rejected, which raises
further doubts about the validity of this particular set of instrumental variables.
The second stage holds two additional surprises. First, the OECD dummy is not
signicant, which indicates the absence of OECD specic e¤ects in the determination
of income levels. Second, the measure of institutions remains highly signicant with
hardly a change in the point estimate, as compared to Hall and Jones(1999) original
specication. The same is true for the t of the second stage which is just marginally
below the t of the Hall and Jones (1999) regression.6 We must consider the sec-
ond stage preliminary, however, since the estimates in equation (2.6) are potentially
contaminated with endogeneity bias, given the weak performance of the rst stage of
the 2SLS regression (II). With this caveat in mind, we do note that the regression
indicates that economic institutions are indeed important in accessing output in the
global sample. The rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation,
government repudiation of contracts, and openness to trade do seem to matter just as
much for OECD countries as for the world.
Since the OECD dummy lacks explanatory power while economic institutions are
highly signicant, it is tempting to conclude that there exists little evidence for para-
meter heterogeneity in economic institutions. However, the estimation of their e¤ect
on income levels is only valid to the degree that the instruments can be established as
appropriate. The rst stage of the 2SLS regression (II) highlights that the instruments
lack not only a compelling intuitive motivation for OECD countries, but also explana-
tory power. Perhaps most importantly, the instruments are neither uncorrelated with
the error term in equation (2.1) (the Sargan Test is not accepted), nor are the four
6We choose to report the second stage R-squared as an indicator of the t, although it does not
possess statistical meaning in the context of 2SLS/IV, since it measures the proportion of variation
in the dependent variable that is accounted for by the tted explanatory variables.
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established instruments strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor, I. The rst
stage of regression (II) thus casts substantial doubt on the validity of the results ob-
tained in the second stage regression; in addition, the presence of a highly signicant
OECD dummy in the rst stage provides strong evidence of parameter heterogeneity
in the instruments.
To explore the issue of instrument heterogeneity head on, we proceed to split the
sample and examine OECD and Non-OECD subsamples separately in Table 2.2. The
purpose is to isolate the impact of the established instruments and the explanatory
power of economic institutions across the respective subsamples.
The 2SLS regression (III) provides further reason to doubt that the established
instruments are appropriate for the case of the OECD sample. Of all four instruments,
only Latitude remains weakly signicant at the 10 percent level in the rst stage. This
is especially surprising since Latitude had lost explanatory power when we introduced
the OECD dummy to the global sample in the 2SLS regression (II). The adjusted R-
squared drops sharply in the rst stage, and the Over-ID Test is also rejected. All this
points to further problems related to either weak or inappropriate instruments for the
subsamples.
The coe¢ cient on economic institutions remains highly signicant in the 2SLS
regression (III), but its magnitude is reduced to about one third of the size obtained in
the global sample. The t for the second stage regression also improves sharply. After
considering the caveat that the economic institutions estimate may be contaminated
by endogeneity bias, the second stage indicates that institutions do exert a positive
e¤ect on output in OECD countries, albeit a substantially smaller one.
Chapter 2 - Institutions and Economic Performance 62
T
ab
le
2.
2
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f I
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
 a
nd
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
Po
w
er
 o
f I
ns
tru
m
en
ts
 A
cr
os
s S
ub
sa
m
pl
es
 (2
SL
S)
(I
II
)
O
E
C
D
(I
V
)
N
on
-O
E
C
D
(V
a)
W
B
 H
ig
h 
In
co
m
e
(V
Ia
)
W
B
 N
on
 H
ig
h 
In
co
m
e
(V
b)
W
B
 H
ig
h 
&
 U
pp
er
M
id
dl
e 
In
co
m
e
(V
Ib
)
W
B
 N
on
 H
ig
h 
&
 N
on
U
pp
er
 M
id
dl
e 
In
co
m
e
In
st
itu
tio
ns
Y
/L
In
st
itu
tio
ns
Y
/L
In
st
itu
tio
ns
Y
/L
In
st
itu
tio
ns
Y
/L
In
st
itu
tio
ns
Y
/L
In
st
itu
tio
ns
Y
/L
In
st
itu
tio
ns
♦
1.
84
5*
**
(0
.4
56
)
5.
77
1*
**
(1
.6
44
)
1.
18
4*
(0
.6
74
)
6.
63
5*
**
(2
.2
37
)
2.
22
6*
**
(0
.4
54
)
3.
24
1
(2
.6
31
)
E
ng
lis
h
L
an
g.
Fr
ac
tio
n
0.
15
9
(0
.1
25
)
0.
01
9
(0
.1
17
)
0.
06
7
(0
.0
96
)
0.
04
8
(0
.1
04
)
0.
13
3
(0
.1
03
)
-0
.0
21
(0
.1
34
)
E
ur
op
ea
n
L
an
g.
Fr
ac
tio
n
0.
13
4
(0
.0
89
)
0.
08
5
(0
.0
59
)
0.
02
8
(0
.0
64
)
0.
09
4*
(0
.0
53
)
0.
04
4
(0
.0
79
)
0.
07
9
(0
.0
61
)
Im
pl
ie
d
T
ra
de
 S
ha
re
0.
04
6
(0
.0
44
)
0.
06
6*
*
(0
.0
27
)
-0
.0
15
(0
.0
31
)
0.
02
6
(0
.0
25
)
0.
00
5
(0
.0
36
)
0.
01
5
(0
.0
26
)
L
at
itu
de
0.
00
3*
(0
.0
02
)
-0
.0
00
(0
.0
01
)
0.
00
3*
*
(0
.0
01
)
-0
.0
00
(0
.0
01
)
0.
00
4*
**
(0
.0
01
)
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
01
)
N
29
29
98
98
31
31
96
96
50
50
77
77
A
dj
. R
-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
26
0.
76
0.
09
0.
00
0
0.
22
0.
20
0.
08
-0
.3
1
0.
28
0.
42
0.
04
0.
23
O
ve
r-
ID
 T
es
t
0.
05
9*
0.
05
9*
0.
42
3
0.
00
5*
**
0.
46
9
0.
00
0*
**
N
ot
es
: N
ot
 re
po
rte
d:
 in
te
rc
ep
t; 
st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s. 
 . 
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
, 5
 a
nd
 1
 p
er
ce
nt
 le
ve
ls
 a
re
 in
di
ca
te
d 
by
 *
, *
*,
 *
**
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 F
irs
t s
ta
ge
 a
lw
ay
s i
nc
lu
de
s t
he
 fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n
sp
ea
ki
ng
 E
ng
lis
h 
or
 a
no
th
er
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
La
ng
ua
ge
 (E
ng
lis
h 
Fr
ac
tio
n 
an
d 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 F
ra
ct
io
n)
, t
he
 Im
pl
ie
d 
Tr
ad
e 
Sh
ar
e 
fr
om
 a
 g
ra
vi
ty
 tr
ad
e 
eq
ua
tio
n 
(I
m
pl
ie
d 
Tr
ad
e 
Sh
ar
e)
 a
nd
 th
e 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
 L
at
itu
de
 o
f a
co
un
try
; S
ec
on
d 
st
ag
e 
re
gr
es
se
s 
th
e 
lo
g 
of
 in
co
m
e 
pe
r 
w
or
ke
r 
on
ly
 o
n 
th
e 
in
st
ru
m
en
te
d 
ec
on
om
ic
 in
st
itu
tio
na
l v
ar
ia
bl
e.
  
O
ve
rid
 T
es
t i
s 
th
e 
p-
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
H
an
se
n-
Sa
rg
an
 T
es
t s
ta
tis
tic
 o
f 
ov
er
id
en
tif
yi
ng
re
st
ric
tio
ns
 o
f 
al
l (
bu
t o
ne
) 
In
st
ru
m
en
t, 
th
e 
jo
in
t n
ul
l b
ei
ng
 th
at
 th
e 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 a
re
 v
al
id
. C
ol
um
ns
 (
V
) 
an
d 
(V
I)
 s
pl
it 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
W
or
ld
 b
an
k’
s 
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
ns
 o
f 
H
ig
h,
 M
ed
iu
m
 a
nd
 L
ow
In
co
m
e 
co
un
tri
es
. T
he
 “
♦
”s
up
er
sc
rip
t i
nd
ic
at
es
 in
st
ru
m
en
te
d 
va
ria
bl
es
.
Chapter 2 - Institutions and Economic Performance 63
We expected that the Non-OECD sample in the 2SLS regression (IV) would re-
tain similar explanatory power as in the original Hall and Jones results in the 2SLS
regression (I). The instruments were well motivated for the developing world, and the
sample now excludes OECD countries for which the instruments have been shown to
lack statistical power as well as economic intuition. From this point of view, one could
even hope to see that the explanatory power of the institutions for the subset of devel-
oping countries should be enhanced. However, the results in the 2SLS regression (IV)
are disappointing. Surprisingly, all instruments except the Implied Trade Share loose
signicance. The t of the rst stage approaches white noise indicating to our surprise
that the instruments perform even worse than in the OECD sample. As in the case of
OECD countries, the Over-ID Test is rejected in the 2SLS regression (IV). While the
coe¢ cient on economic institutions in the second stage remains highly signicant, the
adjusted R-squared is practically reduced to zero. Note that the coe¢ cient on institu-
tions in the Non-OECD sample rises slightly compared to the coe¢ cient in the global
sample (2SLS regression I). Given the weak performance of the rst stage, however, we
cannot view the second stage results as reliable.
In exploring whether the established instruments are valid for OECD countries, we
therefore, quite inadvertently, uncover their weakness in both subsamples. Surprising
is that the convincingly motivated instruments for the Non-OECD subsample are also
ultimately rejected on the basis of the lack of both, signicance and identication. One
might suspect that the result is an artifact of having picked an unfortunate division
of the global dataset. Therefore, we conducted the same exercise with qualitatively
similar sample splits according to the World Bank classication of High/Medium/Low
Income Countries. The results in (Va), (Vb), (VIa) and (VIb) are almost identical
as in regressions (III) and (IV). The results in regressions (III) and (IV) are robust
to di¤erent splits of the global data as the instruments lack signicance and fail the
Over-ID Test in all alternative subsamples reported in Table 2.2.7
Perhaps the ndings in Table 2.2 provide a deeper understanding of why the Hall
and Jones (1999) instruments do not perform strongly in the Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001) sample, which is dominated by former colonies. They show that
colonial origins (proxied by settler mortality) as an instrument for economic institutions
(in their case government expropriation risk) improves the 2SLS estimation compared
to Hall and Jones(1999) instruments. Since Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)
focus only on former colonies, their approach cannot be utilized to solve the endogeneity
7Note that the results are conrmed when we control for the small size of the OECD subsample
as we bootstrap regressions in section 2.3.2.
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problem in OECD sample, which is comprised largely of the nations of origin of the
settlers.
The analysis leaves the discussion regarding the impact of economic institutions
on growth at a crossroads. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have shown
that economic institutions do matter for a set of 69 developing countries that are
distinguished by their colonial history. On the other hand, we are left without guidance
as to which if any economic institutions of the type discussed in Hall and Jones
(1999) matter to the long-run performance of highly developed countries. In the next
section we set out to nd alternative instruments that are valid for OECD countries,
and to test their explanatory power for the Non-OECD sample.
2.2.2 The Hierarchy of Institutions Hypothesis
In search of alternative instruments that control for endogeneity of economic insti-
tutions in both the global and the OECD samples, we turn to political institutions.
The recent institutions literature has begun to draw a clear distinction between polit-
ical and economic institutions. Williamson (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Roland (2004), all posit a hierarchy of insti-
tutions which we will utilize below. While economic institutions determine economic
performance, they are themselves inuenced both directly and indirectly by political
institutions. The direct e¤ect of political institutions stems, for example, from the
concentration of political power in the hands of a malevolent dictator, who dismantles
the economic institutions which ensure property rights and equal opportunity. Polit-
ical institutions may also a¤ect economic institutions indirectly, since they determine
the distribution of de jure political power which, in turn, assigns the power to alter
economic institutions.
While political institutions may not a¤ect output directly, constitutions are not
written in stone. They change slowly but exhibit great persistence over time, for ex-
ample, as countries evolve from dictatorships to democracy (and vice versa). Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that political institutions are collective choices;
hence the distribution of political power in society is the key determinant of their evo-
lution. Persistence is introduced by those holding political power, who nd it in their
interest to maintain the status quo even at signicant economic cost for society as a
whole.
Persson (2004, 2005) and Eicher and Schreiber (2005) report empirical evidence for
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the hierarchy of constitutions, by employing specic constitutional variables as instru-
ments for economic institutions. We follow the same method below. The instruments
perform well because they are slow moving and because their direct impact on output
is negligible. As a practical matter, this can be established in our regressions (see
footnote 10). Glaeser et al (2004) also argue forcefully against a direct link between
output and political institutions. Nonetheless, we are careful to examine our results in
a robustness section below to conrm that they do not hinge on the assumption that
political institutions are entirely exogenous. We allow for the existence of long-term
feedback e¤ects from economic outcomes to constitutions in our robustness section.
Specically we introduce alternative political and constitutional instruments that are
even less likely to be contaminated by endogeneity.
To examine whether the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis provides successful in-
struments, we augment the original Hall and Jones (1999) dataset with a number of
political institutions provided by the Polity IV database, the World Bank, and the In-
ternational Country Risk Guide. From Polity IV we select the Constraints on the Chief
Executive (Executive Constraintsbelow) and Chief Executive Recruitment Regula-
tion (Executive Recruitment Regulation) for 1988, the year predating our data on
income per worker. For robustness, we also include additional Polity IV variables, Leg-
islative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness in 1975 from the Database
on Political Institutions (World Bank), Voice and Accountability from the Govern-
ment Matters database (World Bank), Type and Age of Democracies (as derived
by Persson, 2004 from Polity IV), and variables which reect legal origins (e.g., the
German and Scandinavian legal origins signicant in La Porta et al 2004, and Levine
Loayza and Beck 2000), judicial independence and Constitutional Review (e.g., rigidity
of the constitution, judgesinuences over the legislative branch) from La Porta et al
(2004).8 The addition of political institutions reduces the size of our baseline dataset
from 127 to 114.9
Table 2.A2 in the appendix shows that the economic institutions which comprise
Hall and Jones(1999) social infrastructure variable and our proxies for political insti-
tutions are quite distinct. Factor analysis on the entire institutional dataset shows that
the variables span di¤erent dimensions of the dataspace and separate nicely into one
8The additional Polity IV variables included are the Polity2 index, Competitiveness of Executive
Recruitment, Good Democracy, Political Competition, Competitiveness of (Political) Participation,
Executive Recruitment Regulation, Executive Electoral Competition, Openness of Executive Recruit-
ment, Regime Durability and Regulation of Participation.
9The excluded countries are Barbados, Cape Verde Islands, Hong Kong, Iceland, Luxembourg,
Malta, Namibia, Puerto Rico, Reunion, Seychelles, Suriname, Yemen, and Zaire.
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economic factor (given by the social infrastructure variables) and two political factors.
Table 2.A1 indicates a high correlation among the political variables. To avoid
problems of multicollinearity, we choose Executive Constraints and Executive Recruit-
ment Regulation as our baseline instruments, because these two variables have been
used extensively in the literature.10 In our robustness section we examine whether
our results depend on a particular selection of political institutions. Table 2.3 reports
the results when using our preferred political institutions as instruments in the global
sample.
The 2SLS regression (VII) shows that both instruments are highly signicant and
that their rst stage t is similar to the benchmark in Hall and Jones (1999) as reported
in the 2SLS regression (I). The Over-ID Test is accepted and the political instruments
perform strongly as previously shown in di¤erent contexts by Persson (2004, 2005) and
Eicher Schreiber (2005).11 The coe¢ cient on economic institutions in the second stage
is also similar to the one reported in Hall and Jones (1999).12
For robustness we also pair our political institutions with Hall and Jones(1999)
instruments in the 2SLS regression (VIII) to show that the former retain their explana-
tory power once the additional regressors are included in the rst stage. In addition,
the C-Test (Di¤erence-In-Sargan-Test) allows us to test a subset of the original or-
thogonality conditions in order to establish the exogeneity of our new instruments (to
test our instruments against Hall and Jones) in the 2SLS regression (VIII) and is also
accepted. Thus we can claim that in the global sample our new instruments perform
at least as well as those of Hall and Jones (1999).
While we have found that political institutions are both strong and exogenous
instruments for economic institutions, parameter heterogeneity may still be an issue.
The fact that institutions matter in the global sample, as shown above, does not provide
a guarantee that they work across subsamples.
10These particular variables have been featured prominently in empirical institutional assessments
of Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002), Acemoglu et al (2003), Gleaser et al (2004) Djankov et al (2002) and Alfaro,
Kalelmi-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005).
11Like Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), we also used the cruder approach of adding
the instruments into the second stage regressions to show that they only inuence output through
their e¤ect on economic institutions. Indeed, we always nd them to be insignicant if added to the
second stage.
12If we reduce the Hall and Jones (1999) 2SLS regression (1) to the same 114 countries, we obtain
a coe¢ cient for economic institutions of 5.46.
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Table 2.3
Institutions and New Instruments:
The Hierarchy of Institutions (2SLS)
(VII)
Global Sample
(VIII)
Global Sample
(IX)
Global Sample
Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L
Institutions♦ 4.870***(0.507)
4.871***
(0.459)
5.789***
(1.034)
OECD Dummy 0.300***(0.043)
-0.628
(0.447)
Executive
Constraints
0.040***
(0.012)
0.036***
(0.012)
0.009
(0.011)
Executive
Recruitment
Regulation
0.091**
(0.042)
0.067
(0.041)
0.109***
(0.036)
English Language
Fraction
0.079
(0.086)
European
Language
Fraction
0.047
(0.058)
Implied Trade
Share
0.053)**
(0.026
Latitude 0.002***(0.001)
N 114 114 114 114 114 114
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.33
Over-ID Test 0.355 0.104 0.831
Over-ID C-Test for
Political Institutions
subset
0.37
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels
are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. The First stage always includes Constraints on the Executive
(Executive Constraints) and Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (Executive Recruitment Regulation).
The fraction of the population speaking English or another European Language (English Fraction and
European Fraction), the Implied Trade Share from a gravity trade equation (Implied Trade Share) and the
geographical Latitude of a country and finally a dummy indicating OECD membership as of 1999 are
subsequently added; Second stage regresses the log of income per worker only on the instrumented economic
institutional variable.  The Over-ID Test reports the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan Test statistic of
overidentifying restrictions of all (but one) Instrument, the joint null being that the instruments are valid.
Over-ID, C-Test is the p-value of the C-statistic when Testing the over-identifying restriction for the two
political instruments vis-à-vis the established ones. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables.
The 2SLS regression (IX) highlights that the e¤ect of political institutions does
di¤er across the samples due to the signicant OECD dummy. Nevertheless, in contrast
to the 2SLS regression (III), the new instruments do not loose their validity; they
remain highly signicant and pass the Over-ID Test. The fact that the dummy retains
its signicance in the rst stage does raise the question however, of whether there is a
systematic di¤erence in the inuence of political institutions on economic ones in the
OECD vs. Non-OECD samples. We explore such potential parameter heterogeneity
more thoroughly in Table 2.4.
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We can examine parameter heterogeneity from two perspectives. First, we split the
global sample in regressions (X) and (XII). To avoid loosing information as we move to
the subsample analysis, we alternatively examine parameter heterogeneity by adding
an interaction term to the global sample which interacts instruments and institutions
with the region dummy.
bI = ~ +X~ + D + XD + ~ (2.7)
log Y=L = ~+ bI + D +$bID + ~" (2.8)
Following Brock and Durlauf (2001) the coe¢ cients on institutions in regressions (XI)
and (XIII) are composite coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors for bI + bID. The
results in regressions (XI) and (XIII) thus take advantage of all information contained
in the global dataset, while representing the subsample specic e¤ects of economic
institutions on output.
Table 2.4 presents three important results. First, parameter heterogeneity is con-
rmed to be of statistic and economic signicance, no matter whether the sample is
split (regressions X, XII) or not (regressions XI, XIII). In either case, the results are
signicant and stable across methods in the sense that the coe¢ cients in the interacted,
global sample are just about identical to the ones obtained in the subsample estima-
tion. The signicance of the region dummies provides clear evidence for parameter
heterogeneity.
The second important aspect of Table 2.4 is that political institutions perform well
as instruments across all samples. While only one of the two instruments is signi-
cant, there is strong evidence that the hierarchy of institutions approach does provide
su¢ ciently strong instruments for economic institutions in each subsample. The ad-
justed R-squared is extremely high across methods and samples (with the exception
of rst stage in the pure Non-OECD subsample) and the Over-ID Tests are accepted
throughout.
The third key implication of Table 2.4 is that the inuence of social infrastructure
on output is obtained with considerable precision; it is about three times larger for
Non-OECD countries than for OECD countries. This result is akin to our preliminary
nding in Table 2.2. The smaller coe¢ cient for OECD countries suggests that economic
institutions play a smaller, yet equally signicant role in determining output in OECD
countries as compared to the global or Non-OECD samples. Of course, the income gap
between OECD countries (eight-fold in 1970 according to the PennWorld tables) is also
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much smaller than the 30-fold gap between the richest and the poorest nations in the
global sample. For the Non-OECD sample, the importance of the economic institutions,
namely, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, government
repudiation of contracts, openness to trade, is now signicantly greater than in the
OECD sample.
The magnitude of the IV-estimate for the impact of economic institutions in the
global sample (regression VII) lies between those for the OECD and Non-OECD sam-
ples in the 2SLS regressions (XI) and (XIII), which is intuitive. The new instruments
thus deliver a similar result across samples as the slopes in our Figure 1 indicated
initially: the economic institutions included in the Hall and Jones (1999) social in-
frastructure index certainly have a larger impact in developing countries. Hence it
is no surprise that the coe¢ cient is greatest in the developing country sample, and
somewhat lower for OECD countries. The estimate for the combined e¤ect of the two
datasets which make up the global sample should then lie in the middle.
While the size of the coe¢ cient is smaller for the OECD, it is interesting to see that
institutions explain a larger share of the variation in OECD income as compared to
institutions in the Non-OECD sample. The R-squared for the OECD countries ranges
from 60 to 76 percent while it is only 52 to 60 percent in the Non-OECD sample. Thus
one might be surprised not only how important economic institutions are in the OECD,
but also how precisely they forecast income levels in these countries.
Searching for better instruments that are valid for key subsamples of the global
dataset, we therefore uncovered important support for the hierarchy of institutions
hypothesis in both subsamples and in the global dataset. In the process we come to
the surprising conclusion that the type of social infrastructure identied by Hall and
Jones (1999) does play a signicant role even in advanced OECD economies, which are
often seen as representing the gold standard in terms of control of corruption, rule of
law and free, well-functioning markets. Interestingly, the impact of such institutions
in OECD countries is signicant, but about two thirds smaller than in Non-OECD
countries.
In the next section, we examine how robust our results are to alternative datasets,
alternative measures of economic institution, di¤erent groupings of countries, and to
specications that investigate whether current political institutions are truly exoge-
nous.
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2.3 Robustness
2.3.1 Alternative Instrument Specications
An important aspect of our investigation has been the classication of political institu-
tions as exogenous with respect to output levels. However, the income level regressions
capture long lasting e¤ects of both political and economic institutional changes that
may accumulate over time. While the hierarchy of institutions posits that there is no
direct e¤ect of economic outcomes in a particular year on political institutions and
constitutions, it is certainly possible to imagine that there are feedback e¤ects between
economic outcomes and the distribution of power.
We cannot capture evidence for such feedback e¤ects in our sample when we add
the political institutions to the second stage (the coe¢ cients on political institutions
are insignicant in this case). An alternative method to establish that our instruments
are largely exogenous to output in 1989 is to use political institutions that substantially
predate 1989 income. In our case we can trace our political institutions back to 1900,
88 years prior to our political instruments above. If endogeneity did exist in the case
of 1989 income levels and 1988 political institutions, it would arguably be a lot smaller
for 1989 income levels and institutions in 1900.
Table 2.5
Instrument Robustness
Political Institutions in 1900
(XIV)
Global
(XV)
OECD
(XVI)
Non-OECD
Institutions1989 Y/L Institutions1989 Y/L Institutions1989 Y/L
Institutions1989♦
2.657***
(0.378)
1.790***
(0.41)
1.284
(2.607)
Executive
Constraints1900
0.057***
(0.011)
0.050***
(0.015)
0.013
(0.018)
Executive
Recruitment
Regulation1900
0.110**
(0.043)
0.129
(0.108)
0.046
(0.042)
N 46 46 22 22 24 24
Adjusted R-
squared 0.52 0.56 0.43 0.69 0.08 0.02
Over-ID Test 0.528 0.120 0.540
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are
indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.  The First stage always includes Constraints on the Executive (Executive
Constraints) and Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (Executive Recruitment) in 1900. Economic Institutions
are the ones in 1989. Early political institutions data limitations reduce the sample size to 112 for the global sample.
The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables.
The results for both the OECD and global samples in Table 2.5 are strong, even with
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the 89 year lag in political institutions. Both political institutions are highly signicant
in the global sample, which is reduced to 46 countries due to data constraints, and due
to the fact that a number of countries did not exist in 1900. The global estimate for
the impact of economic institutions on output is again higher in the global than in the
OECD sample. The instruments pass the Over-ID Test for all samples. However, the
Non-OECD regression (XVI) is weak overall, with low R-squares, and no signicant
coe¢ cients. While one might expect that the lack of power is due to small sample
size, the result is equally weak if we use the Durlauf et al (2001) method of interacting
institutions with region dummies to detect parameter heterogeneity while preserving
the variation contained in the whole sample. Therefore, the results are due to the
particular set of countries that is included in the 24 Non-OECD countries in 1900. The
noticeable di¤erence across all samples as compared to Table 2.4 is the reduction of
the impact of economic institutions on output.
An alternative robustness check regarding the choice of political variables that we
employ above, is to examine alternative instruments instead of alternative time periods.
Above we use Executive Recruitment Regulation and Executive Constraints due to
their prevalence in the institutions literature, and because the data can be traced back
to 1900. Instead of selecting any number of variables among the universe of possible
political institutions, Table 2.6 reports regressions based on the information contained
in all 16 political institutions that we identied as potential candidates for instruments.
Since the political data is highly correlated (Table 2.A1), we perform factor analysis on
the global sample. We identify the two dominant factors (e.g., eigenvalues exceed unity)
and report them along with their factor loadings in Table 2.A3. The commonalities
among the variables which play important roles in the two factors are such that we
label factor 1 Democratic Rules and factor 2 Participation/Stability.
The use of all possible political variables increases the power of the estimations sig-
nicantly across all samples. In regressions (XVII) to (IXX) the same pattern emerges
as above, where the global sample indicates a signicant impact of economic institutions
on output which lies between the signicant estimates for OECD and the Non-OECD
countries. With the exception of Participation/Stability for the Non-OECD Sample,
all estimates are highly signicant, no matter which subsample or political factor we
consider. The political instruments are again strong and uncorrelated with the error
term in the global as well as the two subsamples. The factor analysis also improves
the rst stage in terms of signicance and t. Aside from the fact that we are utilizing
information contained in all 16 variables, rather than just two, the improved t might
also be a function of the fact that institutions are probably measured with error, which
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Table 2.6
Instrument Robustness
Factor Analysis: All Political Variables
(XVII)
Global
(XVIII)
OECD
(IXX)
Non OECD
Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L
Institutions♦ 4.029***(0.464)
2.148***
(0.269)
5.690***
(1.958)
Democratic Rules 0.129***(0.020)
0.117***
(0.033)
0.055
(0.021)***
Participation /
Stability
0.081***
(0.020)
0.108***
(0.028)
0.001
(0.022)
N 101 101 27 27 74 74
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.56 0.76 0.77 0.10 0.03
Over-ID Test 0.862 0.432 0.244
Notes: Not reported: Intercept; robust Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels
are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. Democratic Rules and Participation/Stability are the first two rotated
factors from a factor analysis on all political variables (Good Democracy, Polity2, Regime Durability, Executive
Recruitment Regulation, Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment,
Executive Constraints, Regulation of Participation, Competitiveness of Participation, Executive Recruitment,
Political Competition, Democratic Accountability, Legislative Electoral Competition, Executive Electoral
Competition, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability). The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables.
is mitigated by the factor analysis.
As an additional robustness experiment we also examine specic sets of political
institutions that have featured prominently in the political, constitutional, legal and
economic institutions analysis of Persson (2004) and La Porta et al (2004).13 Persson
(2004) uses two main instruments: The Form of Democratic Government (whether
an established democracy is a presidential or majoritarian system) and the Age of
Democracy. These two political institutions are employed as instruments in Table 2.7.
The Persson instruments for political institutions perform well across all subsam-
ples. The Over-ID Test is accepted, the instruments are strong and the t is good.
Note, however, that the estimates of the inuence of economic institutions on output
levels are reduced for the global and Non-OECD samples. Nonetheless, their mag-
nitudes are still quite similar to the ones obtained with our preferred instruments in
Table 2.4.
A prominent alternative to purely political institutions is provided by La Porta et al.
(2004), who emphasize the importance of constitutional variables that regulate the legal
and judicial system as determinants of economic and political freedoms. We explore
the judicial dimension of constitutions in our robustness by using key variables from
13We thank Torsten Persson for making his dataset available to us. La Porta et al (2004) data is
available on the their websites.
Chapter 2 - Institutions and Economic Performance 74
Table 2.7
Instrument Robustness
Persson’s (2004) Political Institutions
(XX)
Global
(XXI)
OECD
(XXII)
Non OECD
Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L
Institutions♦ 3.901***(0.351)
2.627***
(0.400)
3.291***
(0.844)
Form of Democratic
Government
0.224***
(0.034)
0.050
(0.084)
0.209***
(0.042)
Age of Democracy 0.541***(0.077)
0.430***
(0.107)
0.280*
(0.149)
N 112 112 27 27 85 85
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.40 0.72 0.29 0.33
Over-ID Test 0.265 0.664 0.029**
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *,
**, ***, respectively. First stage always includes Parliamentary Democracy and Age of Democracy from Persson (2005). The
instrumented institutions is Hall and Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure and income per worker is from their dataset as well.
Adding the Persson (2004) data reduces the sample size to 112 for the global sample. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented
variables.
La Port et al. (2004) which relate to Legal Origin, Duration of Supreme Court Judge
Tenure, and Judicial Power (whether judges hold power to review constitutionality of
laws).14
As in the case of our purely political constitutional variables above, we argue that
these legal instruments are valid because they are, at best, slow moving over time. In
fact, the legal origins can be argued to be just as predetermined as the colonial expe-
rience invoked by both Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001). Such constitutional variables have usually been in place for long time spans
and rarely change. Table 2.8 provides results using the legal constitutional variables
as instruments.
The Legal constitutional instruments perform strongly in the global sample in re-
gression (XXIII). However, in the subsample estimation in regressions (XXIV and
XXV), the rst stages for OECD and Non-OECD countries are weak and do not per-
form as well as the political instruments introduced above. Again the OECD subsample
coe¢ cient estimate for institutions is smaller than for the global and Non-OECD sam-
ple. However, the Non-OECD subsample is measured with considerable error. While
the instruments are still passing the Sargan Over-ID Test, only German Legal Ori-
gins are actually signicant and the institution coe¢ cient in the second stage is barely
signicant at the 10 percent level. Since the Non-OECD sample is reduced to 36 obser-
14Note that these instruments do not relate to legal enforcement, which could be argued to be
dependent on funds and thus per capita income.
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Table 2.8
Instrument Robustness
La Porta et al (2004) Judicial Institutions
(XXIII)
Global
(XXIV)
OECD
(XXV)
Non OECD
Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L
Institutions♦ 2.790***(0.540)
1.397**
(0.611)
2.730*
(1.657)
German legal
Origin
0.364***
(0.101)
0.186*
(0.096)
0.354*
(0.202)
Scandinavian
Legal Origin
0.335***
(0.120)
0.099
(0.085) NA
♣
Supreme Court
Judge Tenure
0.128**
(0.056)
0.196*
(0.104)
0.061
(0.054)
Constitutional
Review
-0.057
(0.119)
0.003
(0.116)
-0.091
(0.139)
N 60 60 24 24 36 36
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.61 0.24 0.59 0.14 0.27
Over-ID Test 0.670 0.722 0.466
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are
indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. First stages include only the 4 variables from La Porta et al (2004) as
specified in the main text. The instrumented institutions is Hall and Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure and income
per worker is from their dataset as well. The use of the La Porta et al (2004) dataset reduces the sample size to 60
for the global sample. ♣ Dropped due to collinearity. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables.
vations only, it is tempting to attribute the weakness of the results to the small sample
size. However, Durlauf et al (2001) interaction of a region dummy with the institutions
does not solve the issue (not reported here). One might be led to conclude that judicial
institutions may be of signicance in developed countries, but that their inuence is
weaker than political institutions for developing countries (see Tables 2.4 and 2.6).
2.3.2 Outliers and Small Samples
The OECD sample size is small, which raises the question of whether outliers such
as Turkey, Mexico, and Korea inuence the results. Turkey and Mexico are not in
the World Banks classication of High Income countries (used above), and we are,
after all, interested in the contributions of economic institutions to output in highly
developed countries. In this section, we provide outlier robust regression estimates
for the rst and second stage regressions above which use the OECD country sample.
Table 2.9 reports estimations that attribute less weight to observations that feature
large residuals. These regressions are meant to ensure that our results are not driven
by unrepresentative outlying observations.
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The outlier robust results in regressions (III), (X), (XV) and (XVIII) reinforce
our earlier results with coe¢ cients that are in line with the estimates in (III), (X), (XV)
and (XVIII). The regressions indicate that our OECD results are not driven by a small
subset of unrepresentative countries in the small sample. The Hall and Jones(1999)
specication of instruments in (III) does not perform well as the estimatessignicance
and magnitudes are greatly reduced. This indicates not only that the instruments
fail, but also that the impact of economic institutions on output is estimated with
great uncertainty when inadequate instruments are employed in the OECD subsample.
The regressions involving political institutions (X, XV and XVIII) are, however,
robust and they exhibit equivalent magnitudes and signicance levels as the baseline
regressions (X, XV, XVIII). We thus conclude that our results are not negatively
impacted by the small sample size or unrepresentative outliers.
The size of the OECD sample also raises doubts about the stability of the estimators.
To address this issue we bootstrap standard errors and condence bands of our OECD
estimates.
Table 2.10 reports that bootstrapping reduces the power of the rst stage across
the board, but not to the degree that our essential insights derived above would have
to be altered. All instruments that were signicant above remain signicant, although
usually at lower levels. The impact of institutions on output is not impacted, and
only in the case of economic institutions from 1900 is the signicance of the estimate
reduced to the 5 percent level. Indeed these exercises highlight just how robust the
explanatory power and the stability of the coe¢ cient estimates are across di¤erent
instruments and estimation methods for the OECD subsample. We thus conclude that
our results are robust to alternative specications of the instruments, as well as to
alternative estimation techniques.
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2.3.3 Alternative Economic Institutions
All of our results above have so far been conditional on the use of the Hall and Jones
(1999) social infrastructure data as the proxy for economic institutions. The variable
is not uncontroversial, because it consists of only a few institutions chosen from a large
set of potential candidates. The literature on economic institutions and the empirical
indicators that have been employed is surveyed in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005). In this robustness section, we examine whether our results are perhaps related
to a specic choice of economic institutions in the second stage.
Following the publication of Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2001, 2002, and 2005) established property rights and checks against government
power as an important measure of economic institutions. As an additional robustness
check, we seek to examine whether the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) Risk
of Expropriation variable (International Country Risk Guide, averaged over 1985-1995)
may also serve as a proxy for economic institutions in our global and OECD samples.15
We use the McArthur and Sachs (2000) dataset to expand the original Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) dataset from 69 to over 105 countries (including OECD
members).
Table 2.11 shows that the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis performs well and
that political institutions are strong instruments for Risk of Expropriation across all
samples.
15Risk of Expropriation measures di¤erences in institutions due to di¤erent types of states and
state policies.
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Both of our political instruments are signicant and the Over-Id Test is accepted
in all subsamples. Interestingly, di¤erent political institutions matter now for di¤erent
subsamples. In the global sample, both Executive Constraint and Executive Recruit-
ment matter. However in former colonies, only the Executive Constraints matters,
while in OECD countries Executive Recruitment is signicant. The t of the rst
stage is quite high for all samples other than the Non-OECD rst stage. The second
stage exhibits statistically signicant coe¢ cients for economic institutions in all sub-
samples. Again, the OECD estimates regarding the impact of economic institutions
lies below that of the Non-OECD sample.
We can compare the coe¢ cient estimate in the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
baseline regressions (2001, table 4, p. 1386) with our result for the same sample of
countries in the 2SLS regression (XXVII). Our political institution instruments perform
well for the subgroup of former colonies, and we nd that the instruments lead to a
very similar coe¢ cient in the second stage as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001, which is 0.94 in their baseline specication). Even the t of the rst stage is
about as good as the 0.27 reported in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). We
can conclude that the political instruments are strong not only across country samples,
but also across di¤erent proxies for the economic institutions.
2.4 Conclusion
We examine the impact of economic institutions on economic performance across
OECD and Non-OECD subsamples. The goal is to ascertain if the results derived
from studies using global datasets readily translate to high income countries. While
the relationship between economic institutions and economic outcomes has been es-
tablished empirically for developing countries and for global datasets, it has not been
analyzed for the countries that represent the gold standard of institutions today.
Analysis of institutions among developed countries is inhibited by the absence of
established instruments. Popular instruments in the institutions literature are shown to
be relevant only for the global sample or for developing countries. We hypothesize that
the notion of the hierarchy of institutions may provide su¢ ciently strong instruments
and utilize political/constitutional institutions to serve as instruments for economic
institutions. To do so, we show that they lead to very similar results when applied to the
same groups of countries as the established instruments. The political institutions also
pass all relevant statistical tests when they are employed only in the OECD subsample.
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We nd substantial evidence of parameter heterogeneity in economic institutions: the
impact of Hall and Jones(1999) economic institutions on income in OECD countries
is only one third of the e¤ect that the same institutions exert in Non-OECD countries.
Our results are robust to di¤erent specications regarding time periods, di¤erent
sets of political variables and economic institutions, and to a number of di¤erent sam-
ples splits and estimation techniques. Most surprising is perhaps, that the established
instruments which perform strongly in the global sample, such as Latitude and Euro-
pean Languages, do not perform in either the OECD or the Non-OECD sample.
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Table 2.A2
The Hierarchy of Institutions Factor Analysis
(Rotated Factor Loadings)
Factors
1 2 3
Rule of Law 0.35 0.88 0.14
Government effectiveness 0.35 0.87 0.14
Corruption 0.32 0.87 0.17
Government Anti-Diversion Policies 0.32 0.85 0.27
Social Infrastructure 0.41 0.85 -0.02
Regulatory Quality 0.37 0.79 0.01
Economic Institutions
Years Open 0.42 0.74 -0.18
Polity2 index 0.93 0.32 0.08
Executive Recruitment 0.90 0.24 0.02
Competitiveness of Executive Recruit. 0.90 0.24 0.24
Good Democracy 0.89 0.37 0.13
Executive Constraints 0.88 0.29 0.21
Political Competition 0.88 0.38 0.04
Competitiveness of Participation 0.81 0.47 0.12
Executive Recruitment Regulation 0.77 0.25 0.15
Executive Electoral Competition 0.58 0.33 0.53
Democratic Accountability 0.52 0.66 0.30
Voice and Accountability 0.44 0.77 0.17
Openness of Executive Recruitment 0.43 0.01 0.56
Legislative Electoral Competition 0.42 0.26 0.67
Political Stability 0.19 0.81 0.06
Regime Durability 0.09 0.49 0.36
Political Institutions
Regulation of Participation -0.26 0.55 0.31
Note: based on 103 observations for which all data was available.
Table 2.A3
Factor Analysis of Political Institutions
(Global Sample, Rotated Factor Loadings)
Factors
“Democratic Rules” “Participation and Stability”
Polity2 index 0.94 -0.04
Good Democracy 0.93 0.11
Executive Recruit. Competitiveness 0.91 -0.07
Political Competition 0.88 -0.08
Executive Constraints 0.87 0.04
Competitiveness of Exec. Recruit. 0.86 0.06
Competitiveness of Participation 0.84 0.05
Executive Recruitment Regulation 0.76 0.27
Democratic Accountability 0.56 0.19
Executive Electoral Competition 0.55 0.08
Voice and Accountability 0.49 0.19
Legislative Electoral Competition 0.35 0.13
Openness of Executive Recruitment 0.25 -0.08
Political Stability 0.24 0.20
Regime Durability 0.18 0.52
Regulation of Participation -0.09 0.79
Note: based on 109 observations for which all data was available.
Chapter 3
The Dynamics of Institutional
Change - Formal and Informal
Institutions and Economic
Performance
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[..] if institutions are to be adapted to the people for whom they are intended.
[..] whose tastes, customs, prejudices and vices are too deeply rooted to be readily
crowded out by new plantings.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau1
Lawgivers make the citizen good by inculcating habits in them, and this is the
aim of every lawgiver; if he does not succeed in doing that, his legislation is a
failure. It is in this that a good constitution di¤ers from a bad one.
Aristotle2
3.1 Introduction
The abounding recent empirical literature establishes a clear causal relationship be-
tween the level of institutional quality as measured by various indices and economic
performance, be that levels of income or growth rates.3 Hall and Jones (1999) for ex-
ample nd that their index of institutional quality can explain up to 80 percent of the
di¤erences in income per capita between industrialized and developing countries. To
improve economic performance all one has to do is to raise this quality then, it seems.
Where is the rub? Why have a lot of countries failed or are still failing at these
attempts? If this relationship is so clear, Why Are We So Rich and they So Poor?4
Why are the big billsthat are left on the sidewalk, as Mancur Olson (1996) puts
it, not picked up by the poorest nations who could gain the most from institutional
improvement?
One explanation is, that due to conicting and vested interests no attempts to im-
prove matters are made because the entrenched elites stand to loose from these changes.
Even in a democracy ex-ante uncertainty about who might gain and who would loose
under a new institutional framework could lead to the rejection of institutional reform,
even though a majority would have benetted ex-post (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).
However, if political economy reasons were the only explanation, one could not
1"Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Proposed Reformation" unpublished manuscript, 1772.
2Aristotle (1962, p. 1103)
3Cf. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Hall and Jones (1999), for the growth
accounting literature. By using instrumental variables for the quality of institutions they overcome
the inherent problem of reverse causality. For a critical view see Glaeser et al (2004). In the growth
regressions literature Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001a) establish a robust
relation for some institutional variables.
4Landes (1990).
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explain another fact about institutions and economic performance that is observed in
reality: even countries that did indeed set out on the path of institutional reform do
not uniformly perform well. Some succeeded and others failed even though most of
them were trying to implement institutional reforms that were generally seen to be
e¢ ciency enhancing. In fact, in many cases of the transition economies they had been
prescribed by western advisors.5
What are the di¢ culties with changing the formal institutions? Firstly, one would
need to know what the relevant institutions are. The measures usually employed in
the empirical literature are aggregate indices based on surveys and pundits evaluation
and they can broadly be qualied into economic and political institutions6, but do
not o¤er a very precise strategy as to which part of the complex structure of formal
institutions needs to be changed. Then, it might be advisable to copy the perceived
best practice institutions of successful countries as they achieve high scores in these
variables. However, this Institutions Transplantation has failed miserably in many
instances as Mukand and Rodrik (2004) among others assess.
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides insights as to why formal insti-
tutions that work well in one setting lead to dismal results in others. According to
Douglass North (1990, 1994) institutions are humanly devised constraints that struc-
ture human interaction. In particular, they can be formal constraints such as consti-
tutions, laws and regulations or informal constraints namely norms, codes of conduct,
established ways of doing business and informal conict resolution procedures. In fact,
the idea that overall institutional quality depends on formal and informal institutions
can be traced back to J.S. Mill (1848, pp. 135-6) who wrote that
"much of the security of person and property in modern nations is the e¤ect
of manners and opinion [..and of] the fear of exposure rather [than] the direct
operation of the law and the courts of justice"
In accordance with the denitions from the NIE, the view taken in this chapter is,
that overall institutional quality is made up of the interplay of the formal institutional
framework, the informal institutions prevailing in a society, and the enforcement char-
acteristics for both. Consequently, even a well-intentioned politician cannot directly
5For a detailed discussion on the experience of China relative to Latin America or Russia compared
to other more successful transition economies see for example Rodrik (2005).
6Examples for the former are security of property and constraints on the government for the
latter. Hall and Jones (1999) use an aggregate index constructed of diverse entries such as law and
order, bureaucratic quality risk of expropriation and government repudiation of contracts. Most other
studies use similar measures.
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inuence the overall institutional quality. She can only change the formal institutional
framework and allocate resources to the enforcement of this framework. How the in-
formal institutions evolve over time is beyond her control. This view corresponds to
the observation by North (1994), that
"Developing norms of behavior that will support and legitimize new [formal]
rules is a lengthy, incremental process . [...] economies that adopt the formal
rules of another economy will have very di¤erent performance characteristics
than the rst economy because of di¤erent informal norms [..]. The implication
is that transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western
economies to third-world and Eastern European economies is not a su¢ cient
condition for good economic performance."
The formal institutions can virtually be changed overnight by a determined politi-
cian, in theory at no cost -except for the paper and ink that these rules are written
down with- while the informal institutions evolve gradually if agents choose to alter
them.7 Many authors consequently argue along these lines that institutions transplan-
tation may well fail, because the imposed formal framework is not supported by the
prevailing informal one.8
An open question is, why people would not adapt their informal institutions, given
that it would yield economic benets. Simply stating that the new formal institutions
do not match well with the prevailing informal ones does not seem an adequate expla-
nation of why institutions transplantation fails for all cases: Why does it fail in some
countries but not in others? Why do some countries manage to improve their economic
conditions only after a transition period?
At the heart of an explanation to these questions must lie, that in some countries
people choose to adjust their informal institutions and in others they do not. In other
words, to be fair to the proponents of institutions transplantation and shock therapy,9
one should analyze the incentives of the agents to change their informal institutions.
7A similar view is put forward by Roland (2004) who distinguishes slow moving and fast moving
institutions.
8Cf. North (1990, 1994), Rapaczynski (1996) Roland (2004), Greif (1998) and Landes (1990).
Djankov et al. (2003) explicitly state: A key reason for institutional ine¢ ciency is the transplantation
of institutions [..].Mukand and Rodrik (2004): [formal] Institutional solutions that perform well in
one setting may be inappropriate in other settings without the supporting norms and complementary
institutions.
9Doing as much institutional reform as fast as possible. For a discussion and an overview of the
literature see Rodrik (1993)
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Only if one can give compelling reasons why individuals may fail to adapt to the new
circumstances, the conclusion that transplanting institutions will fail, even in the long
run, is justied.10
The present chapter tries to ll that gap and to give reasons, why people might not
adapt their informal institutions. This is achieved without recurring to assumptions
about heterogenous agents or uncertainty. Instead, a notion that is well established in
a di¤erent strand of literature is employed: contributions on the evolution of (social)
norms stress the importance of social interactions and dependence on othersactions
in the process of establishing new informal institutions that are generally accepted.11
A further notion about informal institutions, that has already been alluded to, is
that they are highly context specic: their value and their quality relate to a specic
set of formal institutions, the one they were adapted to. One should not imagine
institutions as being a quantitative measure, but a qualitative one. The indices observed
in the empirical data are assessments of this overall institutional quality by experts or
business people.
The government has the power over the legal/constitutional sphere, while economic
agents have the possibility to build up new informal institutions to improve overall
institutional quality, which should be rewarded by higher economic payo¤s. When the
government changes the formal institutions, part of the informal institutions loose their
value, because they were tailor-made for the old formal setup. Furthermore, people
need to learn about how the new institutions work and what organizational adaptions
are necessary, in order to make most of the new framework. This is modeled by a loss of
value of informal institutional quality proportional to the change in formal institutions
as the new vintageof formal institutions is introduced. The economic agents then
have to decide whether to adapt their informal institutions, which is a lengthy, costly
process.
In order to think about the problem within a clear structure, the following case will
be argued upon: The government has a once in a lifetime chance to alter the formal
institutional framework (or is forced to do so from the outside by some international
entity that conditions lending on large scale reforms) and can only decide on the en-
10In fact, Roland (2004) argues that trying to impose Western fast-moving institutions adequate
to the Wests own slow-moving institutions in countries with a very di¤erent history and culture is
not likely to meet the same economic success. Which immediately leads to the question of why the
slow-moving institutions should not move (slowly) in the right direction in order to meet this success.
11Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) write: [..] is a social norm. [..] the larger the population
share adhering to that norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual.
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forcement measures thereafter. The change leads to an instant (discontinuous) loss of
value of the informal institutions. This discrete change in the informal institutional
quality should not be seen as a contradiction to the notion that the underlying infor-
mal institutions themselves evolve gradually and continuously over time. The idea is
to assume some measure of the value of informal institutions in the context of a certain
vintage of formal institutions. We are not looking at measures of quantity - as in mod-
els of accumulation of human and physical capital - but at the quality of institutions.
The reason that this quality of the informal institutions drops discontinuously at the
instant the formal ones are changed, is not that they literally depreciate, but that they
have a lower value in a di¤erent formal institutional setting.
Acquiring information about the new system, changing traditional ways of doing
business (because established ones may have become illegal or too costly) and building
up new useful networks on the other hand is a slow and costly, continuous process.
Thus, while the informal institutional quality may and will drop discontinuously, an
increase can occur only gradually and continuously. Individuals will start their opti-
mization exercise in the instance after the discrete drop has taken place. They are
then faced with a given set of formal institutions and a given starting value for the
quality of the informal institutions that will depend on the size and extent of the formal
institutional reform. In their optimization they weight the costs and the benets of
adapting. The benets are increased output through higher institutional quality (and
thus production and consumption), while the e¤ort people have to invest to changing
the informal institutions constitute the costs.
For an individual, who for some reason is faced with a new institutional environ-
ment,12 it will be just a question of acquiring information about and skills suitable for
the new formal framework and adapting to the di¤erent norms and ways of doing busi-
ness. An entire society will face a greater problem, if the legal system and other formal
institutions change dramatically. Not only do its individual members have to learn
how the new institutions work, but they must develop new corresponding informal
institutions as well.
Following the ideas of the literature on the evolution of norms, informal institutions
are seen to entail a certain public good character (if all people are law-abiding, being
a thief myself will not alter the institutional quality), and exhibit externalities and
network e¤ects in their creation. The e¤ort devoted to build up informal institutions
12One could imagine an immigrant or a high skilled professional who is transferred to a di¤erent
country.
Chapter 3 - The Dynamics of Institutional Change 93
is not rewarded by some wage rate, but only by the higher future income generated
through higher institutional e¢ ciency. The e¤ectiveness of increasing informal insti-
tutional quality depends on the average, social level of informal institutions in the
economy, which captures the network and externality problems that are seen to be
central to informal institutions.
If this dependence of the e¤ectiveness of building up informal institutions on the
average level is strong enough, it leads to multiple equilibria and a critical threshold
for the size of institutional reform, beyond which the economy will degenerate to an
equilibrium with extremely low overall institutional quality. This explains why large
scale institutional reforms may fail, even if the agents could, in principle, adjust their
informal institutions to the new formal framework.
This chapter builds on the ideas of the New Institutional Economics (cf. North,
1990, 1994, Williamson, 1985 and Olson, 1996) and tries to formally model them.
It goes beyond the ideas discussed in that literature by showing how the changes of
formal institutions interact with the incentives of the agents to adapt their informal
ones. The explanation given for the failure of institutions transplantation in that
literature has simply been the inadequateness of the transplanted formal institutions
to locally prevailing informal ones. Why informal ones do not adjust does not seem to
be rigorously analyzed. The present chapter lls that gap.
Other formal models have considered the importance of endogenous property rights
institutions in general for economic performance. Grossman and Kim (1996) determine
the security of property rights as a result of individual defense spending. Zak (2002)
allows for a role of the state in protecting property. Eicher and Penalosa (2004) analyze
the endogenous strength of intellectual property rights in an endogenous growth model.
However, how these parameters of security of property depend on the action of the state
in providing the formal rules and the individuals in creating the corresponding norms
has not been the focus of these contributions.
Another strand of literature concentrates on the changes of formal institutions.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2000) analyze the transition to the institution of
democracy. Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) determine the type of constitutions (in
the narrow sense of voting rules required to block legislation) that result from agents
bargaining in the process of writing the constitution. But this literature does not
concern itself with the evolution of the informal institutional arrangements.
On the other hand, the contributions on the evolution of (social) norms have focused
exclusively on the informal institutions (taking the formal ones implicitly or explicitly
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as given and xed) and how they evolve in repeated games to solve coordination or
cooperation problems.13 Earlier contributions to this area model norms as imbedded in
interdependent preferences: Akerlof (1980) analyzes involuntary unemployment due to
norms of fair (rather than market clearing) wages and Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull
(1999) show how living o¤ welfare may or may not become an accepted norm.
The chapter presented here, formally models both formal and informal institutions
and their interaction in a dynamic setting and derives key insights concerning their
interdependencies. It demonstrates, what kind of frictions in the formation of informal
institutions must exist in order to lead to a situation where agents rationally choose
not to adjust their informal institutions. It also shows how the action of the state in
changing the formal institutions inuences people in their e¤orts to improve - or not
- their informal ones. The governments aim should be, much as in the introductory
quote of Aristotle, to optimally try to instill the formation of good habits, i.e. the
formation of informal institutions that are in line with the formal ones to increase
economic e¢ ciency.
Similar to the present chapter in the sense of searching for optimal institutional
reforms is the recent contribution by Mukand and Rodrik (2004): optimal policies/
institutions for a country do exist, but what will work best in the local context is
uncertain. Institutions transplantation yields better results the more similar the trans-
planting country is to a leader, who already found his optimal institutions and who is
taken as a role model. Informal institutions are, however, not explicitly modeled but
taken as a part of the xed local conditions.
Francios and Zabojnik (2005) model the slow change of social capital, or trustwor-
thiness in an evolutionary context - without explicitly considering formal institutions -
and arrive at a similar conclusion of caution against rapid reform and explain why trans-
planting modes of production from the West may not work for some late-developing
countries.
From a technical point of view the model of Azariadis and Drazen (1990) uses a sim-
ilar type of externality in the context of human capital accumulation and also describes
the possibility of a critical threshold level for the state variable. In an overlapping gen-
erations model, the e¤ectiveness of a training technologydepends on the aggregate
level of (the old generations) human capital. In this chapter we will consider a large
13See for example Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) for a repeated Prisoners Dilemma, Sethi and
Somanathan (1996), Young (1993) and Bendor and Swistak (2001) for evolutionary game theoretic
frameworks. Schotter and Sopher (2003) provide experimental evidence that word to mouth social
learning is a strong force in the creation of social conventions.
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number of identical, innitely lived individuals. The e¤ectiveness of building informal
institutions depends on the simultaneous e¤orts (and thus the average or social level
of informal institutional quality) of the other agents to create informal institutions.
The chapter is organized as follows: The model will be treated in reverse order in
section 3.2, starting with the agents problem in section 3.2.1, as their actions will be
decisive in generating the multiple equilibria that the government has to be aware of
in section 3.2.2. In section 3.3 implications of the model and empirical evidence are
discussed before o¤ering some concluding remarks in section 3.4.
3.2 The Model
The model framework presented below analyzes the case where the government has a
one time chance to alter the formal institutional framework. After this ´shock´ to the
institutional equilibrium, the agents decide whether and how to adjust their informal
institutions. As we do not rely on assumptions of asymmetric information but allow
for perfect information and foresight, the government is aware of how the agents will
react to its actions and takes that into account in its optimal planning. That is why
we treat the model in reverse order and start with the agents optimization problem
for any given level of formal institutions and starting value of informal institutional
quality in section 3.2.1. How the government inuences this starting value by altering
the formal institutional setting and how it should reform optimally given the agents
reactions is then laid out in section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 The Agents Decision to Accumulate Informal Institu-
tional Quality
The economy is populated by a large number of identical representative agents, n;
who supply labor inelastically to produce output according to a standard production
function:
Yt = Qtf [L]: (3.1)
Labor productivity is thus a function of the quality of the institutional framework,
Qt, in a country. Institutions explain a large part of di¤erences in so-called total
factor productivity across countries, as pointed out by Hall and Jones (1999). Further
evidence is Eicher, Penalosa and Teksoz (2005) who show that the productivity of both
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physical and human capital is a¤ected by institutional quality. Institutions are not a
factor of production as capital and labor, but determine, how e¤ectively given inputs
are used.14
The institutional quality itself at time t; Qt; is modeled in the spirit of the NIE
as a composite of the formal and informal institutional quality and the enforcement
of formal institutions Ft, It and Mt respectively:15 Qt = Q[Mt; Ft; It] with
Q
I
=
QI > 0;
2Q
I2
= QII  0; QIF and QFI > 0; QM > 0; QMM < 0 and a lower bound,
Q[; ; 0] = q:
It is thus stipulated that productivity is non-zero even in the absence of any adher-
ence to formal institutions, which may be thought of as the productivity of a hunter-
gatherer. It is argued here that enforcement and formal institutions are the realm of
a public entity. Agents thus take M and F as given and optimize over the level of
informal institutional quality.
Utility is derived from consuming output, while expanding e¤ort et to invest in
informal institutions. This e¤ort is modeled as the customary utility loss (see for
example Leamer, 1999) such that overall utility is: V = V [Qtf [L]; et], with V1 > 0 and
V2 < 0: It is assumed that utility is additively separable in the two arguments, V =
U [Qtf [L]]   C[et], where U [], is a standard utility function with U 0 > 0 and U 00 < 0.
The standard e¤ort cost from the e¢ ciency wage literature is used such that: C 0 > 0
and C 00 > 0: A similar e¤ort cost setup is for example used by Glaeser, Laibson and
Sacerdote (2002) in modelling the accumulation of social capital.
The law of motion for the informal institutions will be given by a standard accu-
mulation function with an externality:16
_It = a[bIt]et   It: (3.2)
This stipulates that informal institutions contain an inherently social aspect. Trust
or norms cannot be accumulated and established alone. So we focus on the social
(average) level of informal institutions bIt , which inuences the e¢ ciency of individual
14Scully (1988) was among the rst to explicitly formulate that e¢ ciency hypothesis of institutional
variables and test the predictions of that formulation empirically.
15North (1994) for example, writes: It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms and
enforcement charactersitics that shapes economic performance.Greif (1998): [..] a societys institu-
tions are a complex in which informal, implicit institutional features inter-relate with formal, explicit
features in creating a coherent whole.
16Azariadis and Drazen (1990) use a similar type of externality in the context of human capital
accumulation.
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accumulation of I, a[bIt]; with a0 > 0 and a00 < 0, a(0) = 0: However, the informal
institutions must also have a payo¤ for the individual, since otherwise no investment
in them would occur. Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) also model social capital
(which is similar to parts of our notion of informal institutions) as an individually
accumulable asset. Empirically this is conrmed for example by Burt (1992) who has
found among business rms in the United States that controlling for age, education
and experience, employees enjoying strategic positions in networks are more highly
compensated than those who are not.
The depreciation parameter  exemplies the notion, that without any care on part
of the agents, the informal institutions may also deteriorate.17
Agents ignore the externality in the accumulation of It, but in equilibrium (after
everybody chose their respective e¤orts) as all agents are alike, the consistency condi-
tion (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994 and Benhabib and Perli, 1994) thus implies that the
individual level It equals the average, social level bIt and vice versa. The problem of
the individual agent at time t = 0 can then be stated as:18
max
et
Z 1
0
exp( t)(U [Qt[F;M; It]f [L]]  C[et])dt (P1)
s:t: : _It = a[bI]et   It
It=0 = I0:
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is:
H = U [Qtf [L]]  C[et] + (a[bI]et   It);
where  denotes the shadow value of an increase in I: The rst-order conditions
are:19
17Norms are for example viewed as the solutions to collectice action problems in repeated games.
In order to maintain the Nash equilibrium over time, however, some sanctioning and monitoring of
othersbehavior has to take place.
18It would not be hard to introduce a partial externality in the institutional quality function as well
(e.g.: Qt = Q[M;F; I

t
bI1 t ] ). This would qualitatively not change the results of the model and in fact
only make the non-adjustment trap (which will be analyzed in what follows) more likely, as people
have less incentives to invest in informal institution creation. Similarily, if the depreciation would
depend on the aggregate instead of the individual level of I ; the steady state solution (3.4) would
only be altered by not having the  in the denominator.
19In the following, time subscripts are dropped.
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C 0[e] = a[bI] (F1)
  _ = U 0[Q; ]QI    (F2)
_I = a[bI]e  I: (F3)
The usual transversality condition also applies. The rst condition is a static optimal-
ity condition, which states, that the marginal costs of applying more e¤ort to informal
institution formation C 0[e], have to just equal the marginal benets a[bI]: This ex-
presses the e¤ectiveness of the e¤ort in informal institution building weighted with the
shadow value. The higher that shadow value is, the more e¤ort will be devoted to
informal institution building. The individual e¤ort will depend on the average level
of It, as will the individual success in improving informal institutions. The lower the
average level, the less e¤ort an individual will invest.
The second rst-order condition governs how the shadow value evolves over time:
using the condition (F1) it can be nicely interpreted in terms of the marginal benet
of having an additional unit of I, U 0[Q; ]QI ; which increases production and thus
consumption. Reformulating the second condition to: b = d
dt
= = (+)  U
0[Q;]QI
C0 a[
bI];
it states that  will increase (and hence lead agents to devote more e¤ort to informal
institutions formation) whenever the marginal benet of an additional unit of I in
production (discounted by the depreciation and discount factor) is higher than the
marginal cost of providing that additional unit, C
0
a[bI] ; and decrease otherwise. It will
remain constant whenever these two values are just equal, which will constitute a
steady state condition for the problem.
Replacing the control variable e in (F3) with the value that may be obtained from
(F1), rearranging (F2) and imposing the equilibrium condition that I = bI; one can
derive the steady state solutions to Problem (P1):
j _I=0 =
I
a[I]C 0 1(a[I])
(3.3)
j _=0 =
U 0[Q; ]QI
(+ )
: (3.4)
We are interested in examining the dynamic evolution of informal institutions in
the phase space for I and : Two cases can be distinguished, depending on the relative
Chapter 3 - The Dynamics of Institutional Change 99
magnitudes of the elasticities of the e¤ort cost and informal institution accumulation
function in equation (3.3). In equation (3.4),  is clearly decreasing in I and crosses
the vertical axis at
U 0[f [L];q]QI [q]
(+)
: The shape of (3.3) will be a decreasing function in I
and approach the axis asymptotically; if the elasticity of a[] with respect to I; a;I ; is
su¢ ciently large relative to that of C[] with respect to e; C;e, in short if a;I > 1  1C;e :
It will be increasing otherwise.
The economy will exhibit a unique stable equilibrium in the case that one curve is
upward- and the other one downward-sloping (i.e. the elasticity of the accumulation
function is su¢ ciently low). Any pertubation of I from the steady state will result on a
stable adjustment path leading to the (new) steady state. This case occurs for example
when the e¤ectiveness of creating informal institutions is independent of I (i.e. it is a
constant a).
The second case where both curves slope downward (C;e : a;I > 1   1C;e ) is
more complicated. While an explicit solution cannot be found without giving specic
functional forms,20 it is clear that 3 cases may occur: i) the two curves do not cross, the
curves intersect ii) one or iii) two times (the case depicted in the Figure 3.1).21 Only the
last case corresponds to an equilibrium where positive values of informal institutional
quality are sustainable, as will become clear below, when the dynamics are analyzed.
A phase diagram for this case in Figure 3.1 sheds light on the dynamics and stability
of the resulting steady states.
The dynamic behavior of the variables in the respective sectors of the phase diagram
is unambiguous (which is shown in the appendix). This leads one to conclude that the
higher steady state E will be (locally) stable, while the lower one E will be unstable.
There also exists a third, degenerate steady state E0; which is stable.22 Stability thus
establishes an informal institutional threshold I. If informal institutional quality does
not exceed I, the value of an additional unit of informal institutions is too small to
warrant personal investment to avoid depreciation and the economy degenerates to
a world without informal institutions. This is comparable to the size/development
threshold that has been indicated by Eicher and Penalosa (2005).
For any starting value I< I < I; the shadow value  takes on a value on the stable
adjustment path, dening a specic e¤ort level e, that will be higher the lower the
20This is done in section 3.5.1 in the appendix.
21Theoretically, it is of course also possible that the curves are just tangent. As in the rst two
cases this would induce only a stable equilibrium without any informal institutional quality.
22An example is provided and its stability conditions are checked in the appendix section
3.5.1.
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Figure 3.1
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initial value of I; Io; according to (F1). Then  and the e¤ort will gradually decrease
while I asymptotically grows towards the stable steady I.
Starting slightly below the critical threshold on the other hand, induces the economy
to degenerate towards the equilibriumE0. The pointE0 with zero informal institutional
quality and a positive (irrelevant as I = 0)  is clearly also a solution to the system
constituted of equations (3.4) and (3.3). As the overall institutional quality is now
at its lower bound, production does not cease but is very ine¢ cient, since there is no
trade, cooperation and division of labor possible. In this extreme scenario, agents could
literally be imagined as subsistence farmers producing on a low scale by themselves and
even spending resources ine¢ ciently on defense as nobody can be trusted and property
rights are not respected: a true Hobbesian anarchy. The formal institutions in place
may be very sophisticated but are worthless, if nobody behaves in accordance with
them. This was for example the case of Liberia until the civil war: the country shared
the same formal institutions with the United States (it had the same constitution) but
was submerged in total informal institutional anarchy.
Alternatively, with su¢ ciently large amounts of informal institutional quality, the
return to personal investment in it is su¢ ciently large and agents will incur the e¤ort
cost until its disutility equals the return from production/consumption through higher
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overall institutional quality.
Below we will continue to explore the implications of the positive valued equilibria,
particularly we will analyze the governments ability to alter the formal institutions
optimally, given how agents react to changes in the value of informal institutions.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 i) If the e¤ectiveness of building informal institutions is relatively sen-
sitive to the aggregate level of these informal institutions (a;I > 1   1C;e ) and an
equilibrium with positive informal institutional quality exists, there will always be a
critical threshold level I for this quality. Below this critical level the marginal benet
of increasing I will be so low, that it can never outweigh the marginal cost. Initial
conditions below this value lead the economy to degenerate to a low institutional quality
equilibrium.
ii) if two interior equilibria for informal institutional quality exist, the higher one
will always be stable and the lower one unstable
iii) If a;I < 1  1C;e no such critical threshold exists and the agents would build up
informal institutions up to the (unique) steady state level under any circumstances.
Proof. see Appendix.
Frictions in the creation of informal institutions take the form of threshold exter-
nalities in the initial level of informal institutional quality, comparable to those derived
by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) in the context of human capital accumulation. Any
shock that lowers this level below the critical threshold I will result in a deterioration
of the conditions in the economy. Regardless of the quality of the formal institutions,
the overall institutional quality Q will approach its lower limit q. A brief example is
provided in the appendix 3.5.1 to show that the threshold may exist for reasonable
functional specications and to derive some comparative statics. Next, the role the
government may play in inuencing the initial level of I and the agentsincentives by
setting the formal institutional framework is analyzed.
3.2.2 Optimal Scale of Formal Institutional Reform
Having deduced how the agents behave optimally, faced with any given level of formal
institutional quality F and initial informal quality I0; we now analyze the e¤ect of a
one time formal institutional reform at the time t0.
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Changing the formal institutions comes at a cost of a loss in the e¤ectiveness in
informal institutions that had been developed to accommodate the previous formal
institutional regime. Thus informal institutions are viewed to be linked to a certain
vintage of formal institutions. They are highly specic to the context of the formal
institutional framework. A number of authors argue along these lines and state that
institutions transplantation could fail or at least need not be a su¢ cient condition for
good economic performance, because the formal institutions transplanted would not
be in line or at odds with the prevailing informal institutions in a society.23 Empirical
evidence for this is provided by Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003).
We may then conclude that the measure of the quality of the informal institutions
is linked to the set of formal institutions in place. Transplanting the institutions of the
United States to a third world country does not yield a measure of overall institutional
e¢ ciency comparable to that of the United States for this country. The quality of
institutions has to be seen as an interaction of the formal and the informal institutions.
People need to learn about what the new laws and regulations are, how they function
and how to optimally do business within this new framework and develop norms
of behavior that will support and legitimize [the] new [formal] rules (North, 1990).
Djankov et al. (2003) argue that the location of their institutional possibility frontier
depends on the amount of civic capitalof a society: by increasing that capital (which
is similar to our notion of informal institutions) higher institutional quality may be
achieved for a given set of formal institutions.
How well the informal institutions t the new formal ones is what we label in-
formal institutional quality. This quality may change because the agents choose to
alter (slowly improve) the informal institutions or because the government changes the
formal institutional framework and thus drives a wedge between the two types of insti-
tutions. This wedge or the loss in informal institutional value is modeled as a function
of the di¤erence of the old an the new formal institutions.
To be able to analyze the problem at hand, it is assumed that these di¤erent
vintagesof formal institutions can be ordinally ranked according to their quality in
relation to economic performance such that each Fi 2 [0; 1]. For example, La Porta
et al. (1998) argue that di¤erent qualities of formal legal rules regarding investor and
creditor protection exists, but that their enforcement (what we would label overall
institutional quality, as they use empirical measures of overall institutional quality to
23Cf. North (1990, 1994), Mukand and Rodrik (2004), Rapaczynski (1996) Roland (2004) and
Landes (1990).
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proxy for that) di¤ers from country to country.
Without loss of generality the highest possible value of F is normalized to 1. As the
empirical data implies some maximum level for Q (even though there might be some
measurement problem due to the design of the surveys used to obtain the empirical
measures of institutional quality) and since we consider it as a scale factor in produc-
tion, it seems natural to assume some bound on F: Given that there are steady state
solutions to I, this will impose an upper bound on Q:
It is not meant to state that di¤erent formal institutional arrangements could not
have very similar values (the Anglo-Saxon case-law system and the German civic law
are both seen to be relatively e¤ective in enforcing property rights, for example), in
fact an extension of the model would implicate to try to nd the formal setup that
yields the highest quality score, while being most closely in line with the prevailing
informal institutions. Section 3.3 discusses this issue further.
As the government decides at t = 0 to improve the formal institutional quality by
F  Fj  Fi > 0, it is thus implied that the measure of informal institutional quality
also changes to Ij < Ii as it is specic to the context of the old formal institutions. It
will be lower because the informal institutions that tted vintage i will be less tting
for vintage j. The resulting new measure of informal institutional quality at time
t0, Ij;t0 ; will only be a fraction  < 1 of the original informal quality. This fraction
will be decreasing in the relative change of F , Fj
Fi
; because the more di¤erent the new
formal institutions are the less tting the informal ones would be as pointed out above.
Accordingly,  = [Fj; Fi] with (j = i) = 1 and Fj < 0; Fi > 0: The resulting new
informal institutional quality at time t0 (and thus the decisive initial value of I in the
agentsoptimization problem P1) would be:24
Ij;t0 = [Fj ; Fi]Ii;t0 : (3.5)
It is here, that the connection between the governments actions and the incentives
for the agents is made. On the one hand, a higher value of F should lead agents to
devote more e¤ort to improving informal institutions, because by doing so they can
increase future productivity. On the other hand, a greater change in F also leads
to a greater disruption of the institutional equilibrium, lowering the e¢ ciency of the
24It is assumed that only reforms that increase at least the formal institutional quality are under-
taken.
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informal institutional accumulation. If this e¤ect is strong enough, agents might not
nd it optimal to adjust the informal institutions to a new formal framework because
the critical threshold level in informal institutional quality is passed.
The new overall institutional quality on impact of the reform is dened as:
Qj;t0 = Qj[M;Fj; [Fj; Fi]Ii;t0 ]; (3.6)
where enforcement M is considered to be xed for now (implications of M will be
discussed below in section 3.2.2). This new value of overall institutional quality may
well be lower than the value prior to reform. As it is often argued that some reforms
require sacrices before things improve, we will give the following denition:
Denition 1 Reforms are painful, that is lower the overall institutional quality ini-
tially, such that dQ
dF
< dQ
dI
d[Fj ;Fi]
dFJ
; and thus have an output cost, i.e. Qj;t0  Qi < 0 .
Generally Q depends positively on F : However, changing F by F also lowers I -
which will have a negative inuence on Q - initially. The overall change in Q depends
on which e¤ect dominates. In what follows we will generally assume that the above
denition holds.
If reforms are painful today they should yield benets in the future, otherwise they
would not be worth the sacrice. To ensure that, the following is dened:
Denition 2 Reforms are potentially benecial, that is a new stable steady state of
Ij > 0 is higher than the old value Ii;t0.
Remark 1 Generally it is assumed that the system has been in a stable steady state
with some positive value of I prior to reform. A condition that ensures that the above
denition is met for any values of F and I ; regardless of whether there is a unique
steady state or multiple equilibria, is that  U 00
U 0 <
QIF
QIQF
: Since only the _ = 0-schedule
depends on F; this condition requires that this schedule is shifted up for any positive
value of I in Figure 1. In the case of multiple equilibria this also has the nice side-
e¤ect of guaranteeing that reforms are doubly benecial in the sense that they increase
the new stable steady state, while they decrease the unstable one and thus the critical
threshold.25
25Consider the general class of CES utilitiy functions with parameter of intertemporal substitutabil-
ity ; and a Cobb-Douglass class of institutional quality functions: Q = q + FI!: It can easily be
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As we assume that the reform increases the formal institutional quality this ensures
that a reform has the potential of increasing welfare by increasing overall institutional
e¢ ciency. In fact, if reforms are not painful, any reform that is potentially benecial
will unambiguously increase welfare (provided the new stable steady state is reached).
If reforms are painful, a trade-o¤ between output losses for some time versus future
output gains has to be considered. As we are concerned with the question of why
reforms that ex-ante were seen to be e¢ ciency enhancing fail, we will focus on the case
of potentially benecial reforms in the following.
Now the behavior of a benevolent government /central planer may be analyzed. It
would choose the size of reform F = Fj   Fi (which is equivalent to choosing the
new formal institutional set Fj, as Fi is given) so as to maximize the present value of
individual utilities:
max
Fj
V PVj =
Z 1
0
exp( t)(U [Q[Fj; Fi;It;j]f [L]]  C[et ])dt (3.7)
Under perfect information, the government is aware of how the agents will change I
and e, i.e. the times paths Ij;t and e

t;j for any given reform j are known to it. Then,
the integral V PVj has a xed value for any reform, j; that depends on the size of the
reform F(j), since It;j depends on Ij;t0 , according to the solutions to problem (P1). It
is important to stress that this xed value not only depends on Fj but also on Fi ; or
the size of reform F(j) = Fj Fi; as the old equilibrium value of informal institutions
Ii;t0 depended on Fi, and the disparagement parameter  depends positively on the
old formal institutions and negatively on the new ones.26
V PVj = G[F(j); ] (3.8)
By choosing a reform j; the government changes the formal institutional framework
and lowers the value of the informal institutional quality, both of which have an e¤ect
on the agents choices about how much e¤ort to invest into creating the informal
institutions. The higher F alone would incentivize the agents to invest more e¤ort
in institution-building because the return is increased. A potentially benecial reform
would generally rotate the _ = 0 schedule up and to the right in Figure 3.1. This
shown that a su¢ cient condition for this outward shift is   1: The exact condition for a positive
reaction is:   1 + qFI! . This also shows that for some high values of I and F , a negative reaction
would be possible if  is larger than 1.
26Recall that we assumed that the system has been in a stable institutional equilibriumprior to
reform.
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would result in a stable adjustment path to the new higher steady state equilibrium of
I implied by a benecial reform. On the other hand the change in F also a¤ects the
initial value of informal institutional quality, which is lowered by [Fj; Fi]. This means
that more adjustment would be necessary to reach the new steady state. Since reforms
are painful, an adjustment phase with output losses would need to be incurred. In case
that the critical threshold exists it also means a bigger reform increases the chances of
lowering the initial value of I by too much.
Formal Institutional Reform with a Unique, Stable Equilibrium
For clarity, rst consider the case with only one stable steady state described in the
third part of proposition 1: According to denitions 1 and 2 when reforms are painful
but potentially benecial in the long run Q can drop substantially during the initial
stages of reform for large changes in formal institutions, as happened, for example, in
the transition countries.27
Comparing the present value of di¤erent sizes of reforms F(j), if discounting is
high enough, the function G in equation (3.8) will be concave and attain a maximum
for some value F : For very large changes in formal institutions a reform that does
not lower the productivity quite as much might yield a higher present value. This is
illustrated graphically in Figure 3.2 where the present value for all possible di¤erent
sizes of reforms of formal institutions is depicted. The maximum possible change in
formal institutions is equal to one for a country that starts with no formal institutional
quality.
Two exemplary countries are considered in Figure 3.2: Country A is already en-
dowed with a relatively high quality of formal institutions such that the maximum
possible change FAmax is small and would optimally be implemented. Country B -
with very low initial formal institutional quality - would undergo a very painful initial
period if it tried to attain the maximum possible level of formal institutions by choosing
FBmax. Indeed it would be optimal to choose a smaller reform F which maximizes
the present value of individual utilities.
In general, for countries whose maximum scale of reform Fmax lies to the left
of that value it is optimal to choose the maximum. For countries with relatively low
27Obviously, if reforms were not painful and potentially benecial, then it is optimal to implement
a reform that yields the maximum level of formal institutional quality which is 1: Fmax = (1  Fi).
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Figure 3.2
Optimal Reform for Two Countries without Threshold
F∆F∆ 1
[ , ] PFG F Vρ∆ =
max
AF∆ max
BF∆
values of formal institutional quality the interior solution to the problem, F(j) < F 0max
is the optimum.
Proposition 2 For the case of a unique stable equilibrium in informal institutional
quality and under denitions 1 and 2 it need not necessarily be socially optimal to
transplant the perceived best practice formal institutions to a country, if discounting is
su¢ ciently high and its initial level of formal institutions su¢ ciently low.
Proof. see Appendix.
Even though the largest possible reform in the case of a unique steady state may
not be socially optimal this reform will still in the end reach a higher level of overall
institutional quality and higher output. The only reason that large scale reforms show
bad results in this case could be, that the reforms were large indeed, lowered overall
institutional quality substantially and that one has not yet passed the point in time at
which informal institutions have build up su¢ ciently in order to yield higher output.
Before turning to the more interesting case with the critical threshold in informal
institutions, one might consider a digression that pertains to the political economy of
institutional change and why it does not take place on the needed scale so often. With
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the results derived so far, in the case of painful reforms, this would be obvious for the
case of a politician who has a relatively short time horizon, e.g. until the next election.
If output is lower on election day, than it would have been in the absence of reform,
that would probably lower her chances of reelection, which in turn would lead her to
pursue only small scale reforms that yield immediate benets.28
Optimal Formal Institutional Reform in a World of Multiple Equilibria
Bearing in mind, that the initial value of It in the agents optimization problem de-
pends on the scale of the formal institutional reform F according to (3.5) matters are
more delicate in this case. Assuming that the country is in the stable, high steady state
Ii prior to reform (see Figure 3.1), the task for the government again is to maximize
(3.7), however, the function G(F ) now would have a discontinuous downward jump
at a critical level of gF = (fFj   Fi), that pushes the starting value of the informal
institutional quality I0;j in the agents optimization problem below the critical thresh-
old of Ij. The discounted present value of the reform would be negative for sizes of
reforms greater than that critical threshold, because a painful reform lowers the initial
institutional quality and thus consumption and production. That quality would then
decrease even further over time as we would move toward the degenerate equilibrium
until Q =q. The governments problem can now be viewed as being subject to the con-
straint that that threshold level is not passed by the introduction of the new vintage Fj
(if one wants to avoid a long run outcome with the lowest possible institutional quality
q)29:
Ij;t=0 = Ii[Fj; Fi] > Ij[Fj;:::] (3.9)
The interpretation of the constraint is simple: starting from a stable institutional
quality equilibrium Ii prior to reform, we know that a reform will lower the starting
value of It;j in the agents optimization problem (P1) according to (3.5). This is stated
in the LHS of the constraint. The RHS is just the critical threshold level of I in the
context of the new formal institutional vintage j: It is the new unstable steady state Ij,
which will depend on the new formal institutional framework Fj and the parameters
of the model. This constraint implicitly denes a critical value for Fj:
28More sophisticated political economy models like Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) explain the fact
that potentially benecial reforms are not implemented with ex-ante uncertainties about the distrib-
ution of losses and gains from the reform which leads them to be blocked ex-ante, even though they
would have benetted a majority of the population ex-post.
29Of course this constraint is implicitly contained in the maximization of V PVj but we want to
analyze it explicitly. The function G(F ) would also not be continous in Fj anymore.
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If we dene the function 	 = Ii[Fi; ::][Fj; Fi]  Ij[Fj;:::] = 	[Fj; Fi], that depends
on Fj; Fi and the parameters of the model, we can conclude that the constraint will
be binding over some range if 	 is decreasing in Fj and crosses the horizontal axis at
some point to the left of the maximum value of F , which is normalized to one (i.e.
turns negative for some feasible value of F ).
Proposition 3 For the case of multiple equilibria in informal institutional quality, if
9 eFj; such that 	( eFj; eFi) = 0 for some eFi 2 [0; eFj[ and d	dFj < 0 for Fj < eFj then the
economy will degenerate to the no informal institutional quality equilibrium if a reform
Fj  eFj is implemented in an economy that has an initial value of F below eFi:
Proof. see Appendix.
This result describes under which conditions the economy may become trapped in
a situation where agents do not nd it worthwhile to adapt their informal institutions.
It combines the idea on what incentives the agents have to devote e¤ort to changing
these norms (evident in the di¤erent steady state values of I and the di¤erent adjust-
ment dynamics toward them) with the e¤ect the governments actions have on these
incentives. By choosing the size of reform the state inuences the initial conditions via
the parameter of the loss of value of informal institutions . Given that the quality of
informal institutions are context-specic and that there is a friction in their creation,
changing the formal framework by too much leads to a too large disparagement of the
informal quality.
This in turn has adverse e¤ects on the agents incentives to adapt these informal
institutions: the lower their average level the less it pays to devote e¤ort to increase that
level. The agents, when optimizing, do not take into account the positive e¤ect that
e¤ort would have on the e¤ectiveness of building informal institutions (the externality
in the accumulation function) and therefore, a too large disruption of the institutional
equilibrium might lead to dismal outcomes, because the necessary adaption of the
informal institutions does not take place.
The government does not only set the formal institutions but also controls their
level of enforcement Mt , which has been assumed constant so far. Clearly, for the case
of a critical threshold,M is a shift parameter of equation (3.4) as Q depends positively
on it. IncreasingMt could thus help to overcome the critical threshold as it would shift
the _ = 0 schedule downwards. However, if enforcement has to be paid by a balanced
budget condition, enforcement spending could not be increased as reforms are painful
and output initially drops after a reform. At the same time, since enforcement is a
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substitute to informal institutions in the institutional production functionQ, incentives
for the agents to build up informal institutional quality are decreased. This is obvious
from a lower stable steady state that would result in Figure 3.1 if the _ = 0 curve is
shifted down. Thus, only if enforcement could be debt nanced might it be of help to
overcome the critical threshold in informal institutional quality implied by the critical
value of the size of formal reformgF (this issue is discussed further in section 3.5.1 in
the appendix).
If the function G(F ) attains a maximum value F
0
before reaching that critical
valuegF = (fFj  eFi); for which the constraint (3.9) is just violated, F 0 is the optimal
scale of reform (Or the maximum possible level, if that is smaller. The discussion in
this case would be analogous to that in section 3.2.2).
More interesting is of course the case where the externalities are very important and
pronounced or discounting is relatively low such that the function G(F ) is strictly
increasing up to the critical value of formal reformgF , such thatgF is reached before
the (unconstrained) function G(F ) attains its maximum F
0
: now the government
might be severely limited in the set of choices, optimal being the one that is just belowgF ; such that the starting value of I is just above the critical threshold.
This is shown in a stylized way in Figure 3.3 and summarized in a last proposition.
In the Figure, it is assumed that the critical value is the same for two di¤erent discount
rates, which of course need not be the case. The basic insights are of course correct.
Proposition 4 If a critical threshold for the size of reform exists, it is optimal to
choose a reform that is just innitely smaller than the threshold itself if the present
value of reforms is strictly increasing up to that threshold.
Proof. This follows immediatly from the previous propositions and can be seen in
Figure 3.3.
Given that the government has only a one time chance to increase institutional
quality, one should try to get as much as possible done without passing the critical
threshold. There are reasons for concern, however: A major reform that lowers It
below the critical threshold I will result in a deterioration of the conditions of the
economy. While the formal institutions may now be very close to the assumed best
practices for economic development, the outcome will be dismal, because the build-
up of informal institutions that support this framework does not take place. This
may explain why comprehensive Washington Consensus style reforms and institutions
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Figure 3.3
Optimal Reform for Two Countries with Threshold –
Low and High Discount Rate
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Low discounting
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transplantations did not yield the expected benets (in some cases) even though the
formal institutional frameworks put in place were generally seen as e¢ ciency enhancing,
while small scale reforms did produce good results, as in China for example.30 The large
reforms opened up a very big gap between the formal and informal institutions that
would not be closed due to the threshold externality in the formation of the latter,
i.e. the informal institutional quality was pushed below the critical level. Further
implications are discussed in the next section.
3.3 Implications and Evidence
Given the uncertainties about the formation of institutions and the length of the
process, deciding on the optimal value of reform that lies just above the critical thresh-
old is a delicate choice, where miscalculations may have devastating consequences: Big
30A point stressed by Mukand and Rodrik (2004) among others.
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failures in large scale institutional reform may be due to the fact that politicians truly
trying their best were just slightly o¤, or simply did not have the problems of exter-
nalities and the resulting multiple equilibria in mind. Of course a third reason might
be that they were not genuinely trying as is explained by political economy models.
As unfortunately in some cases the statement by Je¤rey Frankel (1995, p. 36)) that
Authoritarians frequently meet neither of the two criteria one wants from a philoso-
pher king: being well informed and being well intentioned is also true for politicians,
it is left to the reader to decide which of the three is the real cause of failure.
However, his model can explain why the knowledge problem for the politicians may
be particularly relevant: in order to calculate the exact critical value for the size of
reform we need to assume some specic functional forms as is done in an example in
the appendix. Even then, this does not lead to a direct policy recommendation such
as take the specic set of formal institutions of country X and transplant them to
country Y, as there is no one to one mapping of the values of the formal institutions
to actual institutional frameworks in reality. However, the model o¤ers an additional
argument (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995 argue for gradualism in the design of large
scale reforms for similar reasons: payo¤s of reforms are uncertain and reversal is costly)
for a cautious approach to large scale reforms, since there is the critical threshold and
passing it would be a catastrophe. On the other hand, as the chance for reform occurs
only ones one should try to get as much as possible done.
The model shows how frictions in the formation of informal institutions that need
to underlie and legitimize the formal institutional framework may lead to failures in
attempts at large scale institutions transplantations in some cases, while in others,
where the initial level of formal institutions is a little higher (which would mean that
they are more similar to the country one is copying from) they might succeed. Empir-
ical support for that result can be found in a recent paper by Berkowitz, Pistor and
Richard (2003) who analyze how transplanting the legal systems from 10 stipulated
origincountries to 39 transplantcountries a¤ects the observed overall quality of the
legal system, which they view as how e¤ective the legal system is in securing property
or investors rights, for example, and which they term legality.31 This legality vari-
able is a subset of the institutional quality variables used in the empirical literature on
institutions and economic development,32 which depends on both formal and informal
31Origin countries are basically old Europe and some other developed countries (the
United States, Australia) for more recent transplantations. The Transplant countries is the
rest of the world for which the relevantg data was available.
32Cf. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Hall and Jones (1999).
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institutions. Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) nd that countries whose popula-
tions were already familiar with the basic principles of the transplanted law (e.g.: their
old laws were more similar to the transplanted law) achieve better overall institutional
quality, which is in line with the implications of the model presented here. In fact,
given that the threshold exists for some countries with very low initial values of formal
institutional quality we found it advisable not to transplant the perceived best prac-
tice formal institutions but a set that would have a lower value of formal institutional
quality. This would of course imply to copy from a country that is more similar - in
our stylized model that means closer in the value of F - to the transplanting one.
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) also show that countries that adapt the law
to local conditions, in general display higher overall institutional quality. This could
be explained by our model if the loss of value of the informal institutions is modeled
more carefully. It should not only depend on the di¤erence of the formal institutions,
but also on the way the transplanting is done: if carried out in a adaptive way, then
the fraction of informal institutional quality that is retained is higher, and the chances
of passing the critical threshold are lower.
Similar arguments are put forward by Rodrik (2000) who provides empirical sup-
port for his argument that a well-designed strategy for institution building should take
into account local knowledge, and should not over-emphasize best practice institu-
tional blueprints used in developed countries at the expense of local participation and
experimentation. Similar ideas are behind the ideas of policy- or reform-ownership,
which have recently been discussed in the IMF (cf. Drazen, 2002, Bourgthan and
Mourmoras, 2002). Including local information in the process of selecting a formal
institutional setup can help to choose one that ts best to local conditions and thus
leads to the smallest loss of value in informal institutions.
One crucial problem in the above is, that one exactly needs to know the critical
threshold value in choosing the optimal reform. The stylized model shows, that it
may indeed exist. However, one has to assume specic functional forms in order to
calculate it, such that it would be next to impossible in the actual design of reform
packages to try to get as close to that value as possible and indeed very dangerous,
as a miscalculation may have dire consequences. If uncertainty about the size of the
threshold plays a role, a conservative approach should be in order: better a reform that
is a little to small, than one that leads to the degenerate equilibrium.
Due to the setup of the model that allows for only one institutional reform in order
to keep it tractable, one cannot apply it directly to the gradualism vs. shock therapy
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debate. If one would assume that reforms can be split up into subsets and that the ad-
justment to the steady state is not inuenced by the agentsknowing that accumulated
informal institutional capitalwill lose value again in the future,33 on could in principle
always reach the highest (or socially desired) level of overall institutional quality by a
suitable gradualist approach, that circumvents the dangers of the no-adjustment trap.
A similar reasoning against rapid reforms is contained in the model of Francios and
Zabojnik (2005) due to the slow evolution of social capital. One should be aware of
politico-economic constraints that might keep future reforms from being implemented,
however.34
As the formation of informal institutions was seen to display externalities and in the
process of nding and creating new norms and ways of doing business and coordination
might be a problem, there could also be a role for the state in trying to coordinate
behavior, for example through informational campaigns. In fact, even private enter-
prises are trying to inuence the public to adhere to certain formal rules. For example,
record companies are running campaigns reminding people that downloading music
les from the internet is illegal. If these campaigns have to be nanced by a balanced
budget, unfortunately the same caveat applies, that is discussed regarding enforcement
in section 3.2.2 and in the example in the appendix: Initially painful reforms in fact
lower the funds available for such measures. But nancing both enforcement and such
informational campaigns through foreign aid or credits could in principle be a way out
of a no-adjustment trap.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter it was shown, that large scale reforms may fail, because informal institu-
tions are context specic. This holds even if agents can adapt norms, codes of conduct
etc. - which were summarized under the notion of informal institutions - after formal
rules have been changed and that adaption leads to higher e¢ ciency in production.
The reason is not that agents are heterogenous or dislike changes, but that there is an
e¤ort cost involved in adapting the informal institutions to the new formal framework,
which makes adjustment sluggish and the payo¤ to that e¤ort depends on the average
level of informal institutions. This seems a plausible assumption as network e¤ects and
33See Jones and Newman (1995) for a model where this notion plays a role in the accumulation of
information capitalthat is conceptually similar to our informal institutional quality.
34Cf. Alesina and Drazen (1991). On the discussion of shock therapy vs gradualism compare also
Dewatripont and Roland (1995) and Rodrik (1993).
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coordination di¢ culties are generally seen to play an important role in the formation
of norms.
The striking feature of the economy are threshold externalities that make adjust-
ment an inviable alternative if the aggregate level of informal institutional quality is
lowered by too much through formal institutional changes. Small and medium size
reforms pose no severe problem and in fact countries that are already close to the
best practice institutional possibility frontier should face no di¢ culties in achieving
the maximum possible value of institutional quality. However, even if we make the
assumption that best practice formal institutions exist,35 it was shown, that very large
scaled reforms may lead to dismal results, even in the long run, if frictions in the
formation of informal institutions play an important role. This might explain several
transition and institutional transplantation failures. The crux of the matter is that the
optimal reform would actually in most cases be one that lowers the measure of informal
institutional quality just a notch above the critical threshold level. This is a delicate
choice in theory and even more so in practice as uncertainties about the exact value
of the critical size of the optimal reform may play an important role. Very ambitious
institutional reforms should be viewed with a cautious eye.
35As the proponents of institutions transplantation seem to suggest.
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3.5 Appendix Chapter 3
3.5.1 An Example
In order to derive some comparative static results, it is necessary to specify func-
tional forms to calculate the exact values of the steady states as they are the decisive
factors. Consider the following simple example: Utility is of the logarithmic form:
U = ln(Qtf [L] ). a = eaI  and C = ce2. The simplest institutional function in line with
our assumptions on Q is: Q = (q +MFI): The resulting non-degenerate steady state
solutions then are:
j _I=0 =
2cIea2I2t (3.10)
j _=0 =
MF
(+ )(q +MFI)
;
dening b = ea2
2c(+)
; and setting  = 0:75 we have to solve the following equation:
1
I0:5
= b MF
(q+MFI)
; which has two positive real solutions, if the lower bound of institutional
quality is su¢ ciently small (in particular: q < b
2MF
4
36):
I1;2 =
1=2b(bMF
p
b2M2F 2 4MFq) q
MF
: These are our non degenerate steady state values
for I :
I =
1=2b(bMF +
p
b2M2F 2   4MFq)  q
MF
(3.11)
I =
1=2b(bMF  
p
b2M2F 2   4MFq)  q
MF
:
This example displays the nice property that the stable steady state is increasing in
F; i.e. reforms are doubly benecial in the sense of Remark 1: the long run institutional
quality will certainly be increased, while the unstable one is decreasing in F ; as dI
dF
F
I
=
bMF 
p
MF (b2MF 4q)p
MF (b2MF 4q)
> 0 and dI
dF
F
I
=
 bMF 
p
MF (b2MF 4q)p
MF (b2MF 4q)
< 0:
This should be good news as the critical threshold value is lowered, while the
potential for increasing Q substantially is there. In the second last section of this
appendix it is shown, that if  depends strongly on the di¤erence between the old and
the new formal institutions the constraint Ii[Fj; Fi] > Ij[Fj;:::] may indeed be binding
36This also shows that some minimum level of formal institutions is required to achieve positive
values of I:
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for some values of Fi and Fj, that lie su¢ ciently far apart (implementing large scale
reforms). This would mean that the no adjustment trap can occur in this example if
the initial value of F is low enough.
With these explicit solutions, we can derive comparative statics on the parameters
of the model (setting M = 1 at the moment):
d(Ii)
db
b
Ii
= 2 bFip
b2F 2i  4Fiq
> 0
d(Ij)
db
b
Ij
=  2 bFjp
b2F 2J 4FJq
< 0 :
This implies that an increase in b unambiguously lowers the chances of passing the
threshold. Or equivalently that the critical size of reform is higher the higher is b, as
the distance between the two steady states that has to be passed in order to get below
the critical value is greater, which increases the scope for reform. As b is dened asea2
2c(+)
; this means in economic terms that higher discounting and depreciation of the
informal institutions increase the critical threshold. These results are intuitive as these
factors lower the potential benets of having an additional unit of I in the production
as it would depreciate faster and its present discounted value would be lower. Equally
intuitive is that a higher cost parameter c increases the threshold as well, while a higher
e¢ ciency of creating informal institutions ea lowers it.
It can also easily be shown that the respective derivatives w.r.t. q have opposite
signs to the ones above, which indicate that a higher fall backposition makes falling
in the trap more likely and reduces the scope of reform.
We may also analyze the role of enforcement in this example: It is straightforward to
show that the e¤ect of enforcement on the unstable steady state is negative: dI
dM
M
I
=
 bMF 
p
MF (b2MF 4q)p
MF (b2MF 4q)
< 0: This means that devoting more resources to enforcement
of the new formal rules after a reform could help to escape a no-adjustment trap.
Unfortunately this is not true if one assumes that these enforcement measures have
to be paid for out of current production via a balanced budget condition. Because
reforms are painful they would lower overall institutional quality and thus production
initially and thus leave less resources available for enforcement. In this simple example
this can be shown by imposing a balanced budget condition on M : Mt =  tQtf [L];
where  is the tax rate on output. Then it follows that: Mt =
 tqf [L]
1  tFI : For painful
reforms for which the negative e¤ect on I is initially stronger than the positive e¤ect
on F (according to the condition in denition 1) the available funding for enforcement
will be lower for any level of  :37 One possible solution would of course be increased
37Compare Zak (2002, p. 63) who shows that even by optimally choosing time path of tax rates
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enforcement funded by foreign aid or credits.
3.5.2 Stability in Figure 1 and the Example in Section 3.5.1
Replacing the control e in (F3) with the value that may be obtained from (F1), re-
arranging (F2) and imposing the equilibrium condition that I = bI; we can write the
following system of canonical equations for Problem (P1):
_I = a(I)C 0 1[a(I)]  I
_ = (+ )  U 0(Q; )QI
(3.12)
These canonical equations unambiguously determine the laws of motion for the prob-
lem:
d( _I)
d
= a(C 0 1)0 > 0 (3.13)
as C 00 > 0 (recall that C is monotonically increasing and convex in e) and
d( _)
dI
=  (U 00()QI) + U 0()QII > 0 (3.14)
as U 00 and QII < 0: This implies the laws of motions as indicated in Figure 3.1.
In the case the curves cross only once, the stable steady state E, would not exist.
In the case of tangency, the equilibrium in the point of tangency would also be unstable
according to these laws of motion. Finally in case of an upward sloping _I schedule
the unique equilibrium is clearly stable.
The corresponding Jacobian of (3.12) for the example above is:
J =
 
  + 0:75ea2I0:5 ea2I1:5
2c
1
(q+IF )2
+ 
!
(3.15)
The determinant is det(J) = ( + )(0:75ea2I0:5   )   ( F
q+IF
)ea2I2
2c
: It is clear that
det(JE0) < 0 ; i.e. the degenerate steady state is stable. Plugging in the steady state
values for I from (3.11) and using the fact that b = ea2
2c(+)
; it can also be shown that
det(JE) < 0 and det(JE) > 0 which conrms the results from the phase diagram that
the lower steady state is unstable, while the higher one is stable.
and enforcement measures, under a balanced budget condition it is also not possible to escape the
poverty trap in his model.
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3.5.3 Negative 	 for the Example of Section 3.5.1
It is left to verify for the example from above that the new value of I; Ii;o may be
lowered su¢ ciently to result in the no adjustment trap: for this we assume that the
fraction  that denes the new informal institutional quality is a simple function of
the relative change in F :  = (Fj
Fi
) 3 , that is reforms are painful and set M = 1. For
the reform j, the critical value 	 is then dened as: 	 =
1=2b(bFi+
p
b2F 2i  4Fiq) q
Fi
(
Fj
Fi
) 3 
1=2b(bFj 
p
b2F 2j  4Fjq) q
Fj
;where the rst factor is the new informal institutional quality
and the second is the critical threshold level, the new unstable steady state. In order
to show that this value can indeed become negative that is that we run the danger of
lowering the initial value of I too much, we reformulate 	 :
	 =
n
F 3i b
2   2F 2i q + F 2i b
p
F 2i b
2   4Fiq
o
 
n
F 3j b
2   2F 2j q   F 2j b
q
F 2j b
2   4Fjq
o
F 3j
:
The rst part in accolades in the numerator depends only on the old vintage i of formal
Institutions, while the second one depends only on the new vintage Fj: Both terms
are increasing in the respective vintages Fi; Fj, which can be shown by calculating the
elasticities of these terms w.r.t. Fi; Fj respectively and will be the case if q is su¢ ciently
small. For the rst term we get:
d
n
F 3i b
2   2F 2i q + F 2i b
p
F 2i b
2   4Fiq
o
dFi
Fin
F 3i b
2   2F 2i q + F 2i b
p
F 2i b
2   4Fiq
o =
bFi + 2
p
F 2i b
2   4Fiqp
F 2i b
2   4Fiq
> 0
and for the second term
d
n
F 3j b
2   2F 2j q   F 2j b
q
F 2j b
2   4Fjq
o
dFj
Fjn
F 3j b
2   2F 2j q   F 2j b
q
F 2j b
2   4Fjq
o =
=
 bFj + 2
q
F 2j b
2   4Fjqq
F 2j b
2   4Fjq
(
> 0 if b2Fj >
16
3
q
< 0 if 4q < b2Fj <
16
3
q
:
Note that the condition on q is relatively mild as b2F > 4q is already required for
existence of real solutions to our problem and it will certainly be fullled for high F 0s:
Chapter 3 - Appendix 120
Hence there will be some value of the scale of reform (Fj   Fi)for which 	 turns
negative.
3.5.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition1
Proof. [.] For the case of a;I > 1  1C;e
38 in general the existence of such a positive
stable steady state would require that the system (3.3), (3.4) has a positive real solution
and that from some point eI onwards, d
h
j _I=0=
I
a(I)C0 1[a(I)]
i
dI
 <
d

j _=0=
U0()QI
(+)

dI
 ; that is
the _I = 0 schedule is atter then the _ = 0 schedule. If that was not the case,
the equilibrium could not be stable, asd(
_I)
d
= a(C 0 1)0 > 0 since C 00 > 0 and d(
_)
dI
=
 U 00()QI > 0 since U 00 < 0. However the lim
I!0
d
h
j _I=0=
I
a(I)C0 1[a(I)]
i
dI
 = 1 as a(0) = 0
and a0 > 0, while lim
I!0
d

j _=0=
U0()QI
(+)

dI
 = U 00(q)QI(q) + U 0(q)QII(q) <1; which shows
that for some point eeI < eI the _I = 0 schedule will be steeper than the _ = 0 line,
such that the two lines
will cross again, creating the unstable steady state I: (the laws of motion d(
_I)
d
=
a(C 0 1)0 > 0 and d(
_)
dI
=  U 00()QI > 0 imply that it is impossible that this steady
state could be stable).
Proof of Proposition2
Proof. Given that reforms are painful an initial output loss Yt=0 is incurred for any
reform. This loss will proportional to the size of reform F; as overall Productivity
Q, depends negatively on it according to equation (3.6). Along the stable adjustment
path agents accumulate informal institutional quality and in each instant the output
loss Yt is reduced. At some point et; the initial level of Q ; will be reached again
and passed along the adjustment pass. From that point on the economy is reaping
in the benets Bt of the reform. The total present value of the output loss is then:R et
o
Yt(exp( t)): The total output gains are similarily
R1et Bt(exp( t)):
38For the case of a;I < 1  1C;e ; it is obvious that one stable steady state exists, as then
we would look at a negativly sloped and a positivly sloped line, which of course will cross
once and only once.
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Consider 2 reforms bj and bbj, with Fbj > Fbbj: Consequently the initial output
loss for bj will be higher as will be the potential benets, since they are more heavily
discounted, however, 9 bj and bbj such that R1et dBt(exp( t))   R eto dYt(exp( t)) >R1et dBt(exp( t))   R eto dYt(exp( t)) for a su¢ ciently large :Which proofs that a
smaller reform is preferable with discounting and very large possible changes in F:
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Technically, a potentially benecial reform lowers the initial value of I via
; but also decreases the unstable steady state (Compare Remark 1) which makes a
no-adjustment trap less likely. The condition d	
dFj
< 0 in the proposition requires that
the reform may lower the starting value in the optimization problem by more than
the threshold is lifted. If
d(Ij(Fj;:::))
dFj
< 0, which corresponds to the case of potentially
benecial reforms as dened above, it is needed that: d([Fj ;Fi]Ii)
dFj
>
d(Ij(Fj;:::))
dFj
: The rst
condition requires the critical value to lie within the feasible domain of F : [0; 1]: In
order to cross the critical threshold it is not only necessary that 	 decreases in F , but
it has to decrease by an amount that is bigger than the distance between the old stable
steady state and the new unstable steady state, Ii   Ij: Given a very low value of Fi
this would be more likely, because the size of the reform could be bigger and thus lead
to a very low  (since  depends positively on the old level of institutional quality
and negatively on the new one, a bigger sized reform F = Fj   Fi, would certainly
lead to a lower value of ) and thus a very low initial value of I: A lower initial value
of the formal institutional quality also goes hand in hand with a lower value of the
stable informal institutional equilibrium level prior to reform, which would heighten
the chances of passing the threshold for a reform that is large enough.
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